Spatial cognition, body representation and affective processes: the role of vestibular information beyond ocular reflexes and control of posture

A growing number of studies in humans demonstrate the involvement of vestibular information in tasks that are seemingly remote from well-known functions such as space constancy or postural control. In this review article we point out three emerging streams of research highlighting the importance of vestibular input: (1) Spatial Cognition: Modulation of vestibular signals can induce specific changes in spatial cognitive tasks like mental imagery and the processing of numbers. This has been shown in studies manipulating body orientation (changing the input from the otoliths), body rotation (changing the input from the semicircular canals), in clinical findings with vestibular patients, and in studies carried out in microgravity. There is also an effect in the reverse direction; top-down processes can affect perception of vestibular stimuli. (2) Body Representation: Numerous studies demonstrate that vestibular stimulation changes the representation of body parts, and sensitivity to tactile input or pain. Thus, the vestibular system plays an integral role in multisensory coordination of body representation. (3) Affective Processes and Disorders: Studies in psychiatric patients and patients with a vestibular disorder report a high comorbidity of vestibular dysfunctions and psychiatric symptoms. Recent studies investigated the beneficial effect of vestibular stimulation on psychiatric disorders, and how vestibular input can change mood and affect. These three emerging streams of research in vestibular science are—at least in part—associated with different neuronal core mechanisms. Spatial transformations draw on parietal areas, body representation is associated with somatosensory areas, and affective processes involve insular and cingulate cortices, all of which receive vestibular input. Even though a wide range of different vestibular cortical projection areas has been ascertained, their functionality still is scarcely understood.

The quiet eye without a target: The primacy of visual information processing

Motor-performance-enhancing effects of long final fixations before movement initiation – a phenomenon called Quiet Eye (QE) – have repeatedly been demonstrated. Drawing on the information-processing framework, it is assumed that the QE supports information processing revealed by the close link between QE duration and task demands concerning, in particular, response selection and movement parameterisation. However, the question remains whether the suggested mechanism also holds for processes referring to stimulus identification. Thus, in a series of two experiments, performance in a targeting task was tested as a function of experimentally manipulated visual processing demands as well as experimentally manipulated QE durations. The results support the suggested link because a performance-enhancing QE effect was found under increased visual processing demands only: Whereas QE duration did not affect performance as long as positional information was preserved (Experiment 1), in the full vs. no target visibility comparison, QE efficiency turned out to depend on information processing time as soon as the interval falls below a certain threshold (Experiment 2). Thus, the results rather contradict alternative, e.g., posture-based explanations of QE effects and support the assumption that the crucial mechanism behind the QE phenomenon is rooted in the cognitive domain.

A Quantitative Analysis of Developer Information Needs in Software Ecosystems

We present the results of an investigation into the nature of information needs of software developers who work in projects that are part of larger ecosystems. This work is based on a quantitative survey of 75 professional software developers. We corroborate the results identified in the sur- vey with needs and motivations proposed in a previous sur- vey and discover that tool support for developers working in an ecosystem context is even more meager than we thought: mailing lists and internet search are the most popular tools developers use to satisfy their ecosystem-related information needs.

Givenness, procedural meaning and connectives: The case of French puisque

I argue that the communication of given information is part of the procedural instructions conveyed by some connectives like the French puisque. I submit in addition that the encoding of givenness has cognitive implications that are visible during online processing. I assess this hypothesis empirically by comparing the way the clauses introduced by two French causal connectives, puisque and parce que, are processed during online reading when the following segment is ‘given’ or ‘new’. I complement these results by an acceptability judgement task using the same sentences. These experiments confirm that introducing a clause conveying given information is a core feature characterizing puisque, as the segment following it is read faster when it contains given rather than new information, and puisque is rated as more acceptable than parce que in such contexts. I discuss the implications of these results for future research on the description of the meaning of connectives.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Developing a point-of-care electronic medical record system for TB/HIV co-infected patients: experiences from Lighthouse Trust, Lilongwe, Malawi.

BACKGROUND Implementation of user-friendly, real-time, electronic medical records for patient management may lead to improved adherence to clinical guidelines and improved quality of patient care. We detail the systematic, iterative process that implementation partners, Lighthouse clinic and Baobab Health Trust, employed to develop and implement a point-of-care electronic medical records system in an integrated, public clinic in Malawi that serves HIV-infected and tuberculosis (TB) patients. METHODS Baobab Health Trust, the system developers, conducted a series of technical and clinical meetings with Lighthouse and Ministry of Health to determine specifications. Multiple pre-testing sessions assessed patient flow, question clarity, information sequencing, and verified compliance to national guidelines. Final components of the TB/HIV electronic medical records system include: patient demographics; anthropometric measurements; laboratory samples and results; HIV testing; WHO clinical staging; TB diagnosis; family planning; clinical review; and drug dispensing. RESULTS Our experience suggests that an electronic medical records system can improve patient management, enhance integration of TB/HIV services, and improve provider decision-making. However, despite sufficient funding and motivation, several challenges delayed system launch including: expansion of system components to include of HIV testing and counseling services; changes in the national antiretroviral treatment guidelines that required system revision; and low confidence to use the system among new healthcare workers. To ensure a more robust and agile system that met all stakeholder and user needs, our electronic medical records launch was delayed more than a year. Open communication with stakeholders, careful consideration of ongoing provider input, and a well-functioning, backup, paper-based TB registry helped ensure successful implementation and sustainability of the system. Additional, on-site, technical support provided reassurance and swift problem-solving during the extended launch period. CONCLUSION Even when system users are closely involved in the design and development of an electronic medical record system, it is critical to allow sufficient time for software development, solicitation of detailed feedback from both users and stakeholders, and iterative system revisions to successfully transition from paper to point-of-care electronic medical records. For those in low-resource settings, electronic medical records for integrated care is a possible and positive innovation.