Neuropathological survey of fallen stock: Active surveillance reveals high prevalence of encephalitic listeriosis in small ruminants

This paper describes the prevalence of brain lesions in the Swiss fallen stock population of small ruminants. 3075 whole brains (75% sheep, 25% goats) were collected as part of a year-long active survey of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in small ruminants conducted by the Swiss authorities between July 2004 and July 2005. All fallen stock brains were systematically examined by histopathology to obtain reliable data on histologically identifiable brain lesions. Lesions were found in an unexpectedly high number of animals (8.1% of all examined brains). A wide spectrum of diseases was detected showing that this approach provides an excellent opportunity to screen for the prevalence of neurological diseases. Encephalitic listeriosis was by far the most frequent cause of CNS lesions in both species and its prevalence was unexpectedly high when compared to notified confirmed cases. In conclusion, the prevalence of listeriosis as estimated by passive surveillance based on the notification of clinical suspects has been underestimated in the past.

What Does the Market Learn from Stock Offering Revisions?

We examine the disclosure of size revisions of seasoned stock offerings to see what information revisions impart to investros. Revisions could deliver firm-originated infoirmation, which discloses something managers know about the firm. Alternatively, they could disseminate market-originated information, which is information market participants have but which is not conveyed until trading takes place. Our results reject the notion that revisions reveal firm-originated news. Instead, the results are consistent with the market-originated news hypothesis and suggest a mechanism that investros and underwriters use to learn about the demand for an offering.

Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces

We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to the residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.