37 resultados para corporal punishment (CP)
Resumo:
We present SUSY_FLAVOR version 2 — a Fortran 77 program that calculates low-energy flavor observables in the general R-parity conserving MSSM. For a set of MSSM parameters as input, the code gives predictions for: 1. Electric dipole moments of the leptons and the neutron. 2. Anomalous magnetic moments (i.e. g − 2) of the leptons. 3. Radiative lepton decays (μ → eγ and τ → μγ , eγ ). 4. Rare Kaon decays (K0 L → π0 ¯νν and K+ → π+ ¯νν). 5. Leptonic B decays (Bs,d → l+l−, B → τ ν and B → Dτ ν). 6. Radiative B decays (B → ¯ Xsγ ). 7. ΔF = 2 processes ( ¯ K0–K0, ¯D–D, ¯Bd–Bd and ¯Bs–Bs mixing). Comparing to SUSY_FLAVOR v1, where the matching conditions were calculated strictly at one-loop level, SUSY_FLAVOR v2 performs the resummation of all chirally enhanced corrections, i.e. takes into account the enhanced effects from tan β and/or large trilinear soft mixing terms to all orders in perturbation theory. Also, in SUSY_FLAVOR v2 new routines calculation of B → (D)τ ν, g − 2, radiative lepton decays and Br(l → l′γ ) were added. All calculations are done using exact diagonalization of the sfermion mass matrices. The program can be obtained from http://www.fuw.edu.pl/susy_flavor.
Resumo:
Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.
Resumo:
Human readiness to incur personal costs to punish norm violators is a key force in the maintenance of social norms. The willingness to punish is, however, characterized by vast individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. In fact, this heterogeneity has so far defied explanations in terms of individual-level demographic or psychological variables. Here, we use resting electroencephalography, a stable measure of individual differences in cortical activity, to show that a highly specific neural marker--baseline cortical activity in the right prefrontal cortex--predicts individuals' punishment behavior. The analysis of task-independent individual variation in cortical baseline activity provides a new window into the neurobiology of decision making by bringing dispositional neural markers to the forefront of the analysis.
Resumo:
RATIONALE People often face decisions that pit self-interested behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against normative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus, normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical processes mediating the impact of these influences remain unknown. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic system to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts. OBJECTIVES The present study investigates dopaminergic drug effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoidance in social interaction. METHODS Two-hundred one healthy male participants were randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair behavior could not be punished. RESULTS In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA administration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA administration had no significant effect on behavior when faced with punishment threats. CONCLUSIONS The results of this study broaden the role of the dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social interactions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behaviors in certain clinical subpopulations.