Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

Germania: l’indomabile trading state

Basato su interviste con i principali attori tedeschi e su un’analisi della letteratura, l’articolo analizza lo sviluppo recente dell’economia tedesca e la strategia tedesca nell’affrontare la crisi dell’eurozona. La Germania è uno stato commerciale (trading state), la cui crescita è fortemente trainata dalle esportazioni. Fino agli anni novanta, rigidità istituzionali forti, nel sistema di relazioni industriali e nel sistema di protezione sociale, contribuivano a conciliare lo sviluppo delle esportazioni con una crescita armonica dei consumi interni, contribuendo cosi a ingabbiare la «tigre» tedesca. A partire dagli anni novanta, sia le relazioni industriali sia la protezione sociale sono state fortemente liberalizzate, stimolando ulteriormente la competitività estera e indebolendo i consumi interni. Il modello economico tedesco, cosi come è venuto profilandosi negli ultimi dieci anni, è alla base delle politiche di austerità che la Germania impone all’Europa. Tali politiche sono fortemente condivise dai partiti politici, dagli attori sociali e dall’opinione pubblica, e le probabilità che la strategia tedesca cambi sono minime.

The Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed

Based on interviews with the main German actors and on secondary sources, the article examines the recent development of the German political economy, and the German strategy vis-à-vis the Euro zone. Germany is a trading state whose economic growth is strongly export-led. Until the years 1990s, strong institutional rigidities, both in industrial relations and in the welfare state, contributed to reconcile export growth with household consumption, thus keeping the German “tiger” on a leash. From the early 1990s on, however, both industrial relations and social protections have been strongly liberalized, thus further stimulating external competitiveness and reducing the role of consumption in the German growth model. The unleashed trading state shapes the German response to the Euro crisis and the austerity policies that Germany imposes to Europe. These policies are strongly supported by political parties, social actors, and public opinion in Germany, and the likelihood that they change in the near future is minimal.

Bern's positioning strategies: Escaping the fate of a secondary capital city?

Bern is a classic example of a so-called secondary capital city, which is defined as a capital city that is not the primary economic center of its nation. Such capital cities feature a specific political economy characterized by a strong government presence in its regional economy and its local governance arrangements. Bern has been losing importance in the Swiss urban system over the past decades due to a stagnating economy, population decline and missed opportunities for regional cooperation. To re-position itself in the Swiss urban hierarchy, political leaders and policymakers established a non-profit organization called “Capital Region Switzerland” in 2010 arguing that a capital city should not be measured by economic success only, but by its function as a political center where political decisions are negotiated and implemented. This city profile analyses Bern's strategy and discusses its ambitions and limitations in the context of the city's history, socio-economic and political conditions. We conclude that Bern's positioning strategy has so far been a political success, yet that there are severe limitations regarding advancing economic development. As a result, this re-positioning strategy is not able to address the fundamental economic development challenges that Bern faces as a secondary capital city.

Services PTAs: Lessons from Practice

Presentation given by Pierre Sauvé at the international conference on the political economy of liberalising trade in services at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem