The mass-hierarchy and CP-violation discovery reach of the LBNO long-baseline neutrino experiment

The next generation neutrino observatory proposed by the LBNO collaboration will address fundamental questions in particle and astroparticle physics. The experiment consists of a far detector, in its first stage a 20 kt LAr double phase TPC and a magnetised iron calorimeter, situated at 2300 km from CERN and a near detector based on a highpressure argon gas TPC. The long baseline provides a unique opportunity to study neutrino flavour oscillations over their 1st and 2nd oscillation maxima exploring the L/E behaviour, and distinguishing effects arising from δCP and matter. In this paper we have reevaluated the physics potential of this setup for determining the mass hierarchy (MH) and discovering CP-violation (CPV), using a conventional neutrino beam from the CERN SPS with a power of 750 kW. We use conservative assumptions on the knowledge of oscillation parameter priors and systematic uncertainties. The impact of each systematic error and the precision of oscillation prior is shown. We demonstrate that the first stage of LBNO can determine unambiguously the MH to > 5δ C.L. over the whole phase space. We show that the statistical treatment of the experiment is of very high importance, resulting in the conclusion that LBNO has ~ 100% probability to determine the MH in at most 4-5 years of running. Since the knowledge of MH is indispensable to extract δCP from the data, the first LBNO phase can convincingly give evidence for CPV on the 3δ C.L. using today’s knowledge on oscillation parameters and realistic assumptions on the systematic uncertainties.

Does perpetrator punishment satisfy victims' feelings of revenge?

Criminal victimization often provokes strong feelings of revenge. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether legal punishment of the perpetrator reduces victims’ feelings of revenge. A cross-sectional study of 174 crime victims revealed that punishment severity does not predict feelings of revenge at a time several years after the trial. A longitudinal study of 31 crime victims revealed that, for the time interval from a few weeks before the trial to a few weeks after the trial, punishment severity significantly predicts a decrease in feelings of revenge; nevertheless intraindividual and interindividual stability of these feelings was high. Taken together, results of the two studies suggest that perpetrator punishment only partially, and moreover only transitorily, satisfies victims’ feelings of revenge. Therefore, satisfaction of victims’ feelings of revenge cannot be taken as empirical justification for tightening of sentencing norms.

Punishment goals of crime victims

Research on subjective punishment goals has focused on the perspective of third-party observers of criminal offenses and neglected the perspective of victims. This study investigates punishment goals among 174 adult crime victims (rape and nonsexual assault) for each participant’s real criminal case. Scales measuring support for punishment goals are constructed by factor analysis of an 18-item list. Results show that 5 highly supported goals can be distinguished: retaliation, recognition of victim status, confirmation of societal values, victim security, and societal security. Analysis of relations between punishment goal scales and personal variables, situational variables, and demanded punishment severity corroborates the view that the punishment goals revealed can be classified according to the two independent dichotomies of moral versus instrumental goals, and micro versus macro goals.

Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.

Norm enforcement in the city revisited: An international field experiment of altruistic punishment, norm maintenance, and broken windows

In laboratory experiments, people are willing to sanction norms at a cost—a behavioral tendency called altruistic punishment. However, the degree to which these findings can be generalized to real-world interactions is still debated. Only a small number of field experiments have been conducted, and initial results suggest that punishment is less frequent outside of the lab. This study replicates one of the first field experiments on altruistic punishment and builds ties to research on norm compliance and the broken windows theory. The original study addressed the enforcement of the anti-littering norm in Athens. We replicate this study in Bern, Zurich, and New York City. As an extension, we investigate how the experimental context (clean vs littered) impacts social norm enforcement. As a second extension, we investigate how opportunity structure impacts the maintenance of the anti-littering norm. Findings indicate that norms are universally enforced, although significantly less than in the standard laboratory experiment,and that enforcement is significantly more common in Switzerland than in New York. Moreover, individuals prefer more subtle forms of enforcement to direct punishment. We also find that enforcement is less frequent in littered than in clean contexts, suggesting that broken windows might not only foster deviant behavior but also weaken informal social control. Finally, we find that opportunity structure can encourage people to maintain norms, as indicated by the fact that people are more likely to voluntarily pick up litter when it is closer to a trash bin.