Motivational profiles of sport event volunteers.

Aim of the study Due to the valuable contribution made by volunteers to sporting events, a better understanding of volunteers’ motivation is imperative for event managers in order to develop effective volunteer re-cruitment and retention strategies. The adoption of working conditions and task domains to the mo-tives and needs of volunteers is one of the key challenges in volunteer management. Conversely, an ignorance of the motives and needs of volunteers could negatively affect their performance and attitude, which will have negative consequences for the execution of events (Strigas & Jackson, 2003). In general, the motives of volunteers are located on a continuum between selflessness (e.g. helping others), and self-interest (e.g. pursuing one’s own interests). Furthermore, it should take into account that volunteers may be motivated by more than one need or goal, and therefore, configure different bundles of motives, resulting in heterogeneous types of motives for voluntary engagement (Dolnicar & Randle, 2007). Despite the extensive number of studies on the motives of sport event volunteers, only few studies focus on the analysis of individual motive profiles concerning volun-teering. Accordingly, we will take a closer look at the following questions: To what extent do volun-teers at sporting events differ in the motives of their engagement, and how can the volunteers be ade-quately classified? Theoretical Background According to the functional approach, relevant subjective motives are related to the outcomes and consequences that volunteering is supposed to lead to and to produce. This means, individuals’ mo-tives determine which incentives are anticipated in return for volunteering (e.g. increase in social contacts), and are important for engaging in volunteering, e.g. the choice between different oppor-tunities for voluntary activity, or different tasks (Stukas et al., 2009). Additionally, inter-individual differences of motive structures as well as matching motives in the reflections of voluntary activities will be considered by using a person-oriented approach. In the person-oriented approach, it is not the specific variables that are made the entities of investigation, but rather persons with a certain combination of characteristic features (Bergmann et al., 2003). Person-orientation in the field of sports event volunteers, it is therefore essential to implement an orientation towards people as a unit of analysis. Accordingly, individual motive profiles become the object of investigation. The individ-ual motive profiles permit a glimpse of intra-individual differences in the evaluation of different motive areas, and thus represent the real subjective perspective. Hence, a person will compare the importance of individual motives for his behaviour primarily in relation to other motives (e.g. social contacts are more important to me than material incentives), and make fewer comparisons with the assessments of other people. Methodology, research design and data analysis The motives of sports event volunteers were analysed in the context of the European Athletics Championships 2014 in Zürich. After data cleaning, the study sample contained a total of 1,169 volunteers, surveyed by an online questionnaire. The VMS-ISA scale developed by Bang and Chel-ladurai (2009) was used and replicated successfully by a confirmatory factor analysis. Accordingly, all seven factors of the scale were included in the subsequent cluster analysis to determine typical motive profiles of volunteers. Before proceeding with the cluster analysis, an intra-individual stand-ardization procedure (according to Spiel, 1998) was applied to take advantage of the intra-individual relationships between the motives of the volunteers. Intra-individual standardization means that every value of each motive dimension was related to the average individual level of ex-pectations. In the final step, motive profiles were determined using a hierarchic cluster analysis based on Ward’s method with squared Euclidean distances. Results, discussion and implications The results reveal that motivational processes differ among sports event volunteers, and that volunteers sometimes combine contradictory bundles of motives. In our study, four different volunteer motive profiles were identified and described by their positive levels on the individual motive dimension: the community supporters, the material incentive seekers, the social networkers, and the career and personal growth pursuers. To describe the four identified motive profiles in more detail and to externally validate them, the clusters were analysed in relation to socio-economic, sport-related, and voluntary work characteristics. This motive-based typology of sports event volunteers can provide valuable guidance for event managers in order to create distinctive and designable working conditions and tasks at sporting events that should, in relation to a person-oriented approach, be tailored to a wide range of individ-ual prerequisites. Furthermore, specific recruitment procedures and appropriate communication measures can be defined in order to approach certain groups of potential volunteers more effectively. References Bang, H., & Chelladurai, P. (2009). Development and validation of the volunteer motivations scale for international sporting events (VMS-ISE). International Journal Sport Management and Market-ing, 6, 332-350. Bergmann, L. R., Magnusson, D., & El-Khouri, B. M. (2003). Studying individual development in an interindividual context. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Dolnicar, S., & Randle, M. (2007). What motivates which volunteers? Psychographic heterogeneity among volunteers in Australia. Voluntas, 18, 135-155. Spiel, C. (1998). Four methodological approaches to the study of stability and change in develop-ment. Methods of Psychological Research Online, 3, 8-22. Stukas, A. A., Worth, K. A., Clary, E. G., & Snyder, M. (2009). The matching of motivations to affordances in the volunteer environment: an index for assessing the impact of multiple matches on volunteer outcomes. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38, 5-28.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Sustained impact of a short small group course with systematic feedback in addition to regular clinical clerkship activities on musculoskeletal examination skills-a controlled study.

BACKGROUND The discrepancy between the extensive impact of musculoskeletal complaints and the common deficiencies in musculoskeletal examination skills lead to increased emphasis on structured teaching and assessment. However, studies of single interventions are scarce and little is known about the time-dependent effect of assisted learning in addition to a standard curriculum. We therefore evaluated the immediate and long-term impact of a small group course on musculoskeletal examination skills. METHODS All 48 Year 4 medical students of a 6 year curriculum, attending their 8 week clerkship of internal medicine at one University department in Berne, participated in this controlled study. Twenty-seven students were assigned to the intervention of a 6×1 h practical course (4-7 students, interactive hands-on examination of real patients; systematic, detailed feedback to each student by teacher, peers and patients). Twenty-one students took part in the regular clerkship activities only and served as controls. In all students clinical skills (CS, 9 items) were assessed in an Objective Structured Clinical Examination (OSCE) station, including specific musculoskeletal examination skills (MSES, 7 items) and interpersonal skills (IPS, 2 items). Two raters assessed the skills on a 4-point Likert scale at the beginning (T0), the end (T1) and 4-12 months after (T2) the clerkship. Statistical analyses included Friedman test, Wilcoxon rank sum test and Mann-Whitney U test. RESULTS At T0 there were no significant differences between the intervention and control group. At T1 and T2 the control group showed no significant changes of CS, MSES and IPS compared to T0. In contrast, the intervention group significantly improved CS, MSES and IPS at T1 (p < 0.001). This enhancement was sustained for CS and MSES (p < 0.05), but not for IPS at T2. CONCLUSIONS Year 4 medical students were incapable of improving their musculoskeletal examination skills during regular clinical clerkship activities. However, an additional small group, interactive clinical skills course with feedback from various sources, improved these essential examination skills immediately after the teaching and several months later. We conclude that supplementary specific teaching activities are needed. Even a single, short-lasting targeted module can have a long lasting effect and is worth the additional effort.

Room for Experiment: The Countess of Arundel’s "Site of Medication"

The so-called Dutch Pranketing Room of Alethea Talbot, Countess of Arundel, at Tart Hall was a site of domestic experiments, courtly splendour and global ambition. Lady Arundel, the probable author of a famous recipe book, would have used Tart Hall for cooking and experiments as well as for impressive dinner parties, and she would have used large amounts of sugar to create intricate imitations of meat and vegetables to astonish, entertain and delight her guests. Linking household practice with global trade as well as artistic creation, Lady Arundel’s banquets are situated not only between a national tradition of cooking, as it appears in Markham’s manuals, and the new possibilities the arising global trade provided, but also played with a mismatch between taste and sight. This mediating role could be compared to that played by the artists the Countess employed. Within this context it is worth noting that a series of paintings displayed in the building’s gallery showed still lifes, markets, and a cook. The inventory of Tart Hall gives an insight into the world of the widely travelled collector and patron of Van Dyck and Rubens, but raises also a number of questions. In my talk I would like to explore the Countess’ Pranketing Room as a site of mediation between alimentary and painterly experiments, considering the use of recipes, experience, invention and transformation