Economic benefits and costs of Sustainable Land Management Technologies: An analysis of WOCAT's global data

Perceived profitability is a key factor in explaining farmers' decision to adopt or not adopt sustainable land management (SLM) technologies. Despite this importance, relatively little is known about the economics of SLM. This paper contributes to the literature by analysing data on costs and perceived cost/benefit ratios of SLM technologies. Data are taken from the World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies technology database and cover 363 case studies conducted in a variety of countries between 1990 and 2012. Based on an in-depth descriptive analysis, we determine what costs accrue to local stakeholders and assess perceived short-term and long-term cost/benefit ratios. Our results show that a large majority of the technologies in our sample are perceived as being profitable: 73% were perceived to have a positive or at least neutral cost/benefit ratio in the short term, while 97% were perceived to have a positive or very positive cost/benefit ratio in the long term. An additional empirical analysis confirms that economic factors are key determinants of land users' decisions to adopt or not adopt SLM technologies. We conclude that a wide range of existing SLM practices generate considerable benefits not only for land users, but for other stakeholders as well. High initial investment costs associated with some practices may, however, constitute a barrier to their adoption; short-term support for land users can help to promote these practices where appropriate.

Economic analysis of soil conservation: Case studies from the highlands of Amhara Region, Ethiopia

Soil degradation is widespread in the Ethiopian Highlands. Its negative impacts on soil productivity contribute to the extreme poverty of the rural population. Soil conservation is propagated as a means of reducing soil erosion, however, it is a costly investment for small-scale farming households. The present study is an attempt to show whether or not selected mechanical Soil and Water Conservation (SWC) technologies are profitable from a farmer’s point of view. A financial Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is carried out to assess whether or not the considered SWC technologies are profitable from a farmer’s point of view. The CBA is supplemented by an evaluation of aspects from the economic and institutional environment. Whether or not soil conservation is profitable from a farmer’s point of view depends on a broad range of factors from the ecological, economic, political, institutional and socio-cultural sphere and also depends on the technology and the prevailing farming system. Because these factors are closely interlinked, it is often not sufficient to change or influence one to make SWC profitable. Several recommendations are formulated with regard to improving the profitability of SWC investments from a farmer’s point of view. Because the reasons for unsustainable resource use are manifold and highly interlinked, only a multi-stakeholder, multi-level and multi-objective approach is likely to offer solutions that address the underlying problems adequately.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Digital vs. conventional implant prosthetic workflows: a cost/time analysis.

OBJECTIVES The aim of this prospective cohort trial was to perform a cost/time analysis for implant-supported single-unit reconstructions in the digital workflow compared to the conventional pathway. MATERIALS AND METHODS A total of 20 patients were included for rehabilitation with 2 × 20 implant crowns in a crossover study design and treated consecutively each with customized titanium abutments plus CAD/CAM-zirconia-suprastructures (test: digital) and with standardized titanium abutments plus PFM-crowns (control conventional). Starting with prosthetic treatment, analysis was estimated for clinical and laboratory work steps including measure of costs in Swiss Francs (CHF), productivity rates and cost minimization for first-line therapy. Statistical calculations were performed with Wilcoxon signed-rank test. RESULTS Both protocols worked successfully for all test and control reconstructions. Direct treatment costs were significantly lower for the digital workflow 1815.35 CHF compared to the conventional pathway 2119.65 CHF [P = 0.0004]. For subprocess evaluation, total laboratory costs were calculated as 941.95 CHF for the test group and 1245.65 CHF for the control group, respectively [P = 0.003]. The clinical dental productivity rate amounted to 29.64 CHF/min (digital) and 24.37 CHF/min (conventional) [P = 0.002]. Overall, cost minimization analysis exhibited an 18% cost reduction within the digital process. CONCLUSION The digital workflow was more efficient than the established conventional pathway for implant-supported crowns in this investigation.

Social Network Analysis and Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Their mutual benefit for the explanation of policy network structures

By switching the level of analysis and aggregating data from the micro-level of individual cases to the macro-level, quantitative data can be analysed within a more case-based approach. This paper presents such an approach in two steps: In a first step, it discusses the combination of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in a sequential mixed-methods research design. In such a design, quantitative social network data on individual cases and their relations at the micro-level are used to describe the structure of the network that these cases constitute at the macro-level. Different network structures can then be compared by QCA. This strategy allows adding an element of potential causal explanation to SNA, while SNA-indicators allow for a systematic description of the cases to be compared by QCA. Because mixing methods can be a promising, but also a risky endeavour, the methodological part also discusses the possibility that underlying assumptions of both methods could clash. In a second step, the research design presented beforehand is applied to an empirical study of policy network structures in Swiss politics. Through a comparison of 11 policy networks, causal paths that lead to a conflictual or consensual policy network structure are identified and discussed. The analysis reveals that different theoretical factors matter and that multiple conjunctural causation is at work. Based on both the methodological discussion and the empirical application, it appears that a combination of SNA and QCA can represent a helpful methodological design for social science research and a possibility of using quantitative data with a more case-based approach.