Estimating the prevalence of comorbid conditions and their effect on health care costs in patients with diabetes mellitus in Switzerland.

BACKGROUND Estimating the prevalence of comorbidities and their associated costs in patients with diabetes is fundamental to optimizing health care management. This study assesses the prevalence and health care costs of comorbid conditions among patients with diabetes compared with patients without diabetes. Distinguishing potentially diabetes- and nondiabetes-related comorbidities in patients with diabetes, we also determined the most frequent chronic conditions and estimated their effect on costs across different health care settings in Switzerland. METHODS Using health care claims data from 2011, we calculated the prevalence and average health care costs of comorbidities among patients with and without diabetes in inpatient and outpatient settings. Patients with diabetes and comorbid conditions were identified using pharmacy-based cost groups. Generalized linear models with negative binomial distribution were used to analyze the effect of comorbidities on health care costs. RESULTS A total of 932,612 persons, including 50,751 patients with diabetes, were enrolled. The most frequent potentially diabetes- and nondiabetes-related comorbidities in patients older than 64 years were cardiovascular diseases (91%), rheumatologic conditions (55%), and hyperlipidemia (53%). The mean total health care costs for diabetes patients varied substantially by comorbidity status (US$3,203-$14,223). Patients with diabetes and more than two comorbidities incurred US$10,584 higher total costs than patients without comorbidity. Costs were significantly higher in patients with diabetes and comorbid cardiovascular disease (US$4,788), hyperlipidemia (US$2,163), hyperacidity disorders (US$8,753), and pain (US$8,324) compared with in those without the given disease. CONCLUSION Comorbidities in patients with diabetes are highly prevalent and have substantial consequences for medical expenditures. Interestingly, hyperacidity disorders and pain were the most costly conditions. Our findings highlight the importance of developing strategies that meet the needs of patients with diabetes and comorbidities. Integrated diabetes care such as used in the Chronic Care Model may represent a useful strategy.

Variance estimation in ranked set sampling using a concomitant variable

We propose a nonparametric variance estimator when ranked set sampling (RSS) and judgment post stratification (JPS) are applied by measuring a concomitant variable. Our proposed estimator is obtained by conditioning on observed concomitant values and using nonparametric kernel regression.

Dexmedetomidine versus standard care sedation with propofol or midazolam in intensive care: an economic evaluation.

INTRODUCTION Dexmedetomidine was shown in two European randomized double-blind double-dummy trials (PRODEX and MIDEX) to be non-inferior to propofol and midazolam in maintaining target sedation levels in mechanically ventilated intensive care unit (ICU) patients. Additionally, dexmedetomidine shortened the time to extubation versus both standard sedatives, suggesting that it may reduce ICU resource needs and thus lower ICU costs. Considering resource utilization data from these two trials, we performed a secondary, cost-minimization analysis assessing the economics of dexmedetomidine versus standard care sedation. METHODS The total ICU costs associated with each study sedative were calculated on the basis of total study sedative consumption and the number of days patients remained intubated, required non-invasive ventilation, or required ICU care without mechanical ventilation. The daily unit costs for these three consecutive ICU periods were set to decline toward discharge, reflecting the observed reduction in mean daily Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System (TISS) points between the periods. A number of additional sensitivity analyses were performed, including one in which the total ICU costs were based on the cumulative sum of daily TISS points over the ICU period, and two further scenarios, with declining direct variable daily costs only. RESULTS Based on pooled data from both trials, sedation with dexmedetomidine resulted in lower total ICU costs than using the standard sedatives, with a difference of €2,656 in the median (interquartile range) total ICU costs-€11,864 (€7,070 to €23,457) versus €14,520 (€7,871 to €26,254)-and €1,649 in the mean total ICU costs. The median (mean) total ICU costs with dexmedetomidine compared with those of propofol or midazolam were €1,292 (€747) and €3,573 (€2,536) lower, respectively. The result was robust, indicating lower costs with dexmedetomidine in all sensitivity analyses, including those in which only direct variable ICU costs were considered. The likelihood of dexmedetomidine resulting in lower total ICU costs compared with pooled standard care was 91.0% (72.4% versus propofol and 98.0% versus midazolam). CONCLUSIONS From an economic point of view, dexmedetomidine appears to be a preferable option compared with standard sedatives for providing light to moderate ICU sedation exceeding 24 hours. The savings potential results primarily from shorter time to extubation. TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov NCT00479661 (PRODEX), NCT00481312 (MIDEX).

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The CLIF Consortium Acute Decompensation score (CLIF-C ADs) for prognosis of hospitalised cirrhotic patients without acute-on-chronic liver failure

BACKGROUND & AIMS Cirrhotic patients with acute decompensation frequently develop acute-on-chronic liver failure (ACLF), which is associated with high mortality rates. Recently, a specific score for these patients has been developed using the CANONIC study database. The aims of this study were to develop and validate the CLIF-C AD score, a specific prognostic score for hospitalised cirrhotic patients with acute decompensation (AD), but without ACLF, and to compare this with the Child-Pugh, MELD, and MELD-Na scores. METHODS The derivation set included 1016 CANONIC study patients without ACLF. Proportional hazards models considering liver transplantation as a competing risk were used to identify score parameters. Estimated coefficients were used as relative weights to compute the CLIF-C ADs. External validation was performed in 225 cirrhotic AD patients. CLIF-C ADs was also tested for sequential use. RESULTS Age, serum sodium, white-cell count, creatinine and INR were selected as the best predictors of mortality. The C-index for prediction of mortality was better for CLIF-C ADs compared with Child-Pugh, MELD, and MELD-Nas at predicting 3- and 12-month mortality in the derivation, internal validation and the external dataset. CLIF-C ADs improved in its ability to predict 3-month mortality using data from days 2, 3-7, and 8-15 (C-index: 0.72, 0.75, and 0.77 respectively). CONCLUSIONS The new CLIF-C ADs is more accurate than other liver scores in predicting prognosis in hospitalised cirrhotic patients without ACLF. CLIF-C ADs therefore may be used to identify a high-risk cohort for intensive management and a low-risk group that may be discharged early.

Safety, feasibility, and long-term results of percutaneous closure of atrial septal defects using the Amplatzer septal occluder without periprocedural echocardiography.

OBJECTIVES We sought to assess the safety and efficacy of percutaneous closure of atrial septal defects (ASDs) under fluoroscopic guidance only, without periprocedural echocardiographic guidance. BACKGROUND Percutaneous closure of ASDs is usually performed using simultaneous fluoroscopic and transthoracic, transesophageal (TEE), or intracardiac echocardiographic (ICE) guidance. However, TEE requires deep sedation or general anesthesia, which considerably lengthens the procedure. TEE and ICE increase costs. METHODS Between 1997 and 2008, a total of 217 consecutive patients (age, 38 ± 22 years; 155 females and 62 males), of whom 44 were children ≤16 years, underwent percutaneous ASD closure with an Amplatzer ASD occluder (AASDO). TEE guidance and general anesthesia were restricted to the children, while devices were implanted under fluoroscopic guidance only in the adults. For comparison of technical safety and feasibility of the procedure without echocardiographic guidance, the children served as a control group. RESULTS The implantation procedure was successful in all but 3 patients (1 child and 2 adults; 1.4%). Mean device size was 23 ± 8 mm (range, 4-40 mm). There was 1 postprocedural complication (0.5%; transient perimyocarditis in an adult patient). At last echocardiographic follow-up, 13 ± 23 months after the procedure, 90% of patients had no residual shunt, whereas a minimal, moderate, or large shunt persisted in 7%, 1%, and 2%, respectively. Four adult patients (2%) underwent implantation of a second device for a residual shunt. During a mean follow-up period of 3 ± 2 years, 2 deaths and 1 ischemic stroke occurred. CONCLUSION According to these results, percutaneous ASD closure using the AASDO without periprocedural echocardiographic guidance seems safe and feasible.

A probabilistic assessment of calcium carbonate export and dissolution in the modern ocean

The marine cycle of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) is an important element of the carbon cycle and co-governs the distribution of carbon and alkalinity within the ocean. However, CaCO3 export fluxes and mechanisms governing CaCO3 dissolution are highly uncertain. We present an observationally constrained, probabilistic assessment of the global and regional CaCO3 budgets. Parameters governing pelagic CaCO3 export fluxes and dissolution rates are sampled using a Monte Carlo scheme to construct a 1000-member ensemble with the Bern3D ocean model. Ensemble results are constrained by comparing simulated and observation-based fields of excess dissolved calcium carbonate (TA*). The minerals calcite and aragonite are modelled explicitly and ocean–sediment fluxes are considered. For local dissolution rates, either a strong or a weak dependency on CaCO3 saturation is assumed. In addition, there is the option to have saturation-independent dissolution above the saturation horizon. The median (and 68 % confidence interval) of the constrained model ensemble for global biogenic CaCO3 export is 0.90 (0.72–1.05) Gt C yr−1, that is within the lower half of previously published estimates (0.4–1.8 Gt C yr−1). The spatial pattern of CaCO3 export is broadly consistent with earlier assessments. Export is large in the Southern Ocean, the tropical Indo–Pacific, the northern Pacific and relatively small in the Atlantic. The constrained results are robust across a range of diapycnal mixing coefficients and, thus, ocean circulation strengths. Modelled ocean circulation and transport timescales for the different set-ups were further evaluated with CFC11 and radiocarbon observations. Parameters and mechanisms governing dissolution are hardly constrained by either the TA* data or the current compilation of CaCO3 flux measurements such that model realisations with and without saturation-dependent dissolution achieve skill. We suggest applying saturation-independent dissolution rates in Earth system models to minimise computational costs.