Numerical corrections to the strong coupling effective Polyakov-line action for finite T Yang-Mills theory

We consider a three-dimensional effective theory of Polyakov lines derived previously from lattice Yang-Mills theory and QCD by means of a resummed strong coupling expansion. The effective theory is useful for investigations of the phase structure, with a sign problem mild enough to allow simulations also at finite density. In this work we present a numerical method to determine improved values for the effective couplings directly from correlators of 4d Yang-Mills theory. For values of the gauge coupling up to the vicinity of the phase transition, the dominant short range effective coupling are well described by their corresponding strong coupling series. We provide numerical results also for the longer range interactions, Polyakov lines in higher representations as well as four-point interactions, and discuss the growing significance of non-local contributions as the lattice gets finer. Within this approach the critical Yang-Mills coupling β c is reproduced to better than one percent from a one-coupling effective theory on N τ = 4 lattices while up to five couplings are needed on N τ = 8 for the same accuracy.

The inverse problem for Schwinger pair production

The production of electron–positron pairs in time-dependent electric fields (Schwinger mechanism) depends non-linearly on the applied field profile. Accordingly, the resulting momentum spectrum is extremely sensitive to small variations of the field parameters. Owing to this non-linear dependence it is so far unpredictable how to choose a field configuration such that a predetermined momentum distribution is generated. We show that quantum kinetic theory along with optimal control theory can be used to approximately solve this inverse problem for Schwinger pair production. We exemplify this by studying the superposition of a small number of harmonic components resulting in predetermined signatures in the asymptotic momentum spectrum. In the long run, our results could facilitate the observation of this yet unobserved pair production mechanism in quantum electrodynamics by providing suggestions for tailored field configurations.

Gamma-hydroxybutyrate enhances mood and prosocial behavior without affecting plasma oxytocin and testosterone.

Gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB) is a GHB-/GABAB-receptor agonist. Reports from GHB abusers indicate euphoric, prosocial, and empathogenic effects of the drug. We measured the effects of GHB on mood, prosocial behavior, social and non-social cognition and assessed potential underlying neuroendocrine mechanisms. GHB (20mg/kg) was tested in 16 healthy males, using a randomized, placebo-controlled, cross-over design. Subjective effects on mood were assessed by visual-analogue-scales and the GHB-Specific-Questionnaire. Prosocial behavior was examined by the Charity Donation Task, the Social Value Orientation test, and the Reciprocity Task. Reaction time, memory, empathy, and theory-of-mind were also tested. Blood plasma levels of GHB, oxytocin, testosterone, progesterone, dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA), cortisol, aldosterone, and adrenocorticotropic-hormone (ACTH) were determined. GHB showed stimulating and sedating effects, and elicited euphoria, disinhibition, and enhanced vitality. In participants with low prosociality, the drug increased donations and prosocial money distributions. In contrast, social cognitive abilities such as emotion recognition, empathy, and theory-of-mind, and basal cognitive functions were not affected. GHB increased plasma progesterone, while oxytocin and testosterone, cortisol, aldosterone, DHEA, and ACTH levels remained unaffected. GHB has mood-enhancing and prosocial effects without affecting social hormones such as oxytocin and testosterone. These data suggest a potential involvement of GHB-/GABAB-receptors and progesterone in mood and prosocial behavior.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Balancing Control and Coaching in CSO Governance : A Paradox Perspective on Board Behavior

How can governance of civil society organizations be conceptualized more adequately by accounting for the dual and simultaneous requirements of controlling and coaching in board behavior? Empirically, we seem to agree that effective governance of a civil society organization is crucial to its sustained viability. Conceptually, however, we observe a lack of consensus on how to best conceptualize CSO governance. By critically juxtaposing two major theoretical lenses to conceptualize governance, namely agency and stewardship theory, we identify a number of challenges conceptualizing board-management relations that deserve our attention. While agency theory privileges controlling behavior, stewardship theory emphasizes the coaching behavior of boards. The purpose of this paper is to offer a concept of governance that is informed by a paradox perspective advancing a subtler, more adequate conceptualization of board governance that accounts for the often conflicting demands on CSO governance. Drawing on a longitudinal interpretive case study, we exemplify our propositions empirically. The paper concludes with discussing the implications of our argument for CSO governance research and practice.

Sharp comparison and maximum principles via horizontal normal mapping in the Heisenberg group

In this paper we solve a problem raised by Gutiérrez and Montanari about comparison principles for H−convex functions on subdomains of Heisenberg groups. Our approach is based on the notion of the sub-Riemannian horizontal normal mapping and uses degree theory for set-valued maps. The statement of the comparison principle combined with a Harnack inequality is applied to prove the Aleksandrov-type maximum principle, describing the correct boundary behavior of continuous H−convex functions vanishing at the boundary of horizontally bounded subdomains of Heisenberg groups. This result answers a question by Garofalo and Tournier. The sharpness of our results are illustrated by examples.