XMapTools: a MATLAB©-based program for electron microprobe X-ray image processing and geothermobarometry

XMapTools is a MATLAB©-based graphical user interface program for electron microprobe X-ray image processing, which can be used to estimate the pressure–temperature conditions of crystallization of minerals in metamorphic rocks. This program (available online at http://www.xmaptools.com) provides a method to standardize raw electron microprobe data and includes functions to calculate the oxide weight percent compositions for various minerals. A set of external functions is provided to calculate structural formulae from the standardized analyses as well as to estimate pressure–temperature conditions of crystallization, using empirical and semi-empirical thermobarometers from the literature. Two graphical user interface modules, Chem2D and Triplot3D, are used to plot mineral compositions into binary and ternary diagrams. As an example, the software is used to study a high-pressure Himalayan eclogite sample from the Stak massif in Pakistan. The high-pressure paragenesis consisting of omphacite and garnet has been retrogressed to a symplectitic assemblage of amphibole, plagioclase and clinopyroxene. Mineral compositions corresponding to ~165,000 analyses yield estimates for the eclogitic pressure–temperature retrograde path from 25 kbar to 9 kbar. Corresponding pressure–temperature maps were plotted and used to interpret the link between the equilibrium conditions of crystallization and the symplectitic microstructures. This example illustrates the usefulness of XMapTools for studying variations of the chemical composition of minerals and for retrieving information on metamorphic conditions on a microscale, towards computation of continuous pressure–temperature-and relative time path in zoned metamorphic minerals not affected by post-crystallization diffusion.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Extreme River Floods in Western Switzerland and the Lake of Constance Region in the Period Prior to Instrumental Measurements

The floods that occurred on the Aare and Rhine rivers in May 2015 and the mostly successful handling of this event in terms of flood protection measures are a good reminder of how important it is to comprehend the causes and processes involved in such natural hazards. While the needed data series of gauge measurements and peak discharge calculations reach back to the 19th century, historical records dating further back in time can provide additional and useful information to help understanding extreme flood events and to evaluate prevention measures such as river dams and corrections undertaken prior to instrumental measurements. In my PhD project I will use a wide range of historical sources to assess and quantify past extreme flood events. It is part of the SNF-funded project “Reconstruction of the Genesis, Process and Impact of Major Pre-instrumental Flood Events of Major Swiss Rivers Including a Peak Discharge Quantification” and will cover the research locations Fribourg (Saane R.), Burgdorf (Emme R.), Thun, Bern (both Aare R.), and the Lake of Constance at the locations Lindau, Constance and Rorschach. My main goals are to provide a long time series of quantitative data for extreme flood events, to discuss the occurring changes in these data, and to evaluate the impact of the aforementioned human influences on the drainage system. Extracting information given in account books from the towns of Basel and Solothurn may also enable me to assess the frequency and seasonality of less severe river floods. Finally, historical information will be used for remodeling the historical hydrological regime to homogenize the historical data series to modern day conditions and thus make it comparable to the data provided by instrumental measurements. The method I will apply for processing all information provided by historical sources such as chronicles, newspapers, institutional records, as well as flood marks, paintings and archeological evidence has been developed and successfully applied to the site of Basel by Wetter et al. (2011). They have also shown that data homogenization is possible by reconstructing previous stream flow conditions using historical river profiles and by carefully observing and re-constructing human changes of the river bed and its surroundings. Taken all information into account, peak discharges for past extreme flood events will be calculated with a one-dimensional hydrological model.

Job-shadowing: Swiss health librarians observing experienced search specialists and information skills trainers in London

Abstract As librarians of the Social & Preventive Medicine Library in Bern, we help researchers perform systematic literature searches and teach students to use medical databases. We developed our skills mainly “on the job”, and we wondered how other health librarians in Europe were trained to become experts in searching. We had a great opportunity to “job shadow” specialists in this area of library service during a 5-day-internship at the Royal Free Hospital Medical Library in London, Great Britain.

Expression of interleukin 4, interleukin 4 splice variants and interferon gamma mRNA in calves experimentally infected with Fasciola hepatica

Interleukin 4 (IL-4) is expected to play a dominant role in the development of T helper (Th) 2 cells. Th2 immune responses with expression of relatively large amounts of interleukin 4 (IL-4) but little interferon gamma (IFN-gamma) are characteristic for chronic helminth infections. But no information is available about IL4 expression during early Fasciola hepatica (F. hepatica) infections in cattle. Therefore, we investigated F. hepatica specific IL-4 and IFN-gamma mRNA expression in peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) from calves experimentally infected with F. hepatica. Cells were collected prior to infection and on post-inoculation days (PIDs) 10, 28 and 70. Interestingly, PBMCs responded to stimulation with F. hepatica secretory-excretory products (FhSEP) already on PID 10 and expressed high amounts of IL-4 but not of IFN-gamma mRNA suggesting that F. hepatica induced a Th2 biased early immune response which was not restricted to the site of infection. Later in infection IL-4 mRNA expression decreased whereas IFN-gamma mRNA expression increased slightly. Isolated lymph node cells (LNCs) stimulated with FhSEP and, even more importantly, non-stimulated LN tissue samples indicated highly polarized Th2 type immune responses in the draining (hepatic) lymph node, but not in the retropharyngeal lymph node. During preliminary experiments, two splice variants of bovine IL-4 mRNA, boIL-4delta2 and boIL-4delta3, were detected. Since a human IL-4delta2 was assumed to act as competitive inhibitor of IL-4, it was important to know whether expression of these splice variants of bovine IL-4 have a regulatory function during an immune response to infection with F. hepatica. Indeed, IL-4 splice variants could be detected in a number of samples, but quantitative analysis did not yield any clue to their function. Therefore, the significance of bovine IL-4 splice variants remains to be determined.