Perfecting Imperfect Duties via Institutionalization

Onora O’Neill’s thesis that, in a world like ours, institutionalization is a necessary condition for the existence of typical universal welfare rights—the “institutionalization thesis” for short—has often been criticized. I believe that most of these criticisms fail to appreciate that the institutionalization thesis is based on her “classical” understanding of rights, which stresses the essential duty-implying character of rights. By and large, O’Neill’s thesis stands and falls with the classical theory of rights. My suggestion is, therefore, that what is really at issue between O’Neill and at least some of her critics is the proper understanding of the concept of a right.

Voting Power and Probability

Voting power is commonly measured using a probability. But what kind of probability is this? Is it a degree of belief or an objective chance or some other sort of probability? The aim of this paper is to answer this question. The answer depends on the use to which a measure of voting power is put. Some objectivist interpretations of probabilities are appropriate when we employ such a measure for descriptive purposes. By contrast, when voting power is used to normatively assess voting rules, the probabilities are best understood as classical probabilities, which count possibilities. This is so because, from a normative stance, voting power is most plausibly taken to concern rights and thus possibilities. The classical interpretation also underwrites the use of the Bernoulli model upon which the Penrose/Banzhaf measure is based.