The Quiet Eye and Information Processing: Facilitation of Stimulus Identification and Response Selection

Background: A prerequisite for high performance in motor tasks is the acquisition of egocentric sensory information that must be translated into motor actions. A phenomenon that supports this process is the Quiet Eye (QE) defined as long final fixation before movement initiation. It is assumed that the QE facilitates information processing, particularly regarding movement parameterization. Aims: The question remains whether this facilitation also holds for the information-processing stage of response selection and – related to perception crucial – stage of stimulus identification. Method: In two experiments with sport science students, performance-enhancing effects of experimentally manipulated QE durations were tested as a function of target position predictability and target visibility, thereby selectively manipulating response selection and stimulus identification demands, respectively. Results: The results support the hypothesis of facilitated information processing through long QE durations since in both experiments performance-enhancing effects of long QE durations were found under increased processing demands only. In Experiment 1, QE duration affected performance only if the target position was not predictable and positional information had to be processed over the QE period. In Experiment 2, in a full vs. no target visibility comparison with saccades to the upcoming target position induced by flicker cues, the functionality of a long QE duration depended on the visual stimulus identification period as soon as the interval falls below a certain threshold. Conclusions: The results corroborate earlier findings that QE efficiency depends on demands put on the visuomotor system, thereby furthering the assumption that the phenomenon supports the processes of sensorimotor integration.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Medical Practice and International Networks. A Swiss National Foundation Funded project based ath the University of Bern

Project presentation

Mitigating the syndromes of desertification: The requirements for transdisciplinary research and information exchange

In developing meaningful mitigation strategies to combat desertification, it is important to address the complex constellation of desertification under different bio-physical, social, demographic, political and economic conditions. In particular, desertification can be described as a cluster of key processes of global change which together form a typical syndrome. A critical reflection on the potential of research to help mitigate desertification will be a useful first step, before addressing the requirements for research partnerships between institutions at local levels and beyond. A practical example from Eritrea, an ecoregion which has been plagued by desertification for many centuries, is given at the end of the paper. It illustrates options for generating the necessary data and developing useful information in order to enhance the impact of research on sustainable development.

Job-shadowing: Swiss health librarians observing experienced search specialists and information skills trainers in London

Abstract As librarians of the Social & Preventive Medicine Library in Bern, we help researchers perform systematic literature searches and teach students to use medical databases. We developed our skills mainly “on the job”, and we wondered how other health librarians in Europe were trained to become experts in searching. We had a great opportunity to “job shadow” specialists in this area of library service during a 5-day-internship at the Royal Free Hospital Medical Library in London, Great Britain.

The New Concept of Universal Service in a Digital Networked Communications Environment

Digitization, sophisticated fiber-optic networks and the resultant convergence of the media, communications and information technology industries have completely transformed the communications ecosystem in the last couple of decades. New contingent business and social models were created that have been mirrored in the amended communications regimes. Yet, despite an overhaul of the communications regulation paradigm, the status of and the rules on universal service have remained surprisingly intact, both during and after the liberalization exercise. The present paper looks into this paradox and examines the sustainability of the existing concept of universal service. It suggests that there is a need for a novel concept of universal service in the digital networked communications environment, whose objectives go beyond the conventional internalizing and redistributional rationales and concentrate on communication and information networks as a public good, where not only access to infrastructure but also access to content may be essential.

AccessMod 3.0: computing geographic coverage and accessibility to health care services using anisotropic movement of patients

Background Access to health care can be described along four dimensions: geographic accessibility, availability, financial accessibility and acceptability. Geographic accessibility measures how physically accessible resources are for the population, while availability reflects what resources are available and in what amount. Combining these two types of measure into a single index provides a measure of geographic (or spatial) coverage, which is an important measure for assessing the degree of accessibility of a health care network. Results This paper describes the latest version of AccessMod, an extension to the Geographical Information System ArcView 3.×, and provides an example of application of this tool. AccessMod 3 allows one to compute geographic coverage to health care using terrain information and population distribution. Four major types of analysis are available in AccessMod: (1) modeling the coverage of catchment areas linked to an existing health facility network based on travel time, to provide a measure of physical accessibility to health care; (2) modeling geographic coverage according to the availability of services; (3) projecting the coverage of a scaling-up of an existing network; (4) providing information for cost effectiveness analysis when little information about the existing network is available. In addition to integrating travelling time, population distribution and the population coverage capacity specific to each health facility in the network, AccessMod can incorporate the influence of landscape components (e.g. topography, river and road networks, vegetation) that impact travelling time to and from facilities. Topographical constraints can be taken into account through an anisotropic analysis that considers the direction of movement. We provide an example of the application of AccessMod in the southern part of Malawi that shows the influences of the landscape constraints and of the modes of transportation on geographic coverage. Conclusion By incorporating the demand (population) and the supply (capacities of heath care centers), AccessMod provides a unifying tool to efficiently assess the geographic coverage of a network of health care facilities. This tool should be of particular interest to developing countries that have a relatively good geographic information on population distribution, terrain, and health facility locations.

Legal Framework for Cross-Regional Networks: The Case of Services and Migration

Paper prepared by Marion Panizzon and Charlotte Sieber-Gasser for the International Conference on the Political Economy of Liberalising Trade in Services, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 14-15 June 2010 Recent literature has shed light on the economic potential of cross-border networks. These networks, consisting of expatriates and their acquaintances from abroad and at home, provide the basis for the creation of cross-border value added chains and therewith the means for turning brain drain into brain circulation. Both aspects are potentially valuable for economic growth in the developing world. Unilateral co-development policies operating through co-funding of expatriate business ventures, but also bilateral agreements liberalising circular migration for a limited set of per-sons testify to the increasing awareness of governments about the potential, which expatriate networks hold for economic growth in developing countries. Whereas such punctual efforts are valuable, viewed from a long term perspective, these top-down, government mandated Diaspora stimulation programs, will not replace, this paper argues, the market-driven liberalisation of infrastructure and other services in developing countries. Nor will they carry, in the case of circular labour migration, the political momentum to liberalise labour market admission for those non-nationals, who will eventually emerge as the future transnational entrepreneurs. It will take a combination of mode 4 and infrastructure services openings-cum regulation for countries at both sides of the spectrum to provide the basis and precondition for transnational business and entrepreneurial networks to emerge and translate into cross-border, value added production chains. Two key issues are of particular relevance in this context: (i) the services sector, especially in infrastructure, tends to suffer from inefficiencies, particularly in developing countries, and (ii) labour migration, a highly complex issue, still faces disproportionately rigid barriers despite well-documented global welfare gains. Both are hindrances for emerging markets to fully take advantage of the potential of these cross-border networks. Adapting the legal framework for enhancing the regulatory and institutional frameworks for services trade, especially in infrastructure services sectors (ISS) and labour migration could provide the incentives necessary for brain circulation and strengthen cross-border value added chains by lowering transaction costs. This paper analyses the shortfalls of the global legal framework – the shallow status quo of GATS commitments in ISS and mode 4 particular – in relation to stimulating brain circulation and the creation of cross-border value added chains in emerging markets. It highlights the necessity of adapting the legal framework, both on the global and the regional level, to stimulate broader and wider market access in the four key ISS sectors (telecommunications, transport, professional and financial services) in developing countries, as domestic supply capacity, global competitiveness and economic diversification in ISS sectors are necessary for mobilising expatriate re-turns, both physical and virtual. The paper argues that industrialised, labour receiving countries need to offer mode 4 market access to wider categories of persons, especially to students, graduate trainees and young professionals from abroad. Further-more, free trade in semi-finished products and mode 4 market access are crucial for the creation of cross-border value added chains across the developing world. Finally, the paper discusses on the basis of a case study on Jordan why the key features of trade agreements, which promote circular migration and the creation of cross-border value added chains, consist of trade liberalisation in services and liberal migration policies.