Pay for performance does not always increase performance

Pay for performance can have a positive or a negative influence on actual performance. The aim of this study was to give an explanation for this contradiction.We demonstrated that the variability of the payment can act as a stressor. According to the transactional model of stress, the influence on performance depends on the subjective interpretation of the variability as challenge or threat. Therefore we manipulated the degree of variability. The data showed decreasing performance for participants who preferred less-variable payments. They performed better under a less-variable rather than more-variable payment. The participants who preferred more-variable payment schemes showed the opposite pattern. These participants showed a higher performance under a more-variable rather than less-variable payment scheme.

How Should Consumers’ Willingness to Pay Be Measured? An Empirical Comparison of State-of-the-Art Approaches

This study compares the performance of four commonly used approaches to measure consumers’ willingness to pay with real purchase data (REAL): the open-ended (OE) question format; choicebased conjoint (CBC) analysis; Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak’s (BDM) incentive-compatible mechanism; and incentive-aligned choice-based conjoint (ICBC) analysis. With this five-in-one approach, the authors test the relative strengths of the four measurement methods, using REAL as the benchmark, on the basis of statistical criteria and decision-relevant metrics. The results indicate that the BDM and ICBC approaches can pass statistical and decision-oriented tests. The authors find that respondents are more price sensitive in incentive-aligned settings than in non-incentive-aligned settings and the REAL setting. Furthermore, they find a large number of “none” choices under ICBC than under hypothetical conjoint analysis. This study uncovers an intriguing possibility: Even when the OE format and CBC analysis generate hypothetical bias, they may still lead to the right demand curves and right pricing decisions.

Does gender-fair language pay off? The social perception of professions from a cross-linguistic perspective

In many languages, masculine forms (e.g., German Lehrer, “teachers, masc.”) have traditionally been used to refer to both women and men, although feminine forms are available, too. Feminine-masculine word pairs (e.g., German Lehrerinnen und Lehrer, “teachers, fem. and teachers, masc.”) are recommended as gender-fair alternatives. A large body of empirical research documents that the use of gender-fair forms instead of masculine forms has a substantial impact on mental representations. Masculine forms activate more male representations even when used in a generic sense, whereas word pairs (e.g., German Lehrerinnen und Lehrer, “teachers, fem. and teachers, masc.”) lead to a higher cognitive inclusion of women (i.e., visibility of women). Some recent studies, however, have also shown that in a professional context word pairs may be associated with lesser status. The present research is the first to investigate both effects within a single paradigm. A cross-linguistic (Italian and German) study with 391 participants shows that word pairs help to avoid a male bias in the gender-typing of professions and increase women's visibility; at the same time, they decrease the estimated salaries of typically feminine professions (but do not affect perceived social status or competence). This potential payoff has implications for language policies aiming at gender-fairness.

How Much am I Expected to Pay for my Parents‘ Firm? An Institutional Logics Perspective on Family Discounts

Recent evidence suggests that successors do not simply inherit their parents’ firm, but have to pay a certain price. Building on institutional logics literature, we explore successors’ family discount expectations, defined as the rebate expected from parents in comparison to nonfamily buyers when assuming control of the firm. We find that family cohesion increases discount expectations, while successors’ fear of failure and family equity stake in the firm decrease discount expectations. Higher education in business or economics weakens These effects. On average, in our study comprised of 16 countries, successors expect a 57% family discount.