Slow fertilization of stickleback eggs: the result of sexual conflict?

BACKGROUND: The fertilization success in sperm competition in externally fertilizing fish depends on number and quality of sperm. The time delay between sequential ejaculations may further influence the outcome of sperm competition. Such a time interval can load the raffle over fertilization if fertilization takes place very fast. Short fertilization times are generally assumed for externally fertilizing fish such as the three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus). In this pair-spawning fish, territorial males often try to steal fertilizations in nests of neighbouring males. This sneaking behaviour causes sperm competition. Sneakers will only get a share of paternity when eggs are not fertilized immediately after sperm release. Contrary to males, females may be interested in multiple paternity of their clutch of eggs. There thus may be a sexual conflict over the speed of fertilization. RESULTS: In this study we used two different in vitro fertilization experiments to assess how fast eggs are fertilized in sticklebacks. We show that complete fertilization takes more than 5 min which is atypically long for externally fertilizing fishes. CONCLUSION: This result suggests that the time difference does not imply high costs to the second stickleback male to ejaculate. Slow fertilization (and concomitant prolonged longevity of sperm) may be the result of sexual conflict in which females aimed at complete fertilization and/or multiple paternity.

Delays in childhood immunization in a conflict area: a study from Sierra Leone during civil war

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Sierra Leone has undergone a decade of civil war from 1991 to 2001. From this period few data on immunization coverage are available, and conflict-related delays in immunization according to the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) schedule have not been investigated. We aimed to study delays in childhood immunization in the context of civil war in a Sierra Leonean community. METHODS: We conducted an immunization survey in Kissy Mess-Mess in the Greater Freetown area in 1998/99 using a two-stage sampling method. Based on immunization cards and verbal history we collected data on immunization for tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, and measles by age group (0-8/9-11/12-23/24-35 months). We studied differences between age groups and explored temporal associations with war-related hostilities taking place in the community. RESULTS: We included 286 children who received 1690 vaccine doses; card retention was 87%. In 243 children (85%, 95% confidence interval (CI): 80-89%) immunization was up-to-date. In 161 of these children (56%, 95%CI: 50-62%) full age-appropriate immunization was achieved; in 82 (29%, 95%CI: 24-34%) immunization was not appropriate for age. In the remaining 43 children immunization was partial in 37 (13%, 95%CI: 9-17) and absent in 6 (2%, 95%CI: 1-5). Immunization status varied across age groups. In children aged 9-11 months the proportion with age-inappropriate (delayed) immunization was higher than in other age groups suggesting an association with war-related hostilities in the community. CONCLUSION: Only about half of children under three years received full age-appropriate immunization. In children born during a period of increased hostilities, immunization was mostly inappropriate for age, but recommended immunizations were not completely abandoned. Missing or delayed immunization represents an additional threat to the health of children living in conflict areas.

Resolving the tragedy of the commons: the feedback between intraspecific conflict and population density

Competition and conflict among individuals can favour exploitative strategies that undermine the common good. Theory suggests that this can lead to a tragedy of the commons and ultimately population extinction, a phenomenon known as evolutionary suicide. Here, I present a model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits. In the simplest form, this supports the notion that selection for high levels of conflict can cause evolutionary suicide. However, as competition comes with survival and fecundity costs, a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct. This suggests that the interaction between population ecology and the evolution of competition and conflict among individuals may be an important mechanism in resolving the level of competition and conflict among individuals.

Asymmetric sexual conflict over parental care in a biparental cichlid

Theoretical models predict that parents should adjust the amount of care both to their own and their partner's body condition. In most biparental species, parental duties are switched repeatedly allowing for repeated mutual adjustment of the amount of care. In the mouthbrooding cichlid Eretmodus cyanostictus, terms are switched only once with females taking the first share. The timing of the shift of the clutch between mates strongly determines both partners' brooding period and thereby their parental investment. Females signal their readiness to transfer the young several days before the male finally takes them, suggesting sexual conflict over the timing of the shift. In a lab experiment, we reduced the body condition of either the female or the male of a pair to test whether energy reserves affect the timing of the shift and whether female signalling behaviour depends on energetic state. Males with a lowered condition took the young later and incubated for a shorter period, which prolonged the incubation time of their female partners. When female condition was lowered, female and male incubation durations remained unchanged, although females signalled their readiness to shift more intensely. Our results suggest that males adjust their parental investment to own energy reserves but are unresponsive to their mate's condition. Females appear to carry the entire costs for the male's adjustment of care. We propose that intrinsic asymmetries in the scope for mutual adjustment of parental investment and the costs of negotiation crucially influence solutions of the conflict between sexes over care.