The lower quality of preventive care among forced migrants in a country with universal healthcare coverage

OBJECTIVE To assess the association between socio-demographic factors and the quality of preventive care and chronic care of cardiovascular (CV) risk factors in a country with universal health care coverage. METHODS Our retrospective cohort assessed a random sample of 966 patients aged 50-80years followed over 2years (2005-2006) in 4 Swiss university primary care settings (Basel/Geneva/Lausanne/Zürich). We used RAND's Quality Assessment Tools indicators and examined recommended preventive care among different socio-demographic subgroups. RESULTS Overall patients received 69.6% of recommended preventive care. Preventive care indicators were more likely to be met among men (72.8% vs. 65.4%; p<0.001), younger patients (from 71.0% at 50-59years to 66.7% at 70-80years, p for trend=0.03) and Swiss patients (71.1% vs. 62.7% in forced migrants; p=0.001). This latter difference remained in multivariate analysis adjusted for gender, age, civil status and occupation (OR 0.68; 95% CI 0.54-0.86). Forced migrants had lower scores for physical examination and breast and colon cancer screening (all p≤0.02). No major differences were seen for chronic care of CV risk factors. CONCLUSION Despite universal healthcare coverage, forced migrants receive less preventive care than Swiss patients in university primary care settings. Greater attention should be paid to forced migrants for preventive care.

A universal description of ultraslow glass dynamics

The dynamics of glass is of importance in materials science but its nature has not yet been fully understood. Here we report that a verification of the temperature dependencies of the primary relaxation time or viscosity in the ultraslowing/ultraviscous domain of glass-forming systems can be carried out via the analysis of the inverse of the Dyre-Olsen temperature index. The subsequent analysis of experimental data indicates the possibility of the self-consistent description of glass-forming low-molecular-weight liquids, polymers, liquid crystals, orientationally disordered crystals and Ising spin-glass-like systems, as well as the prevalence of equations associated with the 'finite temperature divergence'. All these lead to a new formula for the configurational entropy in glass-forming systems. Furthermore, a link to the dominated local symmetry for a given glass former is identified here. Results obtained show a new relationship between the glass transition and critical phenomena.

The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.

Form Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements

Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

Expressing and Amplifying Positive Emotions Facilitate Goal Attainment in Workplace Interactions

Expressing emotions has social functions; it provides information, affects social interactions, and shapes relationships with others. Expressing positive emotions could be a strategic tool for improving goal attainment during social interactions at work. Such effects have been found in research on social contagion, impression management, and emotion work. However, expressing emotions one does not feel entails the risk of being perceived as inauthentic. This risk may well be worth taking when the emotions felt are negative, as expressing negative emotions usually has negative effects. When experiencing positive emotions, however, expressing them authentically promises benefits, and the advantage of amplifying them is not so obvious. We postulated that expressing, and amplifying, positive emotions would foster goal attainment in social interactions at work, particularly when dealing with superiors. Analyses are based on 494 interactions involving the pursuit of a goal by 113 employes. Multilevel analyses, including polynomial analyses, show that authentic display of positive emotions supported goal attainment throughout. However, amplifying felt positive emotions promoted goal attainment only in interactions with superiors, but not with colleagues. Results are discussed with regard to the importance of hierarchy for detecting, and interpreting, signs of strategic display of positive emotions.

In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. We then outline an alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Emotions and Values

There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).

The New Concept of Universal Service in a Digital Networked Communications Environment

Digitization, sophisticated fiber-optic networks and the resultant convergence of the media, communications and information technology industries have completely transformed the communications ecosystem in the last couple of decades. New contingent business and social models were created that have been mirrored in the amended communications regimes. Yet, despite an overhaul of the communications regulation paradigm, the status of and the rules on universal service have remained surprisingly intact, both during and after the liberalization exercise. The present paper looks into this paradox and examines the sustainability of the existing concept of universal service. It suggests that there is a need for a novel concept of universal service in the digital networked communications environment, whose objectives go beyond the conventional internalizing and redistributional rationales and concentrate on communication and information networks as a public good, where not only access to infrastructure but also access to content may be essential.