Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Reputation Formation and the Evolution of Cooperation in Anonymous Online Markets

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade.

Academic cooperation to foster research and advocacy competences in the occupied Palestinian territory (West Bank)

Palestinians living in the West Bank, a territory occupied by the State of Israel according to International Law, face deprived access to land and a limited ability to move freely which pertains to the presence of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure (closures, restricted or forbidden roads, etc.). This confinement has significant impacts on their economic and social livelihoods, and it is even worsening with the on-going construction of a 709 km long Barrier which mainly runs inside the West Bank. With regard to this situation, there is a clear need to strengthen the capacity of civil society and its representatives to apply sound research processes as a basis for improved advocacy for Palestinian human rights. Monitoring processes and tools are needed to assess the impacts of the Palestinians’ confinement, particularly in relation to the Barrier’s construction. Reliable data has also to be collected, managed, and above all, shared. These challenges have been addressed within the Academic Cooperation Palestine Project (ACPP) that brings together academic partners from the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) West Bank (WB), and Switzerland as well as other international academic institutions and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental agencies. ACPP started in early 2011 and is designed as a large cooperation networking platform involving researchers, students, public servants and experts from the oPt WB. A large set of actions have already been developed during the first year of the project, including courses, training, and research actions. First relevant results and impacts of the different actions are presented in this paper. Taken as a whole, the project produces valuable results for all partners: useful advocacy material for the Palestinian partners, and a unique “real-scale laboratory” where investigations are jointly conducted to develop novel confinement and change indicators.

EU trade agreements and their impacts on human rights: study commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)

The European Union’s (EU) trade policy has a strong influence on economic development and the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries, particularly in developing countries. The present study was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as a contribution to further developing appropriate methodologies for assessing human rights risks in development-related policies, an objective set in the BMZ’s 2011 strategy on human rights. The study offers guidance for stakeholders seeking to improve their knowledge of how to assess, both ex ante and ex post, the impact of Economic Partnership Agreements on poverty reduction and the right to food in ACP countries. Currently, human rights impacts are not yet systematically addressed in the trade sustainability impact assessments (trade SIAs) that the European Commission conducts when negotiating trade agreements. Nor do they focus specifically on disadvantaged groups or include other benchmarks relevant to human rights impact assessments (HRIAs). The EU itself has identified a need for action in this regard. In June 2012 it presented an Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy that calls for the inclusion of human rights in all impact assessments and in this context explicitly refers to trade agreements. Since then, the EU has begun to slightly adapt its SIA methodology and is working to define more adequate human rights–consistent procedures. It is hoped that readers of this study will find inspiration to help contribute to this process and help improve human rights consistency of future trade options.

Trust, Competition and Cooperation in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Objective: Impaired social interactions and repetitive behavior are key features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In the present study we compared social decision-making in subjects with and without ASD. Subjects performed five social decision-making games in order to assess trust, fairness, cooperation & competition behavior and social value orientation. Methods: 19 adults with autism spectrum disorder and 17 controls, matched for age and education, participated in the study. Each subject performed five social decision-making tasks. In the trust game, subjects could maximize their gain by sharing some of their money with another person. In the punishment game, subjects played two versions of the Dictator’s Dilemma. In the dictator condition they could share an amount of 0-100 points with another person. In the punishment condition, the opponent was able to punish the subject if he/she was not satisfied with the amount of points received. In the cooperation game, subjects played with a small group of 3 people. Each of them could (anonymously) select an amount of 5, 7.5 or 10 Swiss francs. The goal of the game was to achieve a high group minimum. In the competition game, subjects performed a dexterity task. Before performing the task, they were asked whether they wanted to compete (winner takes it all) or cooperation (sharing the joint achieved amount of points) with a randomly selected person. Lastly, subjects performed a social value orientation task where they were playing for themselves and for another person. Results: There was no overall difference between healthy controls an ASD subjects in investment in the trust game. However, healthy controls increased their investment over number of trials whereas ASD subjects did not. A similar pattern was found for the punishment game. Furthermore, ASD subjects revealed a decreased investment in the dictator condition of the punishment game. There were no mean differences in competition behavior and social value orientation. Conclusions: The results provide evidence for differences between ASD subjects and healthy controls in social decision-making. Subjects with ASD showed a more consistent behavior than healthy controls in the trust game and the dictator dilemma. The present findings provide evidence for impaired social learning in ASD.