Restorative dentistry and restorative materials over the next 20 years: A Delphi survey

OBJECTIVES The aim of this study was to forecast trends in restorative dentistry over the next 20 years and to identify treatment goals and corresponding properties of restorative materials. METHODS Using the Delphi method, a panel of 3 experts identified 8 key questions, which were sent to experts in restorative and preventive dentistry. In round 1 of this survey, 15 international experts devised a clearer semantic definition of the key questions and the completion of respective items for two additional rounds. In round 2, 125 experts from 35 countries rated the items developed in round 1 using a Likert scale. In round 3, the same 125 experts received the ratings of round 2 and were asked to agree or disagree to these ratings by re-voting on all key questions and items. A total of 105 experts re-voted and finally took part in the complete survey. Among the 8 key questions, two questions were selected for the present report: (Q1) "What will be the future role of restorative treatment?" and (Q6) "What will be the key qualities for clinical success of restorations?" For both questions and the respective items, the experts were asked to evaluate the importance and the feasibility for later calculation of the scientific value (i.e. the opportunity, where opportunity=importance+[importance-feasibility]). RESULTS The three items of highest importance for Q1 were "preservation of existing enamel and dentin tissue," "prevention of secondary caries," and "maintenance of the pulp vitality," and for Q6 they were "optimization of adhesion," "biocompatibility," and "minimizing technical sensitivity." SIGNIFICANCE Bioactivity toward the pulp-dentin complex and prevention of secondary caries were the items generally rated as having the highest opportunity.

Campaigning Against Europe? The Role of Euroskeptic Fringe and Mainstream Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Election

In this article, we analyze political parties' campaign communication during the 2009 European Parliamentary election in 11 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). We study which types of issues Euroskeptic fringe and Euroskeptic mainstream parties put on their campaign agendas and the kind and extent of EU opposition they voice. Further, we seek to understand whether Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties co-orient themselves toward each other within their national party systems with regard to their campaigns. To understand the role of Euroskeptic parties in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, we draw on a systematic content analysis of parties' posters and televised campaign spots. Our results show that it is Euroskeptic parties at the edges of the political spectrum who discuss polity questions of EU integration and who most openly criticize the union. Principled opposition against the project of EU integration, however, can only be observed in the UK. Finally, we find indicators for co-orientation effects regarding the tone of EU mobilization: In national political environments where Euroskeptic parties strongly criticize the EU, pro-European parties at the same time publicly advance pro-EU positions.

Minimizing the Threat of a Positive Majority Deficit in Two-tier Voting Systems with Equipopulous Units

The mean majority deficit in a two-tier voting system is a function of the partition of the population. We derive a new square-root rule: For odd-numbered population sizes and equipopulous units the mean majority deficit is maximal when the member size of the units in the partition is close to the square root of the population size. Furthermore, within the partitions into roughly equipopulous units, partitions with small even numbers of units or small even-sized units yield high mean majority deficits. We discuss the implications for the winner-takes-all system in the US Electoral College.

Moral Politics: The Religious Factor in Referenda Voting

This article combines the research strands of moral politics and political behavior by focusing on the effect of individual and contextual religiosity on individual vote decisions in popular initiatives and public referenda concerning morally charged issues. We rely on a total of 13 surveys with 1,000 respondents each conducted after every referendum on moral policies in Switzerland between 1992 and 2012. Results based on cross-classified multilevel models show that religious behaving instead of nominal religious belonging plays a crucial role in decision making on moral issues. This supports the idea that the traditional confessional cleavage is replaced by a new religious cleavage that divides the religious from the secular. This newer cleavage is characterized by party alignments that extend from electoral to direct democratic voting behavior. Overall, our study lends support to previous findings drawn from American research on moral politics, direct democracies, and the public role of religion.

Populist Communication in the Context of European Parliament Elections 2014

Over the last decade European democracies have been facing a challenge by the rising force of new populist movements. The emergence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe created new fertile soil for the strengthening of old-established – and the development of new – populist parties in several EU-member states. José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, emphasized his increased unease concerning these developments when he was speaking at the annual Brussels Think Tank Forum on 22. April 2013: “I am deeply concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis; […]” (Barroso 2013). Indeed, European elites seem to be increasingly worried by these recent developments which are perceived as an impending stress test of the Union and the project of European integration as a whole (Hartleb 2013). Sure enough, the results of the recent European Parliament Elections 2014 revealed a great support for populist political parties in many societies of EU-member countries. To understand the success of populist parties in Europe it is crucial to first shed light on the nature of populist party communication itself. Significant communicative differences may explain the varying success of populist parties between and within countries, while a pure demand-side approach (i.e. a focus on the preferences of the electorate) often fails to do so (Mudde 2010). The aim of this study is therefore to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerge during the EP election campaign 2014 and under which conditions populist communication styles are selected by political parties. So far, the empirical measurement of populism has received only scarce attention (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Besides, most of the existing empirical investigations of populism are single case studies (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008) and scholars have not yet developed systematic methods to measure populism in a comparative way (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). This is a consequence of a lack of conceptual clarity which goes along with populism (Taggart 2000; Barr 2009; Canovan 1999) due to its contextual sensitivity. Hence, populism in Europe should be analysed in a way that clarifies the concept of populism and moreover takes into account that the Europeanization of politics has an influence on the type of populist party communication, which is intended in the course of that study.

Do Ads Add Up? The Impact of Parties' Advertisements on the Stability of Vote Choice at the Swiss National Elections 2011

Our contribution analyses the influence of campaign advertisements on vote choice in the 2011 elections to the Swiss National Council. Concretely, we ask whether and to what extent the relative exposure to party ads of a preferred party exerts a reinforcing effect on an individual's party choice. We make use of the two-wave panel structure contained in the RCS survey data of the Selects 2011 and combine it with data on advertisements in 20 important national and regional newspapers. We find that increasing exposure to the campaign of one's preferred party may reinforce individuals with strong party attachment in their initial vote choice. Yet this effect only materializes with substantial campaign duration and exposure. Additional and exploratory analyses revealed that particularly the two recently emerged parties, the GLP and BDP, might have made a slight difference by potentially persuading defecting voters with the help of their campaign.

The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Automatic X-ray landmark detection and shape segmentation via data-driven joint estimation of image displacements

In this paper, we propose a new method for fully-automatic landmark detection and shape segmentation in X-ray images. To detect landmarks, we estimate the displacements from some randomly sampled image patches to the (unknown) landmark positions, and then we integrate these predictions via a voting scheme. Our key contribution is a new algorithm for estimating these displacements. Different from other methods where each image patch independently predicts its displacement, we jointly estimate the displacements from all patches together in a data driven way, by considering not only the training data but also geometric constraints on the test image. The displacements estimation is formulated as a convex optimization problem that can be solved efficiently. Finally, we use the sparse shape composition model as the a priori information to regularize the landmark positions and thus generate the segmented shape contour. We validate our method on X-ray image datasets of three different anatomical structures: complete femur, proximal femur and pelvis. Experiments show that our method is accurate and robust in landmark detection, and, combined with the shape model, gives a better or comparable performance in shape segmentation compared to state-of-the art methods. Finally, a preliminary study using CT data shows the extensibility of our method to 3D data.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Corruption and the Electoral Support of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Measuring citizens' implicit and explicit attitudes towards the European Union

Studies assessing citizens’ attitudes towards Europe have mostly used explicit concepts and measures. However, psychologists have shown that human behaviour is not only determined by explicit attitudes which can be assessed via self-report, but also by implicit attitudes which require indirect measurement. We combine a self-report questionnaire with an implicit Affective Misattribution Procedure for the first time in an online environment to estimate the reliability, validity and predictive power of this implicit measure for the explanation of European Union-skeptical behaviour. Based on a survey with a sample representative for Germany, we found evidence for good reliability and validity of the implicit measure. In addition, the implicit attitude had a significant incremental impact beyond explicit attitudes on citizens’ proneness to engage in EU-skeptical information and voting behaviour.

European mobility and local political incorporation: The case of British and Romanian residents in Spain

This paper analyses the impact of European mobility in the field of the political nomination of intra-EU migrants in local elections. The study contributes to the debates in the literature related to immigrant nomination and representation by showing how group resources and political opportunities in the country of residence interact with the political opportunities of the European citizenship regime. It argues that the symbolic and legal status of European identity, representation in the European Parliament and strong links between political institutions in the countries of destination and origin play a positive role in boosting immigrant political entrepreneurs’ visibility vis-à-vis host country political actors. In order to illustrate these findings, the paper provides a qualitative comparison of British and Romanian residents in Spain.