The Contested Floodplain. Institutional Change of the Commons in the Kafue Flats, Zambia

The Contested Floodplain tells the story of institutional changes in the management of common pool resources (pasture, wildlife, and fisheries) among Ila and Balundwe agro-pastoralists and Batwa fishermen in the Kafue Flats, in southern Zambia. It explains how and why a once rich floodplain area, managed under local common property regimes, becomes a poor man’s place and a degraded resource area. Based on social anthropological field research, the book explains how well working institutions in the past, regulating communal access to resources, have turned into state property and open access or privatization. The study focuses on the historic developments taking place since pre-colonial and colonial times up to today. Haller shows how the commons had been well regulated by local institutions in the past, often embedded in religious belief systems. He then explains the transformation from common property to state property since colonial times. When the state is unable to provide well-functioning institutions due to a lack in financial income, it contributes to de facto open access and degradation of the commons. The Zambian copper-based economy has faced crisis since 1975, and many Zambians have to look for economic alternatives and find ways to profit from the lack of state control (a paradox of the present-absent state). And while the state is absent, external actors use the ideology of citizenship to justify free use of resources during conflicts with local people. Also within Zambian communities, floodplain resources are highly contested, which is illustrated through conflicts over a proposed irrigation scheme in the area.

Outline of a theory of efficient teams in Sport.

Introduction So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta-analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and its performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. Objectives In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate research in the domain of team performance and, more specifically, the following presentations, is put up for discussion. Method Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are considered to be information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication processes and co-ordination of individual movements. Especially in rapid interactive sports planning and execution of movements based on feedback loops are not possible. Deliberate planning may be a solution mainly for offensive actions, whereas defensive actions have to adjust to the opponent team's actions. Consequently, mental representations must be developed to allow a feed-forward regulation of team member's actions. Results and Conclusions Some preliminary findings based on this conceptual framework as well as further consequences for empirical investigations will be presented. References Cranach, M.v., Ochsenbein, G. & Valach, L. (1986). The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

A Normative Theory of Forgetting: Lessons from the Fruit Fly

Recent experiments revealed that the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster has a dedicated mechanism for forgetting: blocking the G-protein Rac leads to slower and activating Rac to faster forgetting. This active form of forgetting lacks a satisfactory functional explanation. We investigated optimal decision making for an agent adapting to a stochastic environment where a stimulus may switch between being indicative of reward or punishment. Like Drosophila, an optimal agent shows forgetting with a rate that is linked to the time scale of changes in the environment. Moreover, to reduce the odds of missing future reward, an optimal agent may trade the risk of immediate pain for information gain and thus forget faster after aversive conditioning. A simple neuronal network reproduces these features. Our theory shows that forgetting in Drosophila appears as an optimal adaptive behavior in a changing environment. This is in line with the view that forgetting is adaptive rather than a consequence of limitations of the memory system.

How involved are they really? A comparative network analysis of the institutional drivers of local actor inclusion

Different socio-economic and environmental drivers lead local communities in mountain regions to adapt land use practices and engage in protection policies. The political system also has to develop new approaches to adapt to those drivers. Local actors are the target group of those policy approaches, and the question arises of if and how much those actors are consulted or even integrated into the design of local land use and protection policies. This article addresses this question by comparing seven different case studies in Swiss mountain regions. Through a formal social network analysis, the inclusion of local actors in collaborative policy networks is investigated and compared to the involvement of other stakeholders representing the next higher sub-national or national decisional levels. Results show that there is a significant difference (1) in how local actors are embedded compared to other stakeholders; and (2) between top-down versus bottom-up designed policy processes.

A feasible theory of truth over combinatory algebra

We define an applicative theory of truth TPT which proves totality exactly for the polynomial time computable functions. TPT has natural and simple axioms since nearly all its truth axioms are standard for truth theories over an applicative framework. The only exception is the axiom dealing with the word predicate. The truth predicate can only reflect elementhood in the words for terms that have smaller length than a given word. This makes it possible to achieve the very low proof-theoretic strength. Truth induction can be allowed without any constraints. For these reasons the system TPT has the high expressive power one expects from truth theories. It allows embeddings of feasible systems of explicit mathematics and bounded arithmetic. The proof that the theory TPT is feasible is not easy. It is not possible to apply a standard realisation approach. For this reason we develop a new realisation approach whose realisation functions work on directed acyclic graphs. In this way, we can express and manipulate realisation information more efficiently.

Development of meta-representations: Procedural metacognition and the relationship to Theory of Mind

In several studies it was shown that metacognitive ability is crucial for children and their success in school. Much less is known about the emergence of that ability and its relationship to other meta-representations like Theory of Mind competencies. In the past years, a growing literature has suggested that metacognition and Theory of Mind could theoretically be assumed to belong to the same developmental concept. Since then only a few studies showed empirically evidence that metacognition and Theory of Mind are related. But these studies focused on declarative metacognitive knowledge rather than on procedural metacognitive monitoring like in the present study: N = 159 children were first tested shortly before making the transition to school (aged between 5 1/2 and 7 1/2 years) and one year later at the end of their first grade. Analyses suggest that there is in fact a significant relation between early metacognitive monitoring skills (procedural metacognition) and later Theory of Mind competencies. Notably, language seems to play a crucial role in this relationship. Thus our results bring new insights in the research field of the development of meta-representation and support the view that metacognition and Theory of Mind are indeed interrelated, but the precise mechanisms yet remain unclear.