Social Inequality in Political Participation: The Dark Sides of Individualisation

Has the participatory gap between social groups widened over the past decades? And if so, how can it be explained? Based on a re-analysis of 94 electoral surveys in eight Western European countries between 1956 and 2009, this article shows that the difference in national election turnout between the half of the population with the lowest level of education and the half with the highest has increased. It shows that individualisation – the decline of social integration and social control – is a major cause of this trend. In their electoral choices, citizens with fewer resources – in terms of education – rely more heavily on cues and social control of the social groups to which they belong. Once the ties to these groups loosen, these cues and mobilising norms are no longer as strong as they once were, resulting in an increasing abstention of the lower classes on Election Day. In contrast, citizens with abundant resources rely much less on cues and social control, and the process of individualisation impacts on their participatory behaviour to a much lesser extent. The article demonstrates this effect based on a re-analysis of five cumulative waves of the European Social Survey.

Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Policy Coalitions Shape Welfare-policy Choices in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation

In general, fiscal adjustments are associated with significant reductions in social spending. Hence, the welfare state is not spared from austerity. Because the welfare state is still central to party competition, this is electorally risky. The paper addresses the following questions: Do left parties differ from their centrist and rightist competitors in the design of austerity measures? And does government type has an impact on the extent to which austerity policies rely on social spending cuts? By comparing 17 OECD countries between 1982 and 2009 we show that if governments embark on a path to austerity, their ideology does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of welfare state retrenchment. However, if major opposition parties and interest groups rally against social spending cuts, a broad pro-reform coalition is a crucial precondition for large fiscal consolidation programs to rely on substantial cuts to social security.

Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems: Conceptual Lessons from Subnational Switzerland

This article reconceptualizes shared rule and uses novel data to measure it, thus addressing two shortcomings of federal literature. First, while most studies focus on self-rule, one question that is largely neglected is how lower-level governments can influence politics at a higher level in the absence of “second” chambers. The answer is through shared rule. A second shortcoming is that even when addressing this question, scholars concentrate on constitutional-administrative aspects of vertical intergovernmentalism, neglecting more informal, “political” dynamics. Comparing the twenty-six Swiss cantons allows drawing two lessons for federal studies: That shared rule is multifaceted and complex, and that to study informal territorial actors as well as direct political processes is indispensable to understand how power is actually distributed in federal political systems.

Conflicting Cantonalisms: Disputed Sub-national Territorial Identities in Switzerland

The importance of constituent units for democratic federations, in general, and of the Swiss cantons for the Swiss Confederation, in particular, is beyond doubt. What is less clear, however, is how to solve conflicting views on the number and type of such units. The Swiss case offers two highly topical examples in this regard: the merger of the two ‘half-cantons’ Basel-City and Basel-Country, on the one hand, and the creation of a new canton encompassing canton Jura and the French-speaking area of canton Berne, on the other. In comparing different sub-national political identities at play in these two cases, the strength of ‘cantonalism’—understood as attachment to and identification with a canton—in Switzerland in the 21st century is shown. Second, different manifestations of cantonalism are compared: centre-periphery in Basel, linguistic vs. religious in Jura. Finally, the similar direct-democratic pathways chosen to solve both conflicting understandings of cantonalism testify to the Swiss commitment to peaceful, negotiated and popularly sanctioned settlements.

Federalism and the Concept of Political Territoriality: Towards an Analytical Framework for Comparative Territorial Politics

The core issues comparative territorial politics addresses are how and why territory is used to delimit, maintain, or create political power; and with what kind of consequences for efficiency (output) and legitimacy (input). The aim of this article is to integrate various research strands into the comparative study of territorial politics, with federal studies at its core. As an example of a conceptual payoff, ‘political territoriality’ refers the observer to three dimensions of the strategic use of areal boundaries for political power. By focusing on territory as a key variable of political systems, the actors, processes and institutions are first analytically separated and continuously measured, enhancing internal validity, and then theoretically integrated, which allows more valid external inferences than classic, legal-institutionalist federal studies. After discussing the boundaries and substance of comparative territorial politics as a federal discipline, political territoriality is developed towards an analytical framework applicable to politics at any governmental level. The claims are modest: political territoriality does not serve so much as an explanatory concept as rather an ‘attention-directing device’ for federal studies.

The Politics of Local Autonomy: Measuring Cantonal (De)Centralisation in Switzerland

In Switzerland, there are 26 systems of cantonal decentralisation because regulating municipal autonomy is an exclusively cantonal competency. Existing measures of local autonomy/cantonal decentralisation are confined to measuring the real or perceived distribution of functions. Alternatively, they weigh expenditures (Dafflon 1992) or tax revenues (Dlabac and Schaub forthcoming) of municipalities against those of the canton. Complementing these indices, this paper additionally measures the politics dimension of cantonal decentralisation. Seven aspects are measured: intra-cantonal regionalism, cumuldesmandats (double tenure of cantonal MP and mayoral office), territorial quotas for legislative and executive elections, direct local representation and lobbying, party decentralisation, the number and size of constituencies, and direct democracy (communal referendum and initiative). This results in a ranking of all 26 cantons as regards the politics of local autonomy within their political systems. The measure will help scholars to test assumptions held for decentralisation in general, be it as a dependent (explaining decentralisation) or as an independent variable (decentralisation—so what?), within but also beyond the Swiss context.

The Personal Foundations of Political Tolerance towards Immigrants

In this paper, we expand previous research on the psychological foundations of attitudes towards immigrants by evaluating the role of the Big Five personality traits with regard to the formation of political tolerance. Following the literature, we elaborate tolerance as a sequential concept of rejection and acceptance to uncover differentiating effects of personality on both immigrant-specific prejudices as well as on the assignment of the right to vote as a pivotal political privilege to this group. Using a representative sample of the Swiss population, with its distinctive history related to the immigration issue, our two-step Heckman selection models reveal that extroverts and people who score low in agreeableness exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. At the same time, only openness to experience is significantly connected to the likeliness of granting immigrants the right to vote.

Direct democracy and political trust: Enhancing trust, initiating distrust–or both?

This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and political trust. We suggest a solution to the controversy in research centering on positive versus negative effects of direct democracy by analytically differentiating between the availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Theoretically, greater availability of direct democratic rights may enhance political trust by increasing citizens’ perception that political authorities can be controlled as well as by incentivizing political authorities to act trustworthily. In contrast, the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic instruments may initiate distrust as it signals to citizens that political authorities do not act in the public’s interest. We test both hypotheses for the very first time with sub-national data of Switzerland. The empirical results seem to support our theoretical arguments.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.