Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Social role effects on gender stereotyping in Germany and Japan

Social role theory postulates that gender stereotypes are restrained for men and women observed in the same social role. Cultural differences in the valuation of communal attributes might moderate this effect. To examine this possibility, 288 participants (144 German, 144 Japanese) estimated the communal and agentic attributes of an average man or woman described in a male-dominated role, a female-dominated role, or without role information. We hypothesized and found that in Germany and Japan, participants perceived men as more agentic than women without role information and as similarly agentic in the same role. However, for communion, German and Japanese participants reacted differently. German participants perceived women as more communal than men without role information and in male-dominated roles and perceived men as more communal than women in female-dominated roles. Japanese participants perceived all targets as similarly communal, regardless of role or gender, suggesting that communion is generally expected in Japan.

Towards a treaty instrument on marine genetic resources

Marine genetic resources other than fish and mammals are of increasing commercial interest and importance in genetic engineering, but fail being properly addressed in the law of the sea and in international economic law. The paper analyses the implication of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Biodiversity, the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and related instruments under the auspices of WIPO. The paper argues that the triangle of these agreements does not adequately address marine genetic resources in particular in the high seas. Neither concerns of protecting biodiversity nor of access and benefit sharing find appropriate answers commensurate to the commercial potential of marine genetic resources. The paper suggests developing an instrument inspired by, and comparable to, the mechanisms developed by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The instrument would grant facilitated access to marine genetic resources and offer a more detailed set of rules with respect to the sharing of benefits resulting from their use, thereby addressing the existing legal gaps in a comprehensive way.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.

Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change

Estimates show that fossil fuel subsidies average USD 400–600 billion annually worldwide while renewable energy (RE) subsidies amounted to USD 66 billion in 2010 and are predicted to rise to USD 250 billion annually by 2035. Domestic political rationales for energy subsidies include promoting innovation, job creation and economic growth, energy security, and independence. Energy subsidies may also serve social and environmental goals. Whether and to what extent subsidies are effective to achieve these goals or instead lead to market distortions is a matter of much debate and the trade effects of energy subsidies are complex. This paper offers an overview of the types of energy subsidies that are used in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, and their relationship with climate change, in particular greenhouse gas emissions. While the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) is mostly concerned with harm to competitors, this paper considers the extent to which the Agreement could also discipline subsidies that cause harm to the environment as a global common. Beyond the existing legal framework, this paper surveys a number of alternatives for improving the ability of subsidies disciplines to internalize climate change costs of energy production and consumption. One option is a new multilateral agreement on subsidies or trade remedies (with an appropriate carve-out in the WTO regime to allow for it if such an agreement is concluded outside it). Alternatively, climate change-related subsidies could be included as part of another multilateral regime or as part of regional agreements. A third approach would be to incorporate rules on energy subsidies in sectorial agreements, including a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement such as has been proposed in other ICTSD studies.

Decision-usefulness of ideal cost- and ideal value accounting for valuation and stewardship

This paper contrasts the decision-usefulness of prototype accounting regimes based on perfect accounting for value, i.e. ideal value accounting (IVA), and perfect matching of cost, i.e. ideal cost accounting (ICA). The regimes are analyzed in the context of a firm with overlapping capacity investments where projects earn excess returns and residual income is utilized as performance indicator. Provided that IVA and ICA systematically differ based on the criterion of unconditional conservatism, we assess their respective decision-usefulness for different valuation- and stewardship-scenarios. Assuming that addressees solely observe current accounting data of the firm, ICA provides information which is useful for valuation and stewardship without reservation whereas IVA entails problems under specific assumptions.