Detection of Mycoplasma conjunctivae in the eyes of healthy, free-ranging Alpine ibex: possible involvement of Alpine ibex as carriers for the main causing agent of infectious keratoconjunctivitis in wild Caprinae

Mycoplasma conjunctivae is considered the major cause of infectious keratoconjunctivitis (IKC) in Alpine ibex (Capra i. ibex) and chamois (Rupicapra r. rupicapra). While it is known that domestic sheep can act as healthy carriers for M. conjunctivae, this question has not been addressed in wild ungulates so far. In this study, bacteriological investigations and field observations were performed to assess whether free-ranging Alpine ibex can be healthy carriers of M. conjunctivae. Among 136 ibex without clinical signs of IKC, M. conjunctivae was identified 26 times (19.1%) by TaqMan PCR. To assess the potential pathogenicity of M. conjunctivae strains isolated from asymptomatic eyes, strains from three healthy ibex and from 15 IKC-ibex and IKC-chamois were analysed genetically by DNA sequence analysis of the variable part of the lppS gene. No significant differences were observed between strains from asymptomatic and clinically affected animals, reflecting the assumption that healthy ibex may act as carriers for M. conjunctivae strains that may be pathogenic for other individuals. Our results further indicate that development of IKC is associated with M. conjunctivae load in the eyes. In addition, a questionnaire survey revealed that IKC is generally less common in ibex than chamois and that infection in wild ungulates is not necessarily linked to the presence of sheep. These data support the hypothesis that apparently healthy ibex may be important in the epizootiology of IKC and indicate that host predilection may play a role in IKC development.

Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.