GATS and the Regulation of Trade in Services

This collection of essays takes stock of the key challenges that have arisen since the entry into force of the General Agreement on Trade in Services in the mid-1990s and situates them in the context of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda and the proliferation of preferential agreements addressing services today. The multidisciplinary approach provides an opportunity for many of the world's leading experts and a number of new analytical voices to exchange ideas on the future of services trade and regulation. Cosmopolitan approaches to the treatment of labour mobility, the shape of services trade disciplines in the digital age and pro-competitive regulation in air transport are explored with a view to helping readers gain a better understanding of the forces shaping the changes. An essential read for all those concerned with the evolution of the rules-based trading system and its impact on the service economy.

Genetic engineering and the world trade system

While the WTO agreements do not regulate the use of biotechnology per se, their rules can have a profound impact on the use of the technology for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. This book seeks to identify the challenges to international trade regulation that arise from biotechnology. The contributions examine whether existing international obligations of WTO Members are appropriate to deal with the issues arising for the use of biotechnology and whether there is a need for new international legal instruments, including a potential WTO Agreement on Biotechnology. They combine various perspectives on and topics relating to genetic engineering and trade, including human rights and gender; intellectual property rights; traditional knowledge and access and benefit sharing; food security, trade and agricultural production and food safety; and medical research, cloning and international trade.

Meta-Environment and Executable Meta-Language using Smalltalk: an Experience Report

Object-oriented modelling languages such as EMOF are often used to specify domain specific meta-models. However, these modelling languages lack the ability to describe behavior or operational semantics. Several approaches have used a subset of Java mixed with OCL as executable meta-languages. In this experience report we show how we use Smalltalk as an executable meta-language in the context of the Moose reengineering environment. We present how we implemented EMOF and its behavioral aspects. Over the last decade we validated this approach through incrementally building a meta-described reengineering environment. Such an approach bridges the gap between a code-oriented view and a meta-model driven one. It avoids the creation of yet another language and reuses the infrastructure and run-time of the underlying implementation language. It offers an uniform way of letting developers focus on their tasks while at the same time allowing them to meta-describe their domain model. The advantage of our approach is that developers use the same tools and environment they use for their regular tasks. Still the approach is not Smalltalk specific but can be applied to language offering an introspective API such as Ruby, Python, CLOS, Java and C#.

Enquiry into the Notion of Cultural Protectionism in the Media and its Dimensions in Cyberspace

Cultural protectionism has been an element of national and foreign policies, as an extension of state sovereignty expressed both in a defensive and offensive manner. While the generic protectionist formula in the sense of restraining trade between states through measures such as import tariffs or quotas and through privileging domestic production has somewhat disintegrated over time under the rationale for free trade and the strong practical evidence of its benefits, the particular case of cultural protectionism has persevered. As we reveal in this paper, however, it has been modified, or at least its rhetoric has changed. The enquiry into the notion of cultural protectionism or cultural diversity, as the current political jargon would have it, is but one of the paper’s objectives. Its second and certainly more ambitious goal is the search for the normative dimensions of cultural diversity policies in the global digital space, asking what adjustments are needed and how feasible the entire project of diversity regulation in this environment may be. Taking into account the specificities of cyberspace and in a forward-looking manner, we propose some adjustments to current media policy practices that could better serve the goal of a sustainably diverse cultural environment.

Should There Be New Multilateral Rules for Digital Trade?

The Internet revolution and the digital environment have spurred a significant amount of innovative activity that has had spillover effects on many sectors of the economy. For a growing group of countries – both developed and developing – digital goods and services have become an important engine of economic growth and a clear priority in their future-oriented economic strategies. Neither the rapid technological developments associated with digitization, nor their increased societal significance have so far been reflected in international economic law in a comprehensive manner. The law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular, has not reacted in any proactive manner. A pertinent question that arises is whether the WTO rules are still useful and able to accommodate the new digital economy or whether they have been rendered outdated and incapable of dealing with this important development? The present think-piece seeks answers to these questions and maps the key issues and challenges which the WTO faces. In appraisal of the current state of affairs, developments in venues other than the WTO, and proposals tabled by stakeholders, some recommendations for the ways forward are made.

Ethiopia's Food Reserve Policies and Practice

Ethiopia has for a long time been one of the world’s most food-insecure countries. Efforts by the government and a multitude of sponsors including NGOs have developed an array of institutions and instruments to mitigate the negative impact of production and supply disruptions. Public stockpiles are one such tool, the use of which is rapidly increasing worldwide. This brief field study examines the Ethiopian policies and practice in context, including various instruments operated by farmers, processors and traders. The study finds that the multiple objectives assigned to food reserves as well as the present management structure may not be well-suited at a time of high world market prices and when international food aid is dwindling, and as the international regulatory trade and investment environment remains a matter of unfinished business from a global food security perspective. A comprehensive study of various options for improvements would lay out policy alternatives for public authorities and stakeholders.

Regional Trade Agreements and domestic labour market regulation

This chapter discusses the relationship between labour market regulation and regional trade agreements from both a legal and an economic angle. We examine empirically whether regional trade liberalisation is associated with deterioration (“race to the bottom”) of domestic labour standards beyond those reflected in the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Using a panel of 90 developed and developing countries, covering the years from 1980 to 2005, we find that after the entry into force of a regional trade agreement (RTA), labour standards applying to employment protection and unemployment benefits are significantly weakened. We show that such a lowering of protection levels tends to occur in high income countries and that this effect mainly stems from RTAs among such countries rather than with low or middle income countries. Concern about competitive pressure to weaken domestic labour regulation is reflected in a variety of undertakings in RTAs not to administer labour laws with a view to improving one’s competitive position in trade or foreign direct investment (FDI). The above-mentioned empirical findings indicate that such provisions could potentially become relevant, and that this is more likely to be the case for high income members of RTAs. Our analysis, from a legal point of view, of relevant institutional and procedural mechanisms indicates however that enforceability of the relevant provisions is weak for most of the existing legal texts.

Shaping EU trade agreements to support human rights

Trade between Europe and developing countries should be shaped such that market shares are just and trade flows foster sustainable development. But this is not always the case. While developing countries have much to gain from trade, they can also suffer serious losses. This is especially apparent with regard to food security, which often depends largely on smallholders and informal markets in poorer countries. This policy brief sketches the link between trade and the right to food, and describes how integration of Human Rights Impact Assessments in EU trade policy can help ensure sustainable trade regimes that do not cause undue harm.

Human rights and international trade

Economic globalization and respect for human rights are both highly topical issues. In theory, more trade should increase economic welfare and protection of human rights should ensure individual dignity. Both fields of law protect certain freedoms: economic development should lead to higher human rights standards, and UN embargoes are used to secure compliance with human rights agreements. However the interaction between trade liberalisation and human rights protection is complex, and recently, tension has arisen between these two areas. Do WTO obligations covering intellectual property prevent governments from implementing their human rights obligations, including rights to food or health? Is it fair to accord the benefits of trade subject to a clean human rights record? This book first examines the theoretical framework of the interaction between the disciplines of international trade law and human rights. It builds upon the well-known debate between Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who construes trade obligations as human rights, and Professor Philip Alston, who warns of a merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. From this starting point, further chapters explore the differing legal matrices of the two fields and examine how cooperation between them might be improved, both in international law-making and institutions,in dispute settlement. The interaction between trade and human rights is then explored through seven case studies:freedom of expression and competition law; IP protection and health; agricultural trade and the right to food; trade restrictions on conflict WHO convention on tobacco control; and, finally, human rights conditionalities in preferential trade schemes.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Exploring intra-commonwealth goods and services trade

A background paper for the Commonwealth Secretariat by Anirudh Shingal and Mohammad Razzaque: Existing work examining the trade effect of commonwealth membership does not account for sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity and multilateral resistance in estimation, leading to biased estimates. Our analyses improve on all these fronts. Unlike earlier work, we also consider services trade and assemble a much larger sample of trading partners (242 x 242, over 1995-2010). Commonwealth membership is found to increase goods exports by 18.5-33.2% and services exports by 42.8% in our results, ceteris paribus and on average. Our analyses on the determinants of intra-commonwealth trade suggest the positive role of common language (only for goods trade) and colonial relationships as well as the negative impact of geography, thereby confirming that commonwealth member states are not natural trading partners for each other. Finally, being one of Australia, Canada or the UK is associated with 98.2% greater merchandise trade than the commonwealth average; however, a similar effect is not observed for services trade.

Energy subsidies from a climate and trade perspective

A short paper for dissemination based on a research piece published by the E15Initiative: Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change, February 2015. Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts and institutions to generate strategic analysis and recommendations for government, business, and civil society geared towards strengthening the global trade and investment system. The paper is also published in Spanish and Portuguese.

Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change

Estimates show that fossil fuel subsidies average USD 400–600 billion annually worldwide while renewable energy (RE) subsidies amounted to USD 66 billion in 2010 and are predicted to rise to USD 250 billion annually by 2035. Domestic political rationales for energy subsidies include promoting innovation, job creation and economic growth, energy security, and independence. Energy subsidies may also serve social and environmental goals. Whether and to what extent subsidies are effective to achieve these goals or instead lead to market distortions is a matter of much debate and the trade effects of energy subsidies are complex. This paper offers an overview of the types of energy subsidies that are used in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, and their relationship with climate change, in particular greenhouse gas emissions. While the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) is mostly concerned with harm to competitors, this paper considers the extent to which the Agreement could also discipline subsidies that cause harm to the environment as a global common. Beyond the existing legal framework, this paper surveys a number of alternatives for improving the ability of subsidies disciplines to internalize climate change costs of energy production and consumption. One option is a new multilateral agreement on subsidies or trade remedies (with an appropriate carve-out in the WTO regime to allow for it if such an agreement is concluded outside it). Alternatively, climate change-related subsidies could be included as part of another multilateral regime or as part of regional agreements. A third approach would be to incorporate rules on energy subsidies in sectorial agreements, including a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement such as has been proposed in other ICTSD studies.