34 resultados para Restraint of trade
Resumo:
With its wide coverage of economic spheres and the variety of trade and investment measures currently under negotiation, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership opens windows of opportunity for advancing action on climate change. We examine possible avenues and international trade law implications for an alignment of carbon-related standards between the EU and the US. We compare EU and US carbon emissions standards for cars and argue that negotiators should strive for a mutual recognition of their equivalence for a transitional period, while pursuing the goal of full harmonization at the level of the highest standards of two parties at some date in the future. This could be a way to balance between economic and environmental interests and harness economic incentives for the benefit of climate.
Resumo:
With its wide coverage of economic spheres and the variety of trade and investment measures currently under negotiation, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) opens windows of opportunity for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The paper examines the possible avenues and the WTO law implications for the alignment of emissions standards between the European Union (EU) and United States of America (US). Looking particularly at the automobile sector, it argues that TTIP negotiators should strive for the mutual recognition of equivalence of EU and US car emissions standards, while pursuing full harmonisation in the long term. It concludes that the preferential trade agreement (PTA) status of TTIP would not be able to exempt measures taken for regulatory convergence from compliance with applicable WTO rules, particularly the rules of the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Furthermore, the EU and the US would not be able to ignore requests for the recognition of equivalence of third countries’ standards and would need to provide the grounds upon which they assess third countries’ standards as not adequately fulfilling the objectives of their own regulations and therefore rejecting them.
Resumo:
The Graduate Institute organized an academic workshop and roundtable on the occasion of EFTA's 50th Anniversary in Geneva under the chairmanship of H.E. Doris Leuthard, President of the Swiss Confederation. Pierre Sauve, Deputy Managing Director and Director of Studies, WTI and Co-leader, NCCR-Trade work programme on preferentialism and Anirudh Shingal, Senior Research Fellow, WTI and Co-leader, NCCR-Trade work programme on impact assessment of trade, co-authored a paper on the nature of preferentialism in services trade, which Anirudh presented at the workshop. The event was extremely well-attended by high profile dignitaries and academics including President Leuthard; Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy; trade ministers of Brazil and Finland; Jan Kubis, Executive Secretary of the UNECE and several current and former ambassadors. The academic workshop, moderated by Theresa Carpenter (Graduate Institute, Geneva), began in the morning with Prof. Victor Norman's (Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration) presentation on the future of EFTA. Other presentations included those by Prof. Peter Egger (ETH Zurich) on the structural estimation of gravity models with market entry dynamics and by Prof. Richard Baldwin (Graduate Institute, Geneva) on 21st century regionalism. The high-profile Panel in the afternoon, moderated by Prof. Richard Baldwin, was led by President Leuthard who spoke on free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system in 2020. The keynote address at the Panel was delivered by Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati (Coulmbia University), who spoke on strengthening defences against protectionism and liberalizing trade.
Resumo:
CD95 (Fas/Apo-1)-mediated apoptosis was shown to occur through two distinct pathways. One involves a direct activation of caspase-3 by large amounts of caspase-8 generated at the DISC (Type I cells). The other is related to the cleavage of Bid by low concentration of caspase-8, leading to the release of cytochrome c from mitochondria and the activation of caspase-3 by the cytochrome c/APAF-1/caspase-9 apoptosome (Type II cells). It is also known that the protein synthesis inhibitor cycloheximide (CHX) sensitizes Type I cells to CD95-mediated apoptosis, but it remains contradictory whether this effect also occurs in Type II cells. Here, we show that sub-lethal doses of CHX render both Type I and Type II cells sensitive to the apoptogenic effect of anti-CD95 antibodies but not to chemotherapeutic drugs. Moreover, Bcl-2-positive Type II cells become strongly sensitive to CD95-mediated apoptosis by the addition of CHX to the cell culture. This is not the result of a restraint of the anti-apoptotic effect of Bcl-2 at the mitochondrial level since CHX-treated Type II cells still retain their resistance to chemotherapeutic drugs. Therefore, CHX treatment is granting the CD95-mediated pathway the ability to bypass the mitochondria requirement to apoptosis, much alike to what is observed in Type I cells.
Resumo:
The UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity marks a wilful separation between the issues of trade and culture on the international level. The present article explores this intensified institutional, policy- and decision-making disconnect and exposes its flaws and the considerable drawbacks it brings with it. These drawbacks, the article argues, become particularly pronounced in the digital media environment that has impacted upon both the conditions of trade with cultural products and services and upon the diversity of cultural expressions in local and global contexts. Criticising the strong and now increasingly meaningless path dependencies of the analogue age, the article sketches some possible ways to reconciling trade and culture, most of which lead back to the WTO, rather than to UNESCO.
Resumo:
The relationship between trade and culture can be singled-out and deservedly labelled as unique in the discussion of 'trade and ...' issues. The reasons for this exceptional quality lie in the intensity of the relationship, which is indeed most often framed as 'trade versus culture' and has been a significant stumbling block, especially as audiovisual services are concerned, in the Uruguay Round and in the subsequent developments. The second specificity of the relationship is that the international community has organised its efforts in a rather effective manner to offset the lack of satisfying solutions within the framework of the WTO. The legally binding UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions is a clear sign of the potency of the international endeavour, on the one hand, and of the (almost desperate) desire to contest the existing WTO norms in the field of trade and culture, on the other. A third distinctive characteristic of the pair 'trade and culture', which is rarely mentioned and blissfully ignored in any Geneva or Paris talks, is that while the pro-trade and pro-culture opponents have been digging deeper in their respective trenches, the environment where trade and cultural issues are to be regulated has radically changed. The emergence and spread of digital technologies have modified profoundly the conditions for cultural content creation, distribution and access, and rendered some of the associated market failures obsolete, thus mitigating to a substantial degree the 'clash' nature of trade and culture. Against this backdrop, the present paper analyses in a finer-grained manner the move from 'trade and culture' towards 'trade versus culture'. It argues that both the domain of trade and that of culture have suffered from the aspirations to draw clearer lines between the WTO and other trade-related issues, charging the conflict to an extent that leaves few opportunities for practical solutions, which in an advanced digital setting would have been feasible.
Resumo:
This article provides an overview of the most essential issues in the trade and culture discourse from a global law perspective. It looks into the intensified disconnect between trade and culture and exposes its flaws and the considerable drawbacks that it brings with it. It is argued that these drawbacks become especially pronounced in the digital media environment, which has strongly affected both the conditions of trade with cultural products and services and cultural diversity in local and global contexts. In this modified setting, there could have been a number of feasible ‘trade and culture’ solutions – i.e. regulatory designs that whilst enhancing trade liberalisation are also conducive to cultural policy. Yet, the realisation of any of these options becomes chimerical as the line between trade and culture matters is drawn in a clear and resolute manner. The article is meant for an interdisciplinary audience and forthcoming in the Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society.
Resumo:
The present paper is the result of a four-year-long project examining the concept and the policies of cultural diversity and the impact of digital media upon the regulatory environment where the goal of cultural diversity is to be achieved. The focus of the project was primarily on the international level and in particular on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which also epitomise the often framed as opposing pair of trade and culture. In the broad context of the project, we sought to pinpoint the essential elements of an international trade-and-culture conducive framework that can also overcome the existing fragmentation in the field of international law and move towards more coherent solutions. In a narrower context, we sketched some possible improvements to the WTO law that can make it more suitable to the digital networked environment and to the objective of diverse media that some states aspire. . Our key messages are: (1) Neither the WTO nor UNESCO currently offers appropriate solutions to the trade and culture predicament and allows for efficient protection and promotion of cultural diversity; (2) The trade and culture discourse is overly politicised and due to the related path dependencies, a number of feasible solutions appears presently blocked; (3) The digital networked environment has profoundly changed the ways cultural content is created, distributed, accessed and consumed, and may thus offer good reasons to reassess and readjust the present models of governance; (4) Access to information appears to be the most appropriate focus of the discussions with view to protecting and promoting cultural diversity in the new digital media setting, both in local and global contexts; (5) This new focal point demands also broadening and interconnecting the policy discussions, which should go beyond the narrow scope of audiovisual media services, but cautiously account for the developments at the network and applications levels, as well as in other domains, such as most notably intellectual property rights protection; (6) There are various ways in which the WTO can be made more conducive to cultural policy considerations and these include, among others, improved and updated services classifications; enhanced legal certainty with regard to digitally transferred goods and services; incorporation of rules on subsidies for services and on competition.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the main features of Chilean trade and investment treaties, examining if there is a Chilean pattern in the regulation of trade and investment flows or if it is influenced by agreements signed by Chile with developed countries. The article also examines if there are differences between the treaties signed by Chile and other “Southern” developing countries and those negotiated with “Northern” developed economies, and if sustainable development concerns are part of the negotiations of trade and investment agreements by Chile.
Resumo:
Trade, investment and migration are strongly intertwined, being three key factors in international production. Yet, law and regulation of the three has remained highly fragmented. Trade is regulated by the WTO on the multilateral level, and through preferential trade agreements on the regional and bilateral levels – it is fragmented and complex in its own right. Investment, on the other hand, is mainly regulated through bilateral investment treaties with no strong links to the regulation of trade or migration. And, finally, migration is regulated by a web of different international, regional and bilateral agreements which focus on a variety of different aspects of migration ranging from humanitarian to economic. The problems of institutional fragmentation in international law are well known. There is no organizational forum for coherent strategy-making on the multilateral level covering all three areas. Normative regulations may thus contradict each other. Trade regulation may bring about liberalization of access for service providers, but eventually faces problems in recruiting the best people from abroad. Investors may withdraw investment without being held liable for disruptions to labour and to the livelihood and infrastructure of towns and communities affected by disinvestment. Finally, migration policies do not seem to have a significant impact as long as trade policies and investment policies are not working in a way that is conducive to reducing migration pressure, as trade and investment are simply more powerful on the regulatory level than migration. This chapter addresses the question as to how fragmentation of the three fields could be reme-died and greater coherence between these three areas of factor allocation in international economic relations and law could be achieved. It shows that migration regulation on the international level is lagging behind that on trade and investment. Stronger coordination and consideration of migration in trade and investment policy, and stronger international cooperation in migration, will provide the foundations for a coherent international architecture in the field.
Resumo:
To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.
Resumo:
Economic globalization and respect for human rights are both highly topical issues. In theory, more trade should increase economic welfare and protection of human rights should ensure individual dignity. Both fields of law protect certain freedoms: economic development should lead to higher human rights standards, and UN embargoes are used to secure compliance with human rights agreements. However the interaction between trade liberalisation and human rights protection is complex, and recently, tension has arisen between these two areas. Do WTO obligations covering intellectual property prevent governments from implementing their human rights obligations, including rights to food or health? Is it fair to accord the benefits of trade subject to a clean human rights record? This book first examines the theoretical framework of the interaction between the disciplines of international trade law and human rights. It builds upon the well-known debate between Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who construes trade obligations as human rights, and Professor Philip Alston, who warns of a merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. From this starting point, further chapters explore the differing legal matrices of the two fields and examine how cooperation between them might be improved, both in international law-making and institutions,in dispute settlement. The interaction between trade and human rights is then explored through seven case studies:freedom of expression and competition law; IP protection and health; agricultural trade and the right to food; trade restrictions on conflict WHO convention on tobacco control; and, finally, human rights conditionalities in preferential trade schemes.
Resumo:
Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.
Resumo:
How do organizations discursively negotiate organizational identity? In a longitudinal interpretive case study, we investigate the discursive practices of identity negotiations in a non-profit organization. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, documents and participant observations, and in applying a discourse analytical framework, we first identify three distinct discourses that provide the discursive resources for three different identity propositions. Then and in order to understand how these discursive resources are activated and utilized, we reconstruct four distinct discursive practices of organizational identity negotiations: (1) external comparison and differentiation (2) denial of trade-offs and harmonization (3) historization, and (4) moralization. We discuss how this structure relates to other similarly pluralistic organizational contexts.
Resumo:
Parasites and pathogens are apparent key factors for the detrimental health of managed European honey bee subspecies, Apis mellifera. Apicultural trade is arguably the main factor for the almost global distribution of most honey bee diseases, thereby increasing chances for multiple infestations/infections of regions, apiaries, colonies and even individual bees. This imposes difficulties to evaluate the effects of pathogens in isolation, thereby creating demand to survey remote areas. Here, we conducted the first comprehensive survey for 14 honey bee pathogens in Mongolia (N = 3 regions, N = 9 locations, N = 151 colonies), where honey bee colonies depend on humans to overwinter. In Mongolia, honey bees, Apis spp., are not native and colonies of European A. mellifera subspecies have been introduced ~60 years ago. Despite the high detection power and large sample size across Mongolian regions with beekeeping, the mite Acarapis woodi, the bacteria Melissococcus plutonius and Paenibacillus larvae, the microsporidian Nosema apis, Acute bee paralysis virus, Kashmir bee virus, Israeli acute paralysis virus and Lake Sinai virus strain 2 were not detected, suggesting that they are either very rare or absent. The mite Varroa destructor, Nosema ceranae and four viruses (Sacbrood virus, Black queen cell virus, Deformed wing virus (DWV) and Chronic bee paralysis virus) were found with different prevalence. Despite the positive correlation between the prevalence of V. destructor mites and DWV, some areas had only mites, but not DWV, which is most likely due to the exceptional isolation of apiaries (up to 600 km). Phylogenetic analyses of the detected viruses reveal their clustering and European origin, thereby supporting the role of trade for pathogen spread and the isolation of Mongolia from South-Asian countries. In conclusion, this survey reveals the distinctive honey bee pathosphere of Mongolia, which offers opportunities for exciting future research.