The elusive S2 state, the S1/S2 splitting, and the excimer states of the benzene dimer

We observe the weak S 0 → S 2 transitions of the T-shaped benzene dimers (Bz)2 and (Bz-d 6)2 about 250 cm−1 and 220 cm−1 above their respective S 0 → S 1 electronic origins using two-color resonant two-photon ionization spectroscopy. Spin-component scaled (SCS) second-order approximate coupled-cluster (CC2) calculations predict that for the tipped T-shaped geometry, the S 0 → S 2 electronic oscillator strength f el (S 2) is ∼10 times smaller than f el (S 1) and the S 2 state lies ∼240 cm−1 above S 1, in excellent agreement with experiment. The S 0 → S 1 (ππ ∗) transition is mainly localized on the “stem” benzene, with a minor stem → cap charge-transfer contribution; the S 0 → S 2 transition is mainly localized on the “cap” benzene. The orbitals, electronic oscillator strengths f el (S 1) and f el (S 2), and transition frequencies depend strongly on the tipping angle ω between the two Bz moieties. The SCS-CC2 calculated S 1 and S 2 excitation energies at different T-shaped, stacked-parallel and parallel-displaced stationary points of the (Bz)2 ground-state surface allow to construct approximate S 1 and S 2 potential energy surfaces and reveal their relation to the “excimer” states at the stacked-parallel geometry. The f el (S 1) and f el (S 2) transition dipole moments at the C 2v -symmetric T-shape, parallel-displaced and stacked-parallel geometries are either zero or ∼10 times smaller than at the tipped T-shaped geometry. This unusual property of the S 0 → S 1 and S 0 → S 2 transition-dipole moment surfaces of (Bz)2 restricts its observation by electronic spectroscopy to the tipped and tilted T-shaped geometries; the other ground-state geometries are impossible or extremely difficult to observe. The S 0 → S 1/S 2 spectra of (Bz)2 are compared to those of imidazole ⋅ (Bz)2, which has a rigid triangular structure with a tilted (Bz)2 subunit. The S 0 → S 1/ S 2 transitions of imidazole-(benzene)2 lie at similar energies as those of (Bz)2, confirming our assignment of the (Bz)2 S 0 → S 2 transition.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Balancing Control and Coaching in CSO Governance : A Paradox Perspective on Board Behavior

How can governance of civil society organizations be conceptualized more adequately by accounting for the dual and simultaneous requirements of controlling and coaching in board behavior? Empirically, we seem to agree that effective governance of a civil society organization is crucial to its sustained viability. Conceptually, however, we observe a lack of consensus on how to best conceptualize CSO governance. By critically juxtaposing two major theoretical lenses to conceptualize governance, namely agency and stewardship theory, we identify a number of challenges conceptualizing board-management relations that deserve our attention. While agency theory privileges controlling behavior, stewardship theory emphasizes the coaching behavior of boards. The purpose of this paper is to offer a concept of governance that is informed by a paradox perspective advancing a subtler, more adequate conceptualization of board governance that accounts for the often conflicting demands on CSO governance. Drawing on a longitudinal interpretive case study, we exemplify our propositions empirically. The paper concludes with discussing the implications of our argument for CSO governance research and practice.

[Smoking and digestive tract: a complex relationship. Part 2: Intestinal microblota and cigarette smoking]

The digestive tract is colonized from birth by a bacterial population called the microbiota which influences the development of the immune system. Modifications in its composition are associated with problems such as obesity or inflammatory bowel diseases. Antibiotics are known to influence the intestinal microbiota but other environmental factors such as cigarette smoking also seem to have an impact on its composition. This influence might partly explain weight gain which is observed after smoking cessation. Indeed there is a modification of the gut microbiota which becomes similar to that of obese people with a microbiotical profile which is more efficient to extract calories from ingested food. These new findings open new fields of diagnostic and therapeutic approaches through the regulation of the microbiota.

Cosmogenic activation of xenon and copper

Rare event search experiments using liquid xenon as target and detection medium require ultra-low background levels to fully exploit their physics potential. Cosmic ray induced activation of the detector components and, even more importantly, of the xenon itself during production, transportation and storage at the Earth's surface, might result in the production of radioactive isotopes with long half-lives, with a possible impact on the expected background. We present the first dedicated study on the cosmogenic activation of xenon after 345 days of exposure to cosmic rays at the Jungfraujoch research station at 3470m above sea level, complemented by a study of copper which has been activated simultaneously. We have directly observed the production of 7Be, 101Rh, 125Sb, 126I and 127Xe in xenon, out of which only 125Sb could potentially lead to background for a multi-ton scale dark matter search. The production rates for five out of eight studied radioactive isotopes in copper are in agreement with the only existing dedicated activation measurement, while we observe lower rates for the remaining ones. The specific saturation activities for both samples are also compared to predictions obtained with commonly used software packages, where we observe some underpredictions, especially for xenon activation.

Spatio-temporal co-ordination of RhoA, Rac1 and Cdc42 activation during prototypical edge protrusion and retraction dynamics

The three canonical Rho GTPases RhoA, Rac1 and Cdc42 co-ordinate cytoskeletal dynamics. Recent studies indicate that all three Rho GTPases are activated at the leading edge of motile fibroblasts, where their activity fluctuates at subminute time and micrometer length scales. Here, we use a microfluidic chip to acutely manipulate fibroblast edge dynamics by applying pulses of platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF) or the Rho kinase inhibitor Y-27632 (which lowers contractility). This induces acute and robust membrane protrusion and retraction events, that exhibit stereotyped cytoskeletal dynamics, allowing us to fairly compare specific morphodynamic states across experiments. Using a novel Cdc42, as well as previously described, second generation RhoA and Rac1 biosensors, we observe distinct spatio-temporal signaling programs that involve all three Rho GTPases, during protrusion/retraction edge dynamics. Our results suggest that Rac1, Cdc42 and RhoA regulate different cytoskeletal and adhesion processes to fine tune the highly plastic edge protrusion/retraction dynamics that power cell motility.