38 resultados para the SIMPLE algorithm


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In the fermion loop formulation the contributions to the partition function naturally separate into topological equivalence classes with a definite sign. This separation forms the basis for an efficient fermion simulation algorithm using a fluctuating open fermion string. It guarantees sufficient tunnelling between the topological sectors, and hence provides a solution to the fermion sign problem affecting systems with broken supersymmetry. Moreover, the algorithm shows no critical slowing down even in the massless limit and can hence handle the massless Goldstino mode emerging in the supersymmetry broken phase. In this paper – the third in a series of three – we present the details of the simulation algorithm and demonstrate its efficiency by means of a few examples.

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Context. The Rosetta encounter with comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko provides a unique opportunity for an in situ, up-close investigation of ion-neutral chemistry in the coma of a weakly outgassing comet far from the Sun. Aims. Observations of primary and secondary ions and modeling are used to investigate the role of ion-neutral chemistry within the thin coma. Methods. Observations from late October through mid-December 2014 show the continuous presence of the solar wind 30 km from the comet nucleus. These and other observations indicate that there is no contact surface and the solar wind has direct access to the nucleus. On several occasions during this time period, the Rosetta/ROSINA/Double Focusing Mass Spectrometer measured the low-energy ion composition in the coma. Organic volatiles and water group ions and their breakup products (masses 14 through 19), CO2+ (masses 28 and 44) and other mass peaks (at masses 26, 27, and possibly 30) were observed. Secondary ions include H3O+ and HCO+ (masses 19 and 29). These secondary ions indicate ion-neutral chemistry in the thin coma of the comet. A relatively simple model is constructed to account for the low H3O+/H2O+ and HCO+/CO+ ratios observed in a water dominated coma. Results from this simple model are compared with results from models that include a more detailed chemical reaction network. Results. At low outgassing rates, predictions from the simple model agree with observations and with results from more complex models that include much more chemistry. At higher outgassing rates, the ion-neutral chemistry is still limited and high HCO+/CO+ ratios are predicted and observed. However, at higher outgassing rates, the model predicts high H3O+/H2O+ ratios and the observed ratios are often low. These low ratios may be the result of the highly heterogeneous nature of the coma, where CO and CO2 number densities can exceed that of water.

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Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

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CONTEXT Hyperthyroidism is an established risk factor for atrial fibrillation (AF), but information concerning the association with variations within the normal range of thyroid function and subgroups at risk is lacking. OBJECTIVE This study aimed to investigate the association between normal thyroid function and AF prospectively and explore potential differential risk patterns. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS From the Rotterdam Study we included 9166 participants ≥ 45 y with TSH and/or free T4 (FT4) measurements and AF assessment (1997-2012 median followup, 6.8 y), with 399 prevalent and 403 incident AF cases. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES Outcome measures were 3-fold: 1) hazard ratios (HRs) for the risk of incident AF by Cox proportional-hazards models, 2) 10-year absolute risks taking competing risk of death into account, and 3) discrimination ability of adding FT4 to the CHARGE-AF simple model, an established prediction model for AF. RESULTS Higher FT4 levels were associated with higher risks of AF (HR 1.63, 95% confidence interval, 1.19-2.22), when comparing those in the highest quartile to those in lowest quartile. Absolute 10-year risks increased with higher FT4 in participants ≤ 65 y from 1-9% and from 6-12% in subjects ≥ 65 y. Discrimination of the prediction model improved when adding FT4 to the simple model (c-statistic, 0.722 vs 0.729; P = .039). TSH levels were not associated with AF. CONCLUSIONS There is an increased risk of AF with higher FT4 levels within the normal range, especially in younger subjects. Adding FT4 to the simple model slightly improved discrimination of risk prediction.

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BACKGROUND & AIMS European and American guidelines have endorsed the Barcelona Clinic Liver Cancer (BCLC) staging system. The aim of this study was to assess the performance of the recently developed Hong Kong Liver Cancer (HKLC) classification as a staging system for hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) in Europe. METHODS We used a pooled set of 1693 HCC patients combining three prospective European cohorts. Discrimination ability between the nine substages and five stages of the HKLC classification system was assessed. To evaluate the predictive power of the HKLC and BCLC staging systems on overall survival, Nagelkerke pseudo R2, Bayesian Information Criterion and Harrell's concordance index were calculated. The number of patients who would benefit from a curative therapy was assessed for both staging system. RESULTS The HKLC classification in nine substages shows suboptimal discrimination between the staging groups. The classification in five stages shows better discrimination between groups. However, the BCLC classification performs better than the HKLC classification in the ability to predict OS. The HKLC treatment algorithm tags significantly more patients to curative therapy than the BCLC. CONCLUSIONS The BCLC staging system performs better for European patients than the HKLC staging system in predicting OS. Twice more patients are eligible for a curative therapy with the HKLC algorithm, whether this translates in survival benefit remains to be investigated. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

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OBJECTIVES To improve malnutrition awareness and management in our department of general internal medicine; to assess patients' nutritional risk; and to evaluate whether an online educational program leads to an increase in basic knowledge and more frequent nutritional therapies. METHODS A prospective pre-post intervention study at a university department of general internal medicine was conducted. Nutritional screening using Nutritional Risk Score 2002 (NRS 2002) was performed, and prescriptions of nutritional therapies were assessed. The intervention included an online learning program and a pocket card for all residents, who had to fill in a multiple-choice questions (MCQ) test about basic nutritional knowledge before and after the intervention. RESULTS A total of 342 patients were included in the preintervention phase, and 300 were in the postintervention phase. In the preintervention phase, 54.1% were at nutritional risk (NRS 2002 ≥3) compared with 61.7% in the postintervention phase. There was no increase in the prescription of nutritional therapies (18.7% versus 17.0%). Forty-nine and 41 residents (response rate 58% and 48%) filled in the MCQ test before and after the intervention, respectively. The mean percentage of correct answers was 55.6% and 59.43%, respectively (which was not significant). Fifty of 84 residents completed the online program. The residents who participated in the whole program scored higher on the second MCQ test (63% versus 55% correct answers, P = 0.031). CONCLUSIONS Despite a high ratio of malnourished patients, the nutritional intervention, as assessed by nutritional prescriptions, is insufficient. However, the simple educational program via Internet and usage of NRS 2002 pocket cards did not improve either malnutrition awareness or nutritional treatment. More sophisticated educational systems to fight malnutrition are necessary.

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SOMS is a general surrogate-based multistart algorithm, which is used in combination with any local optimizer to find global optima for computationally expensive functions with multiple local minima. SOMS differs from previous multistart methods in that a surrogate approximation is used by the multistart algorithm to help reduce the number of function evaluations necessary to identify the most promising points from which to start each nonlinear programming local search. SOMS’s numerical results are compared with four well-known methods, namely, Multi-Level Single Linkage (MLSL), MATLAB’s MultiStart, MATLAB’s GlobalSearch, and GLOBAL. In addition, we propose a class of wavy test functions that mimic the wavy nature of objective functions arising in many black-box simulations. Extensive comparisons of algorithms on the wavy testfunctions and on earlier standard global-optimization test functions are done for a total of 19 different test problems. The numerical results indicate that SOMS performs favorably in comparison to alternative methods and does especially well on wavy functions when the number of function evaluations allowed is limited.

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This paper addresses a potential role that tariffs and tariff policy can play in encouraging countries to take part in a multilateral effort to mitigate climate change. It begins by assessing whether increasing tariffs on products from energy intensive or polluting industries amounts to a violation of WTO rules and whether protectionism in this case can be differentiated from genuine environmental concerns. It then argues that while lowering tariffs for environmental goods can serve as a carrot to promote dissemination of cleaner technologies, tariff deconsolidation is a legitimate stick to encourage polluting countries to move towards an international climate agreement. The paper further explores this view by undertaking a partialequilibrium simulation analysis to examine the impact of a unilateral unit increase in tariffs on the imports of the most carbon-intensive products from countries not committed to climate polices. Our results suggest that the committed importing countries would have to raise their tariffs only slightly to effect a significant decline in the imports of these products from the non-committed countries. For instance, a unit increase in the simple average applied tariffs on the imports of these carbon-intensive products in 2005 from our sample of non-committed exporting countries would reduce the imports of these products by an average 32.6% in Australia, 178% in Canada, 195% in the EU, 271% in Japan and 62% in the US, therebysuggesting the effectiveness of such a measure in pushing countries towards a global climate policy.