The Quiet Eye and Information Processing: Facilitation of Stimulus Identification and Response Selection

Background: A prerequisite for high performance in motor tasks is the acquisition of egocentric sensory information that must be translated into motor actions. A phenomenon that supports this process is the Quiet Eye (QE) defined as long final fixation before movement initiation. It is assumed that the QE facilitates information processing, particularly regarding movement parameterization. Aims: The question remains whether this facilitation also holds for the information-processing stage of response selection and – related to perception crucial – stage of stimulus identification. Method: In two experiments with sport science students, performance-enhancing effects of experimentally manipulated QE durations were tested as a function of target position predictability and target visibility, thereby selectively manipulating response selection and stimulus identification demands, respectively. Results: The results support the hypothesis of facilitated information processing through long QE durations since in both experiments performance-enhancing effects of long QE durations were found under increased processing demands only. In Experiment 1, QE duration affected performance only if the target position was not predictable and positional information had to be processed over the QE period. In Experiment 2, in a full vs. no target visibility comparison with saccades to the upcoming target position induced by flicker cues, the functionality of a long QE duration depended on the visual stimulus identification period as soon as the interval falls below a certain threshold. Conclusions: The results corroborate earlier findings that QE efficiency depends on demands put on the visuomotor system, thereby furthering the assumption that the phenomenon supports the processes of sensorimotor integration.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Job-shadowing: Swiss health librarians observing experienced search specialists and information skills trainers in London

Abstract As librarians of the Social & Preventive Medicine Library in Bern, we help researchers perform systematic literature searches and teach students to use medical databases. We developed our skills mainly “on the job”, and we wondered how other health librarians in Europe were trained to become experts in searching. We had a great opportunity to “job shadow” specialists in this area of library service during a 5-day-internship at the Royal Free Hospital Medical Library in London, Great Britain.

Phosphatidylethanol: normalization during detoxification, gender aspects and correlation with other biomarkers and self-reports

Phosphatidylethanol (PEth) is a direct ethanol metabolite, and has recently attracted attention as biomarker of ethanol intake. The aims of the current study are: (1) to characterize the normalization time of PEth in larger samples than previously conducted; (2) to elucidate potential gender differences; and (3) to report the correlation of PEth with other biomarkers and self-reported alcohol consumption. Fifty-seven alcohol-dependent patients (ICD 10 F 10.25; 9 females, 48 males) entering medical detoxification at three study sites were enrolled. The study sample was comprised of 48 males and 9 females, with mean age 43.5. Mean gamma glutamyl transpeptidase (GGT) was 209.61 U/l, average mean corpuscular volume (MCV) was 97.35 fl, mean carbohydrate deficient transferrin (%CDT) was 8.68, and mean total ethanol intake in the last 7 days was 1653 g. PEth was measured in heparinized whole blood with a high-pressure liquid chromatography method, while GGT, MCV and %CDT were measured using routine methods. PEth levels at day 1 of detoxification ranged between 0.63 and 26.95 micromol/l (6.22 mean, 4.70 median, SD 4.97). There were no false negatives at day 1. Sensitivities for the other biomarkers were 40.4% for MCV, 73.1% for GGT and 69.2% for %CDT, respectively. No gender differences were found for PEth levels at any time point. Our data suggest that PEth is (1) a suitable intermediate term marker of ethanol intake in both sexes; and (2) sensitivity is extraordinary high in alcohol dependent patients. The results add further evidence to the data that suggest that PEth has potential as a candidate for a sensitive and specific biomarker, which reflects longer-lasting intake of higher amounts of alcohol and seemingly has the above mentioned certain advantages over traditional biomarkers.

A communication and information technology infrastructure for real time monitoring and management of type 1 diabetes patients

This paper is focused on the integration of state-of-the-art technologies in the fields of telecommunications, simulation algorithms, and data mining in order to develop a Type 1 diabetes patient's semi to fully-automated monitoring and management system. The main components of the system are a glucose measurement device, an insulin delivery system (insulin injection or insulin pumps), a mobile phone for the GPRS network, and a PDA or laptop for the Internet. In the medical environment, appropriate infrastructure for storage, analysis and visualizing of patients' data has been implemented to facilitate treatment design by health care experts.

Information provision and information needs in adult survivors of childhood cancer

BACKGROUND Knowledge about their past medical history is central for childhood cancer survivors to ensure informed decisions in their health management. Knowledge about information provision and information needs in this population is still scarce. We thus aimed to assess: (1) the information survivors reported to have received on disease, treatment, follow-up, and late effects; (2) their information needs in these four domains and the format in which they would like it provided; (3) the association with psychological distress and quality of life (QoL). PROCEDURE As part of the Follow-up survey of the Swiss Childhood Cancer Survivor Study, we sent a questionnaire to all survivors (≥18 years) who previously participated to the baseline survey, were diagnosed with cancer after 1990 at an age of <16 years. RESULTS Most survivors had received oral information only (on illness: oral: 82%, written: 38%, treatment: oral: 79%, written: 36%; follow-up: oral: 77%, written: 23%; late effects: oral: 68%, written: 14%). Most survivors who had not previously received any information rated it as important, especially information on late effects (71%). A large proportion of survivors reported current information needs and would like to receive personalized information especially on late effects (44%). Survivors with higher information needs reported higher psychological distress and lower QoL. CONCLUSIONS Survivors want to be more informed especially on possible late effects, and want to receive personalized information. Improving information provision, both qualitatively and quantitatively, will allow survivors to have better control of their health and to become better decision makers. Pediatr Blood Cancer 2014;61:312-318. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Effects of overt self-­talk on team partners’ other-efficacy and performance in a golf putting task

Introduction According to Lent and Lopez’ (2002) tripartite view of efficacy beliefs, members of a team form beliefs about the efficacy of their team partners. This other-efficacy belief can influence individual performance as shown by Dunlop, Beatty, and Beauchamp (2011) in their experimental study using manipulated performance feedback to alter other-efficacy beliefs. Participants holding favorable other-efficacy beliefs outperformed those with lower other--‐efficacy beliefs. Antecedents of such other-efficacy beliefs are amongst others perceptions regarding motivation and psychological factors of the partner (Jackson, Knapp, & Beauchamp, 2008). Overt self-talk could be interpreted as the manifestation of such motivational or psychological factors. In line with this assumption, in an experimental study using dubbed videos of the same segment of a tennis match, Van Raalte, Brewer, Cornelius, and Petitpas (2006) found that players were perceived more favorably (e.g., more concentrated, and of higher ability levels) when shown with dubbed positive self-talk as compared to dubbed negative or no dubbed self--‐talk. Objectives The aim of the study was to examine the possible effects of a confederate’s overt self-talk on participants’ other-efficacy beliefs and performance in a team setting. Method In a laboratory experiment (between-subjects, pre-post-test design, matched by pretest performance) 89 undergraduate students (female = 35, M = 20.81 years, SD = 2.34) participated in a golf putting task together with a confederate (same gender groups). Depending on the experimental condition (positive, negative, or no self-talk), the confederate commented his or her putts according to a self-talk script. Bogus performance feedback assured that the performance of the confederate was held constant. Performance was measured as the distance to the center of the target, other-efficacy by a questionnaire. Results The data collection has just finished and the results of repeated measures analyses of variance will be presented and discussed at the congress. We expect to find higher other-efficacy beliefs and better individual performance in the positive self-talk condition. References Dunlop, W.L., Beatty, D.J., & Beauchamp, M.R. (2011). Examining the influence of other-efficacy and self-efficacy on personal performance. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 33, 586-593. Jackson, B., Knapp, P., & Beauchamp, M.R. (2008). Origins and consequences of tripartite efficacy beliefs within elite athlete dyads. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 30, 512-540. Lent, R.W., & Lopez, F.G. (2002). Cognitive ties that bind: A tripartite view of efficacy beliefs in growth--‐promoting relationships. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 21, 256-286. Van Raalte, J.L., Brewer, B.W, Cornelius, A.E., & Petitpas, A.J. (2006). Self-presentational effects of self-talk on perceptions of tennis players. Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 3, 134-149.