On the relationship between need for cognition and self-control capacity

In the present study, we examined the hypothesis that individuals’ motivational tendency to engage in effortful information processing (i.e., their need for cognition; NFC) is positively related to their self-control capacity. This hypothesis was based on previous findings that effortful information processing and self-control both depend on a joint strength resource, and that this resource is boosted by frequent use. NFC was assessed via questionnaire. One week later, the participants (N = 46) completed a test of self-control capacity (Stroop Task). As expected, NFC was positively related to self-control capacity but unrelated to general processing speed.

Paramecium tetraurelia chromatin assembly factor-1-like protein PtCAF-1 is involved in RNA-mediated control of DNA elimination

Genome-wide DNA remodelling in the ciliate Paramecium is ensured by RNA-mediated trans-nuclear crosstalk between the germline and the somatic genomes during sexual development. The rearrangements include elimination of transposable elements, minisatellites and tens of thousands non-coding elements called internally eliminated sequences (IESs). The trans-nuclear genome comparison process employs a distinct class of germline small RNAs (scnRNAs) that are compared against the parental somatic genome to select the germline-specific subset of scnRNAs that subsequently target DNA elimination in the progeny genome. Only a handful of proteins involved in this process have been identified so far and the mechanism of DNA targeting is unknown. Here we describe chromatin assembly factor-1-like protein (PtCAF-1), which we show is required for the survival of sexual progeny and localizes first in the parental and later in the newly developing macronucleus. Gene silencing shows that PtCAF-1 is required for the elimination of transposable elements and a subset of IESs. PTCAF-1 depletion also impairs the selection of germline-specific scnRNAs during development. We identify specific histone modifications appearing during Paramecium development which are strongly reduced in PTCAF-1 depleted cells. Our results demonstrate the importance of PtCAF-1 for the epigenetic trans-nuclear cross-talk mechanism.

Cortical control of facial expression.

The present topical review deals with the motor control of facial expressions in humans. Facial expressions are a central part of human communication. Emotional face expressions have a crucial role in human non-verbal behavior, allowing a rapid transfer of information between individuals. Facial expressions can be both voluntarily or emotionally controlled. Recent studies in non-human primates and humans revealed that the motor control of facial expressions has a distributed neural representation. At least 5 cortical regions on the medial and lateral aspects of each hemisphere are involved: the primary motor cortex, the ventral lateral premotor cortex, the supplementary motor area on the medial wall, and, finally, the rostral and caudal cingulate cortex. The results of studies in humans and non-human primates suggest that the innervation of the face is bilaterally controlled for the upper part, and mainly contralaterally controlled for the lower part. Furthermore, the primary motor cortex, the ventral lateral premotor cortex, and the supplementary motor area are essential for the voluntary control of facial expressions. In contrast, the cingulate cortical areas are important for emotional expression, since they receive input from different structures of the limbic system. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Opposing RA and FGF signals control proximodistal vertebrate limb development through regulation of Meis genes.

Vertebrate limbs develop in a temporal proximodistal sequence, with proximal regions specified and generated earlier than distal ones. Whereas considerable information is available on the mechanisms promoting limb growth, those involved in determining the proximodistal identity of limb parts remain largely unknown. We show here that retinoic acid (RA) is an upstream activator of the proximal determinant genes Meis1 and Meis2. RA promotes proximalization of limb cells and endogenous RA signaling is required to maintain the proximal Meis domain in the limb. RA synthesis and signaling range, which initially span the entire lateral plate mesoderm, become restricted to proximal limb domains by the apical ectodermal ridge (AER) activity following limb initiation. We identify fibroblast growth factor (FGF) as the main molecule responsible for this AER activity and propose a model integrating the role of FGF in limb cell proliferation, with a specific function in promoting distalization through inhibition of RA production and signaling.

Lake-effect snow as the dominant control of mesic-forest distribution in Michigan, USA

1Recent studies demonstrated the sensitivity of northern forest ecosystems to changes in the amount and duration of snow cover at annual to decadal time scales. However, the consequences of snowfall variability remain uncertain for ecological variables operating at longer time scales, especially the distributions of forest communities. 2The Great Lakes region of North America offers a unique setting to examine the long-term effects of variable snowfall on forest communities. Lake-effect snow produces a three-fold gradient in annual snowfall over tens of kilometres, and dramatic edaphic variations occur among landform types resulting from Quaternary glaciations. We tested the hypothesis that these factors interact to control the distributions of mesic (dominated by Acer saccharum, Tsuga canadensis and Fagus grandifolia) and xeric forests (dominated by Pinus and Quercus spp.) in northern Lower Michigan. 3We compiled pre-European-settlement vegetation data and overlaid these data with records of climate, water balance and soil, onto Landtype Association polygons in a geographical information system. We then used multivariate adaptive regression splines to model the abundance of mesic vegetation in relation to environmental controls. 4Snowfall is the most predictive among five variables retained by our model, and it affects model performance 29% more than soil texture, the second most important variable. The abundance of mesic trees is high on fine-textured soils regardless of snowfall, but it increases with snowfall on coarse-textured substrates. Lake-effect snowfall also determines the species composition within mesic forests. The weighted importance of A. saccharum is significantly greater than of T. canadensis or F. grandifolia within the lake-effect snowbelt, whereas T. canadensis is more plentiful outside the snowbelt. These patterns are probably driven by the influence of snowfall on soil moisture, nutrient availability and fire return intervals. 5Our results imply that a key factor dictating the spatio-temporal patterns of forest communities in the vast region around the Great Lakes is how the lake-effect snowfall regime responds to global change. Snowfall reductions will probably cause a major decrease in the abundance of ecologically and economically important species, such as A. saccharum.