Firm Building and Entrepreneurship in Second-Tier High-Tech Regions

This paper examines how a second-tier high-technology region leveraged corporate assets—mostly from transnational firms—in building a knowledge-based economy. The paper reviews how firm building and entrepreneurship influence the evolution of a peripheral regional economy. Using a case study of Boise, Idaho (the US), the research highlights several important sources of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial firm formation is closely linked with a region's ability to grow incubator organizations, particularly innovative firms. These innovative firms provide the training ground for entrepreneurs. Firms, however, differ and the ways in which firm building activities influence regional entrepreneurship depend on firm strategy and organization. Thus, second-tier high-tech regions in the US are taking a different path than their well-known counterparts such as Silicon Valley or Route 128 around Boston.

Aggression und soziale Interaktion im Erziehungsheim

In einer Kamerabrillenstudie werden die sozialen und materiellen Umwelten von Jugendlichen, die in Erziehungsheimen für verhaltensauffällige und sozial beeinträchtigte Kinder und Jugendliche leben, untersucht und mit einer Kontrastgruppe nicht verhaltensauffälliger, zuhause lebender Jugendlichen verglichen. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Heimjugendliche über einen eingeschränkten Streifraum verfügen, weniger mit Peers interagieren und mehr Aggression ausgesetzt sind. Für den Erfolg der Heimerziehung ist es zentral, Peers nicht unbeaufsichtigt zu lassen, weil durch eine negative Peerbeeinflussung der Erfolg der Intervention geschwächt wird.

Minimizing the Threat of a Positive Majority Deficit in Two-tier Voting Systems with Equipopulous Units

The mean majority deficit in a two-tier voting system is a function of the partition of the population. We derive a new square-root rule: For odd-numbered population sizes and equipopulous units the mean majority deficit is maximal when the member size of the units in the partition is close to the square root of the population size. Furthermore, within the partitions into roughly equipopulous units, partitions with small even numbers of units or small even-sized units yield high mean majority deficits. We discuss the implications for the winner-takes-all system in the US Electoral College.