Enabling the Next Generation of Spaceborne Quadrupole Mass Spectrometers

The quadrupole mass spectrometer (QMS) has over 30 years of spaceflight heritage in making important neutral gas and low energy ion observations. Given their geometrical constraints, these instruments are currently operated at the extreme limit of their capabilities. However, a technique called higher order auxiliary excitation provides a set of novel, robust, electronics-based solutions for improving the performance of these sensors. By driving the quadrupole rods with an additional frequency nearly twice that of the normal RF operating frequency, substantially increased abundance sensitivity, maximum attainable mass resolution, and peak stability can be achieved through operation of voltage scan lines through the center of formed upper stability islands. Such improvements are modeled using numerical simulations of ion trajectories in a quadrupole field with and without applied higher order auxiliary excitation. When compared to a traditional QMS with a mass range up to 500Da, sensors can be designed with the same precision electronics to have expected mass ranges beyond 1500Da with a power increase of less than twice that of its heritage implementations.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Effects of microbeam radiation therapy on normal and tumoral blood vessels

Microbeam radiation therapy (MRT) is a new form of preclinical radiotherapy using quasi-parallel arrays of synchrotron X-ray microbeams. While the deposition of several hundred Grays in the microbeam paths, the normal brain tissues presents a high tolerance which is accompanied by the permanence of apparently normal vessels. Conversely, the efficiency of MRT on tumor growth control is thought to be related to a preferential damaging of tumor blood vessels. The high resistance of the healthy vascular network was demonstrated in different animal models by in vivo biphoton microscopy, magnetic resonance imaging, and histological studies. While a transient increase in permeability was shown, the structure of the vessels remained intact. The use of a chick chorioallantoic membrane at different stages of development showed that the damages induced by microbeams depend on vessel maturation. In vivo and ultrastructural observations showed negligible effects of microbeams on the mature vasculature at late stages of development; nevertheless a complete destruction of the immature capillary plexus was found in the microbeam paths. The use of MRT in rodent models revealed a preferential effect on tumor vessels. Although no major modification was observed in the vasculature of normal brain tissue, tumors showed a denudation of capillaries accompanied by transient increased permeability followed by reduced tumor perfusion and finally, a decrease in number of tumor vessels. Thus, MRT is a very promising treatment strategy with pronounced tumor control effects most likely based on the anti-vascular effects of MRT.

The SCITEAS experiment: Optical characterizations of sublimating icy planetary analogues

We have designed and built a laboratory facility to investigate the spectro-photometric and morphologic properties of different types of ice-bearing planetary surface analogs and follow their evolution upon exposure to a low pressure and low temperature environment. The results obtained with this experiment are used to verify and improve our interpretations of current optical remote-sensing datasets. They also provide valuable information for the development and operation of future optical instruments. The Simulation Chamber for Imaging the Temporal Evolution of Analogue Samples (SCITEAS) is a small thermal vacuum chamber equipped with a variety of ports and feedthroughs that permit both in-situ and remote characterizations as well as interacting with the sample. A large quartz window located directly above the sample is used to observe its surface from outside with a set of visible and near-infrared cameras. The sample holder can be easily and quickly inserted and removed from the chamber and is compatible with the other measurement facilities of the Laboratory for Outflow Studies of Sublimating Materials (LOSSy) at the University of Bern. We report here on the results of two of the first experiments performed in the SCITEAS chamber. In the first experiment, fine-grained water ice mixed with dark organic and mineral matter was left to sublime in vacuum and at low temperature, simulating the evolution of the surface of a comet nucleus approaching the Sun. We observed and characterized the formation and evolution of a crust of refractory organic and mineral matter at the surface of the sample and linked the evolution of its structure and texture to its spectro-photometric properties. In the second experiment, a frozen soil was prepared by freezing a mixture of smectite mineral and water. The sample was then left to sublime for 6 h to simulate the loss of volatiles from icy soil at high latitudes on Mars. Colour images were produced using the definitions of the filters foreseen for the CaSSIS imager of the Exomars/TGO mission in order to prepare future science operations.

Estimating the uptake of traffic-derived NO2 from 15N abundance in Norway spruce needles

The 15N ratio of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted from vehicles, measured in the air adjacent to a highway in the Swiss Middle Land, was very high [δ15N(NO2) = +5.7‰]. This high 15N abundance was used to estimate long-term NO2 dry deposition into a forest ecosystem by measuring δ15N in the needles and the soil of potted and autochthonous spruce trees [Picea abies (L.) Karst] exposed to NO2 in a transect orthogonal to the highway. δ15N in the current-year needles of potted trees was 2.0‰ higher than that of the control after 4 months of exposure close to the highway, suggesting a 25% contribution to the N-nutrition of these needles. Needle fall into the pots was prevented by grids placed above the soil, while the continuous decomposition of needle litter below the autochthonous trees over previous years has increased δ15N values in the soil, resulting in parallel gradients of δ15N in soil and needles with distance from the highway. Estimates of NO2 uptake into needles obtained from the δ15N data were significantly correlated with the inputs calculated with a shoot gas exchange model based on a parameterisation widely used in deposition modelling. Therefore, we provide an indication of estimated N inputs to forest ecosystems via dry deposition of NO2 at the receptor level under field conditions.