Overthrowing the Tyranny of Alphabetical Ordering in Documentation Systems

Software developers are often unsure of the exact name of the API method they need to use to invoke the desired behavior. Most state-of-the-art documentation browsers present API artefacts in alphabetical order. Albeit easy to implement, alphabetical order does not help much: if the developer knew the name of the required method, he could have just searched for it in the first place. In a context where multiple projects use the same API, and their source code is available, we can improve the API presentation by organizing the elements in the order in which they are more likely to be used by the developer. Usage frequency data for methods is gathered by analyzing other projects from the same ecosystem and this data is used then to improve tools. We present a preliminary study on the potential of this approach to improve the API presentation by reducing the time it takes to find the method that implements a given feature. We also briefly present our experience with two proof-of-concept tools implemented for Smalltalk and Java.

Extending private-collective innovation: a case study

The private-collective innovation model proposes incentives for individuals and firms to privately invest resources to create public goods innovations. Such innovations are characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusivity in consumption. Examples include open source software, user-generated media products, drug formulas, and sport equipment designs. There is still limited empirical research on private-collective innovation. We present a case study to (1) provide empirical evidence of a case of private-collective innovation, showing specific benefits, and (2) to extend the private-collective innovation model by analyzing the hidden costs for the company involved. We examine the development of the Nokia Internet Tablet, which builds on both proprietary and open source software development, and that involves both Nokia developers and volunteers who are not employed by the company. Seven benefits for Nokia are identified, as are five hidden costs: difficulty to differentiate, guarding business secrets, reducing community entry barriers, giving up control, and organizational inertia. We examine the actions taken by the management to mitigate these costs throughout the development period.

How Firms Make Friends: Communities in Private-Collective Innovation

When firms contribute to open source projects, they in fact invest into public goods which may be used by everyone, even by their competitors. This seemingly paradoxical behavior can be explained by the model of private-collective innovation where private investors participate in collective action. Previous literature has shown that companies benefit through the production process providing them with unique incentives such as learning and reputation effects. By contributing to open source projects firms are able to build a network of external individuals and organizations participating in the creation and development of the software. As will be shown in this doctoral dissertation firm-sponsored communities involve the formation of interorganizational relationships which eventually may lead to a source of sustained competitive advantage. However, managing a largely independent open source community is a challenging balancing act between exertion of control to appropriate value creation, and openness in order to gain and preserve credibility and motivate external contributions. Therefore, this dissertation consisting of an introductory chapter and three separate research papers analyzes characteristics of firm-driven open source communities, finds reasons why and mechanisms by which companies facilitate the creation of such networks, and shows how firms can benefit most from their communities.

Unfair Advantage: An Intriguing Example of Legal Transformation in the Swiss Private Law

This paper demonstrates a mixed approach to the theme of the instrumentality of law by both analysing the goal of a legal transformation and the techniques adapted to achieve it. The correct recognition of a certain practical necessity has lead the Swiss Federal Tribunal to an intriguing judgement “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” of 1997. The legal remedies provided for cases of unfair advantage have been then creatively modified praeter legem. The adaptation was strongly influenced by foreign legal patterns. The Swiss Code of Obligations of 1911 provides a norm in art. 21 on unfair advantage (unconscionable contract), prescribing that if one party takes unjustified advantage over the weaknesses of another in order to receive an excessive benefit, such a contract is avoidable. Its wording has been shaped over a hundred years ago and still remains intact. However, over the course of the 20th century the necessity for a more efficient protection has arisen. The legal doctrine and jurisprudence were constantly pointing out the incompleteness of the remedies provided by art. 21 of the Code of Obligations. In the “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” (BGE 123 III 292) the Swiss Federal Tribunal finally introduced the possibility to modify the contract. Its decision has been described as “a sign of the zeitgeist, spirit of the time”. It was the Swiss legal doctrine that has imposed the new measure under the influence of the German “quantitative Teilnichtigkeit” (quantitative partial nullity). The historical heritage of the Roman laesio enormis has also played its role.

Torn between state and market: Private policy implementation and conflicting institutional logics

Policy implementation by private actors constitutes a “missing link” for understanding the implications of private governance. This paper proposes and assesses an institutional logics framework that combines a top-down, policy design approach with a bottom-up, implementation perspective on discretion. We argue that the conflicting institutional logics of the state and the market, in combination with differing degrees of goal ambiguity, accountability and hybridity play a crucial role for output performance. These arguments are analyzed based on a secondary analysis of seven case studies of private and hybrid policy implementation in diverging contexts. We find that aligning private output performance with public interests is at least partly a question of policy design congruence: private implementing actors tend to perform deficiently when the conflicting logics of the state and the market combine with weak accountability mechanisms.