Subnational Patterns of Democracy in Austria, Germany and Switzerland

This article investigates the main political institutions in the sub-national democracies of Austria, Germany and Switzerland. It applies Lijphart’s approach to these German-speaking countries in Western Europe and expands it – following recent advances – by direct democracy. The main finding of the sub-national analysis is that, similar to Lijphart, two dimensions of democracy can be distinguished. While the first can be considered as the ‘consensual dimension’ of democracy, the second represents the ‘rules of the game’. Moreover, and in contrast to analyses at the national level, direct democracy does not constitute a dimension on its own, but forms an important element of consensus decision-making in the sub-national units at hand. Finally, based on cluster analysis three homogenous national clusters were found, but also one cluster with sub-national democracies from Germany and Austria that are more similar to one another than to other Länder within their respective federal states.

Direct democracy and political trust: Enhancing trust, initiating distrust–or both?

This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and political trust. We suggest a solution to the controversy in research centering on positive versus negative effects of direct democracy by analytically differentiating between the availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Theoretically, greater availability of direct democratic rights may enhance political trust by increasing citizens’ perception that political authorities can be controlled as well as by incentivizing political authorities to act trustworthily. In contrast, the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic instruments may initiate distrust as it signals to citizens that political authorities do not act in the public’s interest. We test both hypotheses for the very first time with sub-national data of Switzerland. The empirical results seem to support our theoretical arguments.

Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy

This paper studies the relation between coalition structures in policy processes and policy change. While different factors such as policy images, learning processes, external events, or venue shopping are important to explain policy change, coalition structures within policy processes are often neglected. However, policy change happens as a result of negotiations and coordination among coalitions within policy processes. The paper analyzes how conflict, collaboration, and power relations among coalitions of actors influence policy change in an institutional context of a consensus democracy. Empirically, I rely on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to conduct a cross-sector comparison of the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. Coalition structures with low conflict and strong collaboration among coalitions as well as structures with dominant coalitions and weak collaboration both facilitate major policy change. Competing coalitions that are separated by strong conflict but still collaborate strongly produce policy outputs that are close to the status quo.

Direct Democracy and Institutional Trust: Relationships and Differences across Personality Traits

Direct democracy plays a prominent role in the explanation of institutional trust. To date, however, empirical findings on the effects of direct democracy remain inconclusive. In this article, we argue that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences institutional trust, but how and to what degree depends on individuals’ personality traits. Running hierarchical analyses of unique survey data from a random sample of eligible Swiss voters, we document three findings: First, we show that the number of ballot measures is not directly associated with institutional trust. Second, we demonstrate that the Big Five personality traits affect the propensity to trust. Third, some of these traits also alter the relationship between direct democracy and institutional trust, suggesting that certain personality types are more likely to be sensitive to popular votes than others and that not everyone is equally likely to respond to political stimuli, even in highly democratic environments.

Taking the multidimensionality of democracy seriously: institutional patterns and the quality of democracy

Democracies come in all shapes and sizes. Which configuration of political institutions produces the highest democratic quality is a notorious debate. The lineup of contenders includes ‘consensus’, ‘Westminster’, and ‘centripetal’ democracy. A trend in the evaluation of the relationship between empirical patterns of democracy and its quality is that the multidimensional nature of both concepts is increasingly taken into account. This article tests the assertion that certain centripetal configurations of proportionality in party systems and government, and unitarism in the remaining state structure, might outperform all other alternatives both in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness. Analyzing 33 democracies, the results of interactive regression models only partially support this claim. Proportional–unitary democracies have the best track record in terms of representation, but there are little differences in participation, transparency, and government capability compared with other models.

How exclusive is assembly democracy? Citizens assembly and ballot participation compared

This paper analyses the difference between two specific forms of citizens’ involvements, namely whether a vote is cast by ballot or in a citizens’ assembly in which people gather in town halls to decide legislative questions in a deliberative manner. We show both theoretically and empirically how citizens’ assemblies and decisions at the ballot box substantially differ not only in terms of their underlying model of democracy, but also in their structural conditions and, thus, with respect to the social inequality of participation. We test our hypotheses in a Bayesian multilevel framework using real participation data collected from 15 political decisions made in a Swiss commune. Our results show that citizens’ assemblies are not only characterised by lower participation rates, but also by a particular composition of the electorate. While citizens’ assemblies are more equal regarding income groups, ballots favour a more equitable participation in terms of gender and age.

Democratic Legitimation of Trade Policy Tomorrow: TTIP, Democracy and Market in the Swiss Constitution

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are increasingly more concerned with regulatory convergence, rather than trade liberalisation through elimination of tariffs. This appears to result more often in so-called dynamic trade agreements, which still evolve after adoption. Further economic integration in democracies, however, depends on the support of the constituency. This article takes a closer look at the democratic legitimation of global economic integration in a case study on Switzerland. It finds that the current principles and institutions of democracy in Switzerland are unlikely to fully accommodate the new regulatory challenges of dynamic FTAs.