Border tax adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?

Will die Schweiz mit unilateralen energie- und klimapolitischen Massnahmen ambitionierte Ziele verfolgen, dann erfahren energieintensive Sektoren Nachteile im internationalen Wett- bewerb. Produktionsverlagerungen und „carbon leakage“ sind die Folgen, was nicht im Sinne der Schweizer Wirtschaft und der globalen Klimaziele ist. Mit Grenzausgleichsmassnahmen (BAM) kann die Schweiz ihre energieintensiven Betriebe nicht vor internationalen Wettbe- werbsnachteilen schützen. Weiter kommt hinzu, dass die Einführung von BAM aus rechtli- cher Sicht „riskant“ ist und bei einem Schweizer Alleingang mit hohen Vollzugshürden ge- rechnet werden muss. Für die Schweiz macht eine Einführung von BAM nur im Rahmen ei- ner grösseren Klimakoalition Sinn (bspw. zusammen mit der EU). Alternativen zu BAM sind die einfacher und autonom umsetzbaren Ausnahmeregelungen für energieintensive Betriebe oder Output-based-allocation-Systeme.

The Determinants of Personal Income Tax Progressivity Around the Globe

This paper utilizes a novel database collected by the authors to document features of the progressivity of personal income tax systems across 209 countries for the years 1980-2009. We measure progressivity in several ways. First, we associate it with the increase in effective average (marginal) tax rates between a wage of zero and ten times the average wage in a country. Second, we consider the curvature of the tax schedule expressed as the difference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from a wage of zero to ten times the average wage and a linear average tax schedule and, alternatively, the diference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from the minimum positive taxable income, to ten times the average wage as opposed to a linear average tax schedule. Moreover, the paper assesses patterns regarding the conditional correlation of country-specifc tax progressivity measures with a host of economic and political country-specific characteristics and find the labor supply elasticity and the income replacement rates for the unemployed to be key determinants of progressivity around the globe, in line with economic theory.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.