36 resultados para Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
Resumo:
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE Mechanical thrombectomy is beneficial for patients with acute ischemic stroke and a proximal anterior occlusion, but it is unclear if these results can be extrapolated to patients with an M2 occlusion. The purpose of this study was to examine the technical aspects, safety, and outcomes of mechanical thrombectomy with a stent retriever in patients with an isolated M2 occlusion who were included in 3 large multicenter prospective studies. MATERIALS AND METHODS We included patients from the Solitaire Flow Restoration Thrombectomy for Acute Revascularization (STAR), Solitaire With the Intention For Thrombectomy (SWIFT), and Solitaire With the Intention for Thrombectomy as Primary Endovascular Treatment (SWIFT PRIME) studies, 3 large multicenter prospective studies on thrombectomy for ischemic stroke. We compared outcomes and technical details of patients with an M2 with those with an M1 occlusion. All patients were treated with a stent retriever. Imaging data and outcomes were scored by an independent core laboratory. Successful reperfusion was defined as modified Thrombolysis in Cerebral Infarction score of 2b/3. RESULTS We included 50 patients with an M2 and 249 patients with an M1 occlusion. Patients with an M2 occlusion were older (mean age, 71 versus 67 years; P = .04) and had a lower NIHSS score (median, 13 versus 17; P < .001) compared with those with an M1 occlusion. Procedural time was nonsignificantly shorter in patients with an M2 occlusion (median, 29 versus 35 minutes; P = .41). The average number of passes with a stent retriever was also nonsignificantly lower in patients with an M2 occlusion (mean, 1.4 versus 1.7; P = .07). There were no significant differences in successful reperfusion (85% versus 82%, P = .82), symptomatic intracerebral hemorrhages (2% versus 2%, P = 1.0), device-related serious adverse events (6% versus 4%, P = .46), or modified Rankin Scale score 0-2 at follow-up (60% versus 56%, P = .64). CONCLUSIONS Endovascular reperfusion therapy appears to be feasible in selected patients with ischemic stroke and an M2 occlusion.
Resumo:
Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.
Resumo:
PURPOSE To compare time-efficiency in the production of implant crowns using a digital workflow versus the conventional pathway. MATERIALS AND METHODS This prospective clinical study used a crossover design that included 20 study participants receiving single-tooth replacements in posterior sites. Each patient received a customized titanium abutment plus a computer-aided design/computer-assisted manufacture (CAD/CAM) zirconia suprastructure (for those in the test group, using digital workflow) and a standardized titanium abutment plus a porcelain-fused-to-metal crown (for those in the control group, using a conventional pathway). The start of the implant prosthetic treatment was established as the baseline. Time-efficiency analysis was defined as the primary outcome, and was measured for every single clinical and laboratory work step in minutes. Statistical analysis was calculated with the Wilcoxon rank sum test. RESULTS All crowns could be provided within two clinical appointments, independent of the manufacturing process. The mean total production time, as the sum of clinical plus laboratory work steps, was significantly different. The mean ± standard deviation (SD) time was 185.4 ± 17.9 minutes for the digital workflow process and 223.0 ± 26.2 minutes for the conventional pathway (P = .0001). Therefore, digital processing for overall treatment was 16% faster. Detailed analysis for the clinical treatment revealed a significantly reduced mean ± SD chair time of 27.3 ± 3.4 minutes for the test group compared with 33.2 ± 4.9 minutes for the control group (P = .0001). Similar results were found for the mean laboratory work time, with a significant decrease of 158.1 ± 17.2 minutes for the test group vs 189.8 ± 25.3 minutes for the control group (P = .0001). CONCLUSION Only a few studies have investigated efficiency parameters of digital workflows compared with conventional pathways in implant dental medicine. This investigation shows that the digital workflow seems to be more time-efficient than the established conventional production pathway for fixed implant-supported crowns. Both clinical chair time and laboratory manufacturing steps could be effectively shortened with the digital process of intraoral scanning plus CAD/CAM technology.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVES The aim of this prospective cohort trial was to perform a cost/time analysis for implant-supported single-unit reconstructions in the digital workflow compared to the conventional pathway. MATERIALS AND METHODS A total of 20 patients were included for rehabilitation with 2 × 20 implant crowns in a crossover study design and treated consecutively each with customized titanium abutments plus CAD/CAM-zirconia-suprastructures (test: digital) and with standardized titanium abutments plus PFM-crowns (control conventional). Starting with prosthetic treatment, analysis was estimated for clinical and laboratory work steps including measure of costs in Swiss Francs (CHF), productivity rates and cost minimization for first-line therapy. Statistical calculations were performed with Wilcoxon signed-rank test. RESULTS Both protocols worked successfully for all test and control reconstructions. Direct treatment costs were significantly lower for the digital workflow 1815.35 CHF compared to the conventional pathway 2119.65 CHF [P = 0.0004]. For subprocess evaluation, total laboratory costs were calculated as 941.95 CHF for the test group and 1245.65 CHF for the control group, respectively [P = 0.003]. The clinical dental productivity rate amounted to 29.64 CHF/min (digital) and 24.37 CHF/min (conventional) [P = 0.002]. Overall, cost minimization analysis exhibited an 18% cost reduction within the digital process. CONCLUSION The digital workflow was more efficient than the established conventional pathway for implant-supported crowns in this investigation.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVE Recent small single-center data indicate that the current hemodynamic parameters used to diagnose critical limb ischemia are insensitive. We investigated the validity of the societal guidelines-recommended hemodynamic parameters against core laboratory-adjudicated angiographic data from the multicenter IN.PACT DEEP (RandomIzed AmPhirion DEEP DEB vs StAndard PTA for the treatment of below the knee Critical limb ischemia) Trial. METHODS Of the 358 patients in the IN.PACT DEEP Trial to assess drug-eluting balloon vs standard balloon angioplasty for infrapopliteal disease, 237 had isolated infrapopliteal disease with an available ankle-brachial index (ABI), and only 40 of the latter had available toe pressure measurements. The associations between ABI, ankle pressure, and toe pressure with tibial runoff, Rutherford category, and plantar arch were examined according to the cutoff points recommended by the societal guidelines. Abnormal tibial runoff was defined as severely stenotic (≥70%) or occluded and scored as one-, two-, or three-vessel disease. A stenotic or occluded plantar arch was considered abnormal. RESULTS Only 14 of 237 patients (6%) had an ABI <0.4. Abnormal ankle pressure, defined as <50 mm Hg if Rutherford category 4 and <70 mm Hg if Rutherford category 5 or 6, was found only in 37 patients (16%). Abnormal toe pressure, defined as <30 mm Hg if Rutherford category 4 and <50 mm Hg if Rutherford category 5 or 6, was found in 24 of 40 patients (60%) with available measurements. Importantly, 29% of these 24 patients had an ABI within normal reference ranges. A univariate multinomial logistic regression found no association between the above hemodynamic parameters and the number of diseased infrapopliteal vessels. However, there was a significant paradoxic association where patients with Rutherford category 6 had higher ABI and ankle pressure than those with Rutherford category 5. Similarly, there was no association between ABI and pedal arch patency. CONCLUSIONS The current recommended hemodynamic parameters fail to identify a significant portion of patients with lower extremity ulcers and angiographically proven severe disease. Toe pressure has better sensitivity and should be considered in all patients with critical limb ischemia.
Resumo:
INTRODUCTION Although hepatitis C virus (HCV) screening is recommended for all HIV-infected patients initiating antiretroviral therapy, data on epidemiologic characteristics of HCV infection in resource-limited settings are scarce. METHODS We searched PubMed and EMBASE for studies assessing the prevalence of HCV infection among HIV-infected individuals in Africa and extracted data on laboratory methods used. Prevalence estimates from individual studies were combined for each country using random-effects meta-analysis. The importance of study design, population and setting as well as type of test (anti-HCV antibody tests and polymerase chain reactions) was examined with meta-regression. RESULTS Three randomized controlled trials, 28 cohort studies and 121 cross-sectional analyses with 108,180 HIV-infected individuals from 35 countries were included. The majority of data came from outpatient populations (55%), followed by blood donors (15%) and pregnant women (14%). Based on estimates from 159 study populations, anti-HCV positivity prevalence ranged between 3.3% (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.8-4.7) in Southern Africa and 42.3% (95% CI 4.1-80.5) in North Africa. Study design, type of setting and age distribution did not influence this prevalence significantly. The prevalence of replicating HCV infection, estimated from data of 29 cohorts, was 2.0% (95% CI 1.5-2.6). Ten studies from nine countries reported the HCV genotype of 74 samples, 53% were genotype 1, 24% genotype 2, 14% genotype 4 and 9% genotypes 3, 5 or 6. CONCLUSIONS The prevalence of anti-HCV antibodies is high in HIV-infected patients in Africa, but replicating HCV infection is rare and varies widely across countries.