Knowledge representation through graphs

Due to the increasing amount of data, knowledge aggregation, representation and reasoning are highly important for companies. In this paper, knowledge aggregation is presented as the first step. In the sequel, successful knowledge representation, for instance through graphs, enables knowledge-based reasoning. There exist various forms of knowledge representation through graphs; some of which allow to handle uncertainty and imprecision by invoking the technology of fuzzy sets. The paper provides an overview of different types of graphs stressing their relationships and their essential features.

Applying the fuzzy analytical hierarchy process in digital marketing

The fuzzy analytical network process (FANP) is introduced as a potential multi-criteria-decision-making (MCDM) method to improve digital marketing management endeavors. Today’s information overload makes digital marketing optimization, which is needed to continuously improve one’s business, increasingly difficult. The proposed FANP framework is a method for enhancing the interaction between customers and marketers (i.e., involved stakeholders) and thus for reducing the challenges of big data. The presented implementation takes realities’ fuzziness into account to manage the constant interaction and continuous development of communication between marketers and customers on the Web. Using this FANP framework, the marketers are able to increasingly meet the varying requirements of their customers. To improve the understanding of the implementation, advanced visualization methods (e.g., wireframes) are used.

Enhancing multidirectional communication for cognitive cities

This paper presents the technical background and functionality of a meta-application (meta-app) for cognitive cities. This app enhances communication and thereby facilitates e-governance. This paper focuses on a user-centered implementation of the Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) by presenting its technical specifications in relation with cognitive cities. For didactical reasons, a use case from the user perspective is included. Finally the findings are summed up and future work is presented

Smart Cities – Ein Überblick!

Nach einer kurzen Begriffsfassung von Smart Cities gehen wir basierend auf den folgenden Beiträgen dieses Heftes auf verschiedene Eigenschaften einer solchen smarten Stadt ein. Dadurch versuchen wir den Ist-Zustand dieser Städte zu dokumentieren. Damit die jeweiligen Stakeholder (strategische) Entscheide treffen können, widmen wir danach ein Kapitel den Chancen und Risiken von Smart Cities. Anhand einer Studie des Europäischen Parlaments zeigen wir nachfolgend entsprechende Bestrebungen aus Europa auf. Anschliessend präsentieren wir eine Best-Practice-Roadmap für die Realisierung von Smart Cities. Zum Schluss zeichnen wir auf einer konnektivistischen Lern- und Kognitionstheorie aufbauend einen Weg zur Cognitive City der Zukunft. Dabei wird der Mensch nicht als isoliertes, sondern als vernetztes Individuum gesehen. Dies begünstigt die Weiterentwicklung von Smart Cities zu Städten, welche aktiv und selbstständig lernen und dadurch automatisch auf Veränderungen ihrer Umwelt reagieren können.

Pralines from a smaller gift box taste better

This study shows that taste ratings of repeatedly chosen pralines decrease more when the gift box is large compared to small. Within their first choices consumers select the most preferred praline less often from the large assortment. These results are discussed in the light of variety seeking and dysfunctional choice.

A mixed-integer linear programming approach to the optimization of event-bus schedules: a scheduling application in the tourism sector

This paper deals with “The Enchanted Journey,” which is a daily event tour booked by Bollywood-film fans. During the tour, the participants visit original sites of famous Bollywood films at various locations in Switzerland; moreover, the tour includes stops for lunch and shopping. Each day, up to five buses operate the tour. For operational reasons, however, two or more buses cannot stay at the same location simultaneously. Further operative constraints include time windows for all activities and precedence constraints between some activities. The planning problem is how to compute a feasible schedule for each bus. We implement a two-step hierarchical approach. In the first step, we minimize the total waiting time; in the second step, we minimize the total travel time of all buses. We present a basic formulation of this problem as a mixed-integer linear program. We enhance this basic formulation by symmetry-breaking constraints, which reduces the search space without loss of generality. We report on computational results obtained with the Gurobi Solver. Our numerical results show that all relevant problem instances can be solved using the basic formulation within reasonable CPU time, and that the symmetry-breaking constraints reduce that CPU time considerably.

Planning of a make-to-order production process in the printing industry

Offset printing is a common method to produce large amounts of printed matter. We consider a real-world offset printing process that is used to imprint customer-specific designs on napkin pouches. The production equipment used gives rise to various technological constraints. The planning problem consists of allocating designs to printing-plate slots such that the given customer demand for each design is fulfilled, all technological and organizational constraints are met and the total overproduction and setup costs are minimized. We formulate this planning problem as a mixed-binary linear program, and we develop a multi-pass matching-based savings heuristic. We report computational results for a set of problem instances devised from real-world data.

Do individual directors matter?

Paper 1: Pilot study of Swiss firms Abstract Using a fixed effects approach, we investigate whether the presence of specific individuals on Swiss firms’ boards affects firm performance and the policy choices they make. We find evidence for a substantial impact of these directors’ presence on their firms. Moreover, the director effects are correlated across policies and performance measures but uncorrelated to the directors’ background. We find these results interesting but conclude that they should to be substantiated on a dataset that is larger and better understood by researchers. Also, further tests are required to rule out methodological concerns. Paper 2: Evidence from the S&P 1,500 Abstract We ask whether directors on corporate boards contribute to firm performance as individuals. From the universe of the S&P 1,500 firms since 1996 we track 2,062 directors who serve on multiple boards over extended periods of time. Our initial findings suggest that the presence of these directors is associated with substantial performance shifts (director fixed effects). Closer examination shows that these effects are statistical artifacts and we conclude that directors are largely fungible. Moreover, we contribute to the discussion of the fixed effects method. In particular, we highlight that the selection of the randomization method is pivotal when generating placebo benchmarks. Paper 3: Robustness, statistical power, and important directors Abstract This article provides a better understanding of Senn’s (2014) findings: The outcome that individual directors are unrelated to firm performance proves robust against different estimation models and testing strategies. By looking at CEOs, the statistical power of the placebo benchmarking test is evaluated. We find that only the stronger tests are able to detect CEO fixed effects. However, these tests are not suitable to analyze directors. The suitable tests would detect director effects if the inter quartile range of the true effects amounted to 3 percentage points ROA. As Senn (2014) finds no such effects for outside directors in general, we focus on groups of particularly important directors (e.g., COBs, non-busy directors, successful directors). Overall, our evidence suggests that the members of these groups are not individually associated with firm performance either. Thus, we confirm that individual directors are largely fungible. If the individual has an effect on performance, it is of small magnitude.

Fuzzy knowledge representation in cognitive cities

This paper gives an insight into cognitive computing for smart cities, resulting in cognitive cities. Cognitive cities and cognitive computing research with the underlying concepts of knowledge graphs and fuzzy cognitive maps are presented and supported by existing tools (i.e., IBM Watson and Google Now) and intended tools (meta-app). The paper illustrates FCM as a suiting instrument to represent information/knowledge in a city environment driven by human-technology interaction, enforcing the concept of cognitive cities. A proposed paper prototype combines the findings of the paper and shows the next step in the implementation of the proposed meta-app.

The effect of superiors' exogenous constraints on budget negotiations

In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.