Online Reputation Systems and Cumulative Advantage

The study of online reputation systems and their importance for promoting trust and cooperation and, therefore, the smooth functioning of online markets has received considerable attention over the last few years. In the first part of our talk we will try to give a brief overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work in this field, summarize the main findings from this research and identify open questions where results are either controversial or do not yet exist. The second part of our talk will focus on one of these issues that deserve further research, namely the relation between online reputation systems and processes of "cumulative advantage." Cumulative advantage is the mechanism where a favorable relative position of having a good reputation becomes a resource for further relative gains. The process leads to increased status inequality and a heavily skewed distribution of number of feedbacks, i.e. the ties in the reputation network. We present empirical evidence for direct and indirect reputation effects on the micro level of an auction reputation system and discuss the distributional consequences for the market level.

Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions

Exchange between anonymous actors in Internet auctions corresponds to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma-like situation. Therefore, in any given auction the risk is high that seller and buyer will cheat and, as a consequence, that the market will collapse. However, mutual cooperation can be attained by the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this system, sellers have incentives to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we empirically explore the effects of the reputation system. In general, the analysis of nonobtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation, and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimates of effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions such as the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the selling price (highest bid). In particular, we try to answer the question whether sellers receive a "premium" for reputation. Our results show that buyers are willing to pay higher prices for reputation in order to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves from cheating buyers by the choice of an appropriate payment mode. Therefore, despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior, simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets.