A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies

This article uses a policy network perspective to assess the independence of regulatory agencies (RAs) in liberalized public utility sectors. We focus on the de facto independence of RAs from elected politicians, regulatees and other co-regulators. We go further than previous studies, which only undertook a general analysis of the de jure independence of RAs from political authorities. Specifically, we apply a social network analysis (SNA), which concentrates on the attributes and relational profiles of all actors involved in new regulatory arrangements. The concept of de facto independence is applied to the Swiss telecommunications sector in order to provide initial empirical insights. Results clearly show that SNA indicators are an appropriate tool to identify the de facto independence of RAs and can improve knowledge about the issues arising from the emergence of the ‘regulatory State’.

Having your cake and eating it too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Trypanosomal TAC40 constitutes a novel subclass of mitochondrial -barrel proteins specialized in mitochondrial genome inheritance

Mitochondria cannot form de novo but require mechanisms allowing their inheritance to daughter cells. In contrast to most other eukaryotes Trypanosoma brucei has a single mitochondrion whose single-unit genome is physically connected to the flagellum. Here we identify a β-barrel mitochondrial outer membrane protein, termed tripartite attachment complex 40 (TAC40), that localizes to this connection. TAC40 is essential for mitochondrial DNA inheritance and belongs to the mitochondrial porin protein family. However, it is not specifically related to any of the three subclasses of mitochondrial porins represented by the metabolite transporter voltage-dependent anion channel (VDAC), the protein translocator of the outer membrane 40 (TOM40), or the fungi-specific MDM10, a component of the endoplasmic reticulum–mitochondria encounter structure (ERMES). MDM10 and TAC40 mediate cellular architecture and participate in transmembrane complexes that are essential for mitochondrial DNA inheritance. In yeast MDM10, in the context of the ERMES, is postulated to connect the mitochondrial genomes to actin filaments, whereas in trypanosomes TAC40 mediates the linkage of the mitochondrial DNA to the basal body of the flagellum. However, TAC40 does not colocalize with trypanosomal orthologs of ERMES components and, unlike MDM10, it regulates neither mitochondrial morphology nor the assembly of the protein translocase. TAC40 therefore defines a novel subclass of mitochondrial porins that is distinct from VDAC, TOM40, and MDM10. However, whereas the architecture of the TAC40-containing complex in trypanosomes and the MDM10-containing ERMES in yeast is very different, both are organized around a β-barrel protein of the mitochondrial porin family that mediates a DNA–cytoskeleton linkage that is essential for mitochondrial DNA inheritance.

Regulation of the Telecommunications in Switzerland: A Network Approach to Assess the Regulatory Agencies' Independence

The liberalization process of the Swiss telecommunications sector follows a logic of ‘autonomous adaptation’ to the regulations of the European Union (EU). Switzerland, which is not a Member State of the EU, voluntarily adapts to the European policy without being for- mally required to do so (Sciarini et al., 2004). This process went hand in hand with the partial privatization of the legal statute and assets of the former monopolist and with the re-regulation of the liberalized telecommunications sector.

Can the green economy enhance sustainable mountain development? The potential role of awareness building

Mountain socio-ecological systems produce valuable but complex ecosystem services resulting from biomes stratified by altitude and gravity. These systems are often managed and shaped by smallholders whose marginalization is exacerbated by uncertainties and a lack of policy attention. Human–environment interfaces in mountains hence require holistic policies. We analyse the potential of the Global Mountain Green Economy Agenda (GMGEA) in building awareness and thus prompting cross-sectoral policy strategies for sustainable mountain development. Considering the critique of the green economy presented at the Rio + 20 conference, we argue that the GMGEA can nevertheless structure knowledge and inform regional institutions about the complexity of mountain socio-ecological systems, a necessary pre-condition to prompt inter-agency collaboration and cross-sectoral policy formulation. After reviewing the content of the GMGEA, we draw on two empirical cases in the Pakistani and Nepali Himalayas. First, we show that lack of awareness has led to a sequence of fragmented interventions with unanticipated, and unwanted, consequences for communities. Second, using a green economy lens, we show how fragmentation could have been avoided and cross-sectoral policies yielded more beneficial results. Project fragmentation reflects disconnected or layered policies by government agencies, which inherently keep specialized agendas and have no incentive to collaborate. Awareness makes agencies more likely to collaborate and adopt cross-sectoral approaches, allowing them to target more beneficiaries, be more visible, and raise more funds. Nevertheless, we also identify four factors that may currently still limit the effect of the GMGEA: high costs of inter-agency collaboration, lack of legitimacy of the green economy, insufficiently-secured smallholder participation, and limited understanding of the mechanisms through which global agendas influence local policy.

Unique Sm core structure of U7 snRNPs: assembly by a specialized SMN complex and the role of a new component, Lsm11, in histone RNA processing.

A set of seven Sm proteins assemble on the Sm-binding site of spliceosomal U snRNAs to form the ring-shaped Sm core. The U7 snRNP involved in histone RNA 3' processing contains a structurally similar but biochemically unique Sm core in which two of these proteins, Sm D1 and D2, are replaced by Lsm10 and by another as yet unknown component. Here we characterize this factor, termed Lsm11, as a novel Sm-like protein with apparently two distinct functions. In vitro studies suggest that its long N-terminal part mediates an important step in histone mRNA 3'-end cleavage, most likely by recruiting a zinc finger protein previously identified as a processing factor. In contrast, the C-terminal part, which comprises two Sm motifs interrupted by an unusually long spacer, is sufficient to assemble with U7, but not U1, snRNA. Assembly of this U7-specific Sm core depends on the noncanonical Sm-binding site of U7 snRNA. Moreover, it is facilitated by a specialized SMN complex that contains Lsm10 and Lsm11 but lacks Sm D1/D2. Thus, the U7-specific Lsm11 protein not only specifies the assembly of the U7 Sm core but also fulfills an important role in U7 snRNP-mediated histone mRNA processing.

Regulation and the Management of Expectations - Rating Agencies Revisited

In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars have begun to revise their conceptions of how market participants interact. While the traditional “rationalist optic” posits market participants who are able to process decisionrelevant information and thereby transform uncertainty into quantifiable risks, the increasingly popular “sociological optic” stresses the role of uncertainty in expectation formation and social conventions for creating confidence in markets. Applications of the sociological optic to concrete regulatory problems are still limited. By subjecting both optics to the same regulatory problem—the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their ratings in capital markets—this paper provides insights into whether the sociological optic offers advice to tackle concrete regulatory problems and discusses the potential of the sociological optic in complementing the rationalist optic. The empirical application suggests that the sociological optic is not only able to improve our understanding of the role of CRAs and their ratings, but also to provide solutions complementary to those posited by the rationalist optic.