Cooperative Effects of Electron Donors and Acceptors for the Stabilization of Elusive Metal Cluster Frameworks: Synthesis and Solid-State Structures of Pt-19(CO)(24)(mu(4)-AuPPh3)(3)](-) and Pt-19(CO)(24){mu(4)-Au-2(PPh3)(2)}(2)]

The anionic cluster Pt-19(CO)(22)](4-) (1), of pentagonal symmetry, reacts with CO and AuPPh3+ fragments. Upon increasing the Au:Pt-19, molar ratio, different species are sequentially formed, but only the last two members of the series could be characterized by X-ray diffraction, namely, Pt-19(CO)(24)(mu(4)-AuPPh3)(3)](-) (2) and Pt-19(CO)(24){mu(4)-Au-2(PPh3)(2)}(2)] (3).The metallic framework of the starting cluster is completely modified after the addition of CO and AuL+, and both products display the same platinum core of trigonal symmetry, with closely packed metal atoms. The three AuL+ units cap three different square faces in 2, whereas four AuL+ fragments are grouped in two independent bimetallic units in the neutral cluster 3. Electrochemical and spectroelectrochemical studies on 2 showed that its redox ability is comparable with that of the homometallic 1.

Biactantial agreement in the Gongduk transitive verb in the broader Tibeto-Burman context

The Gongduk language is spoken in an enclave in south central Bhutan comprising several villages and hamlets in the mountains west of the Kurichu. The language occupies a distinct phylogenetic position within the Tibeto-Burman language family. The intransitive verb agrees for person and number with the subject, and the transitive shows biactantial agreement for person and number with both agent and patient. A morphological analysis has identified the individual agreement morphemes, their precise grammatical meaning and their patterns of allomorphy. The cognacy of the greater part of the desinences of the Gongduk verb with morphemes identifiable in the biactantial agreement systems of other Tibeto-Burman languages supports the view that at least a portion of such conjugational morphology must be reconstructed to the common ancestral language.

ARMin: a robot for patient-cooperative arm therapy

Task-oriented, repetitive and intensive arm training can enhance arm rehabilitation in patients with paralyzed upper extremities due to lesions of the central nervous system. There is evidence that the training duration is a key factor for the therapy progress. Robot-supported therapy can improve the rehabilitation allowing more intensive training. This paper presents the kinematics, the control and the therapy modes of the arm therapy robot ARMin. It is a haptic display with semi-exoskeleton kinematics with four active and two passive degrees of freedom. Equipped with position, force and torque sensors the device can deliver patient-cooperative arm therapy taking into account the activity of the patient and supporting him/her only as much as needed. The haptic display is combined with an audiovisual display that is used to present the movement and the movement task to the patient. It is assumed that the patient-cooperative therapy approach combined with a multimodal display can increase the patient's motivation and activity and, therefore, the therapeutic progress.

A novel paradigm for patient-cooperative control of upper-limb rehabilitation robots

Early intervention and intensive therapy improve the outcome of neuromuscular rehabilitation. There are indications that where a patient is motivated and premeditates their movement, the recovery is more effective. Therefore, a strategy for patient-cooperative control of rehabilitation devices for upper extremities is proposed and evaluated. The strategy is based on the minimal intervention principle allowing an efficient exploitation of task space redundancies and resulting in user-driven movement trajectories. The patient's effort is taken into consideration by enabling the machine to comply with forces exerted by the user. The interaction is enhanced through a multimodal display and a virtually generated environment that includes haptic, visual and sound modalities.

Inter-observer agreement for diagnostic classification of esophageal motility disorders defined in high-resolution manometry

High-resolution esophageal manometry (HRM) is a recent development used in the evaluation of esophageal function. Our aim was to assess the inter-observer agreement for diagnosis of esophageal motility disorders using this technology. Practitioners registered on the HRM Working Group website were invited to review and classify (i) 147 individual water swallows and (ii) 40 diagnostic studies comprising 10 swallows using a drop-down menu that followed the Chicago Classification system. Data were presented using a standardized format with pressure contours without a summary of HRM metrics. The sequence of swallows was fixed for each user but randomized between users to avoid sequence bias. Participants were blinded to other entries. (i) Individual swallows were assessed by 18 practitioners (13 institutions). Consensus agreement (≤2/18 dissenters) was present for most cases of normal peristalsis and achalasia but not for cases of peristaltic dysmotility. (ii) Diagnostic studies were assessed by 36 practitioners (28 institutions). Overall inter-observer agreement was 'moderate' (kappa 0.51) being 'substantial' (kappa > 0.7) for achalasia type I/II and no lower than 'fair-moderate' (kappa >0.34) for any diagnosis. Overall agreement was somewhat higher among those that had performed >400 studies (n = 9; kappa 0.55) and 'substantial' among experts involved in development of the Chicago Classification system (n = 4; kappa 0.66). This prospective, randomized, and blinded study reports an acceptable level of inter-observer agreement for HRM diagnoses across the full spectrum of esophageal motility disorders for a large group of clinicians working in a range of medical institutions. Suboptimal agreement for diagnosis of peristaltic motility disorders highlights contribution of objective HRM metrics.

Law and science: risk assessment and risk management in the WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Assessing and managing risks relating to the consumption of food stuffs for humans and to the environment has been one of the most complex legal issues in WTO law, ever since the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round and entered into force in 1995. The problem was expounded in a number of cases. Panels and the Appellate Body adopted different philosophies in interpreting the agreement and the basic concept of risk assessment as defined in Annex A para. 4 of the Agreement. Risk assessment entails fundamental question on law and science. Different interpretations reflect different underlying perceptions of science and its relationship to the law. The present thesis supported by the Swiss National Research Foundation undertakes an in-depth analysis of these underlying perceptions. The author expounds the essence and differences of positivism and relativism in philosophy and natural sciences. He clarifies the relationship of fundamental concepts such as risk, hazards and probability. This investigation is a remarkable effort on the part of lawyer keen to learn more about the fundamentals based upon which the law – often unconsciously – is operated by the legal profession and the trade community. Based upon these insights, he turns to a critical assessment of jurisprudence both of panels and the Appellate Body. Extensively referring and discussing the literature, he deconstructs findings and decisions in light of implied and assumed underlying philosophies and perceptions as to the relationship of law and science, in particular in the field of food standards. Finding that both positivism and relativism does not provide adequate answers, the author turns critical rationalism and applies the methodologies of falsification developed by Karl R. Popper. Critical rationalism allows combining discourse in science and law and helps preparing the ground for a new approach to risk assessment and risk management. Linking the problem to the doctrine of multilevel governance the author develops a theory allocating risk assessment to international for a while leaving the matter of risk management to national and democratically accountable government. While the author throughout the thesis questions the possibility of separating risk assessment and risk management, the thesis offers new avenues which may assist in structuring a complex and difficult problem

Microscopic theory of cooperative spin crossover: Interaction of molecular modes with phonons

In this article, we present a new microscopic theoretical approach to the description of spin crossover in molecular crystals. The spin crossover crystals under consideration are composed of molecular fragments formed by the spin-crossover metal ion and its nearest ligand surrounding and exhibiting well defined localized (molecular) vibrations. As distinguished from the previous models of this phenomenon, the developed approach takes into account the interaction of spin-crossover ions not only with the phonons but also a strong coupling of the electronic shells with molecular modes. This leads to an effective coupling of the local modes with phonons which is shown to be responsible for the cooperative spin transition accompanied by the structural reorganization. The transition is characterized by the two order parameters representing the mean values of the products of electronic diagonal matrices and the coordinates of the local modes for the high- and low-spin states of the spin crossover complex. Finally, we demonstrate that the approach provides a reasonable explanation of the observed spin transition in the [Fe(ptz)6](BF4)2 crystal. The theory well reproduces the observed abrupt low-spin → high-spin transition and the temperature dependence of the high-spin fraction in a wide temperature range as well as the pronounced hysteresis loop. At the same time within the limiting approximations adopted in the developed model, the evaluated high-spin fraction vs. T shows that the cooperative spin-lattice transition proves to be incomplete in the sense that the high-spin fraction does not reach its maximum value at high temperature.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture

To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.

Cooperative VET in Training Networks: Analysing the Free-Rider Problem in a Sociology-of-Conventions Perspective

In training networks, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises pool their resources to train apprentices within the framework of the dual VET system, while an intermediary organisation is tasked with managing operations. Over the course of their apprenticeship, the apprentices switch from one training company to another on a (half-) yearly basis. Drawing on a case study of four training networks in Switzerland and the theoretical framework of the sociology of conventions, this paper aims to understand the reasons for the slow dissemination and reluctant adoption of this promising form of organising VET in Switzerland. The results of the study show that the system of moving from one company to another creates a variety of free-rider constellations in the distribution of the collectively generated corporative benefits. This explains why companies are reluctant to participate in this model. For the network to be sustainable, the intermediary organisation has to address discontent arising from free-rider problems while taking into account that the solutions found are always tentative and will often result in new free-rider problems.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Intervals for the assessment of measurement agreement: Similarities, differences, and consequences of incorrect interpretations

Several intervals have been proposed to quantify the agreement of two methods intended to measure the same quantity in the situation where only one measurement per method and subject is available. The limits of agreement are probably the most well-known among these intervals, which are all based on the differences between the two measurement methods. The different meanings of the intervals are not always properly recognized in applications. However, at least for small-to-moderate sample sizes, the differences will be substantial. This is illustrated both using the width of the intervals and on probabilistic scales related to the definitions of the intervals. In particular, for small-to-moderate sample sizes, it is shown that limits of agreement and prediction intervals should not be used to make statements about the distribution of the differences between the two measurement methods or about a plausible range for all future differences. Care should therefore be taken to ensure the correct choice of the interval for the intended interpretation.