John Garstang at Sirkeli Höyük, Cilician Plain, in 1936-1937: Old Photographs and New Evidence from the Renewed Excavations

During the winter of 1936-1937, British archaeologist John Garstang (1876-1956) excavated several trenches at the site of Sirkeli Höyük, located in the Plain of Cilicia (18 km west of modern-day Ceyhan). After a single campaign, however, he left the site and his interest shifted to site of Yumuktepe/Mersin, where he then excavated for a number of years. Apart from two very brief preliminary reports of his excavations at Sirkeli Höyük, which were published in the journal 'Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of Liverpool', not much is known about the trenches and their associated finds. Unpublished photographs kept in the Special Archives of University College London shed new light on the location and orientation of some of Garstang’s trenches at the site. Furthermore, in the 2012 campaign of the renewed Turkish-Swiss excavations at the site, a trench was found in the western part of the northern terrace that most probably was excavated by Garstang, but was not mentioned by him in his reports. This hitherto unknown trench may be related to his discovery of a lion-shaped column base made of basalt that is now kept in the collections of the Archaeological Museum of Adana.

Algebra of Classical Theoretical Term Reductions in the Sciences

An elementary algebra identifies conceptual and corresponding applicational limitations in John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim’s (K-O) 1956 model of theoretical reduction in the sciences. The K-O model was once widely accepted, at least in spirit, but seems afterward to have been discredited, or in any event superceeded. Today, the K-O reduction model is seldom mentioned, except to clarify when a reduction in the Kemeny-Oppenheim sense is not intended. The present essay takes a fresh look at the basic mathematics of K-O comparative vocabulary theoretical term reductions, from historical and philosophical standpoints, as a contribution to the history of the philosophy of science. The K-O theoretical reduction model qualifies a theory replacement as a successful reduction when preconditions of explanatory adequacy and comparable systematicization are met, and there occur fewer numbers of theoretical terms identified as replicable syntax types in the most economical statement of a theory’s putative propositional truths, as compared with the theoretical term count for the theory it replaces. The challenge to the historical model developed here, to help explain its scope and limitations, involves the potential for equivocal theoretical meanings of multiple theoretical term tokens of the same syntactical type.

Religion as Social Reality. A Take on the Emic–Etic Debate in Light of John Searle’s Philosophy of Society

In this article I argue that the shift from a private to a public–social understanding of religion raises new ontological and epistemological questions for the scientific study of religion\s. These questions are deeply related to three central features of the emic– etic debate, namely the problems of intentionality, objectivity, and comparison. Focusing on these interrelated issues, I discuss the potential of John Searle’s philoso- phy of society for the scientific study of religion\s. Considering the role of intentional- ity at the social level, I present Searle’s concept of “social ontology” and discuss its epistemological implications. To clarify Searle’s position regarding the objectivity of the social sciences, I propose a heuristic model contrasting different stances within the scientific study of religion\s. Finally, I explore some problematic aspects of Searle’s views for a comparative study of religion\s, and sketch a solution within his frame- work. I shall argue that a distinction between the epistemological and ontological dimensions of religious affairs would help clarify the issues at stake in the past and future of the emic–etic debate.