Oesophageal and gastric endoscopic foreign body removal: complications and follow-up of 102 dogs

OBJECTIVES: To assess complication rate, risk factors for complications and outcome in dogs with oesophageal and gastric endoscopic foreign body (FB) removal. METHODS: Medical records of 102 dogs undergoing endoscopic removal of oesophageal and/or gastric FBs from March 2001 to November 2006 were retrospectively reviewed. All owners were contacted by telephone to provide follow-up information. RESULTS: West Highland white terriers, Yorkshire terriers and Bernese mountain dogs were over-represented compared to the hospital population. Endoscopy alone was successful in 92/102 dogs (90.2 per cent), whereas gastrotomy (but no oesophagotomy) was required in 10 dogs (9.8 per cent). Complications in 13/102 dogs (12.7 per cent) were perforation (8), oesophageal stricture (1), oesophageal diverticula (1), perioesophageal abscess (1), pneumothorax and pleural effusion (1) and respiratory arrest (1). Six dogs (all weighing <10 kg) had complications resulting in death or euthanasia. Bone FBs, bodyweight of less than 10 kg, and oesophageal or gastric FB in place for more than three days were significant risk factors for complications. Of the dogs available for follow-up (75/96), 92 per cent had no complications after discharge. CLINICAL SIGNIFICANCE: Endoscopic FB removal is associated with a low overall complication rate with bone FBs and bodyweight of less than 10 kg as significant risk factors.

Principals, agents, and the European Union’s foreign economic policies

In the introduction to this collection on the principal–agent approach and the European Union’s (EU) foreign economic policies we briefly present the EU’s institutional structure for policy-making in trade, monetary, development and international competition and financial policy. We also offer some data on the extent of the EU’s involvement in the international economy. Our discussion of the principal–agent approach and how it can be applied to an analysis of the EU’s foreign economic policies forms the basis of the following contributions. It allows us to formulate three questions that are of particular interest for applications of the principal–agent approach to the EU. Finally, we summarize the various studies included in this collection.

Streptococcus pneumoniae detects and responds to foreign bacterial peptide fragments in its environment

Streptococcus pneumoniae is an important cause of bacterial meningitis and pneumonia but usually colonizes the human nasopharynx harmlessly. As this niche is simultaneously populated by other bacterial species, we looked for a role and pathway of communication between pneumococci and other species. This paper shows that two proteins of non-encapsulated S. pneumoniae, AliB-like ORF 1 and ORF 2, bind specifically to peptides matching other species resulting in changes in the pneumococci. AliB-like ORF 1 binds specifically peptide SETTFGRDFN, matching 50S ribosomal subunit protein L4 of Enterobacteriaceae, and facilitates upregulation of competence for genetic transformation. AliB-like ORF 2 binds specifically peptides containing sequence FPPQS, matching proteins of Prevotella species common in healthy human nasopharyngeal microbiota. We found that AliB-like ORF 2 mediates the early phase of nasopharyngeal colonization in vivo. The ability of S. pneumoniae to bind and respond to peptides of other bacterial species occupying the same host niche may play a key role in adaptation to its environment and in interspecies communication. These findings reveal a completely new concept of pneumococcal interspecies communication which may have implications for communication between other bacterial species and for future interventional therapeutics.

Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid ‘Land Grab’

Food security is important. A rising world population coupled with climate change creates growing pressure on global world food supplies. States alleviate this pressure domestically by attracting agri-foreign direct investment (agri-FDI). This is a high-risk strategy for weak states: the state may gain valuable foreign currency, technology and debt-free growth; but equally, investors may fail to deliver on their commitments and exploit weak domestic legal infrastructure to ‘grab’ large areas of prime agricultural land, leaving only marginal land for domestic production. A net loss to local food security and to the national economy results. This is problematic because the state must continue to guarantee its citizens’ right to food and property. Agri-FDI needs close regulation to maximise its benefit. This article maps the multilevel system of governance covering agri-FDI. We show how this system creates asymmetric rights in favour of the investor to the detriment of the host state’s food security and how these problems might be alleviated.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?