Internationale Kontrolle lokaler Verwaltung in einer Konfliktregion. Das Experiment „Freie Stadt Danzig“ (1920-1939)

The Free City of Danzig was founded by the Allies after World War One to settle the conflict between Poles and Germans as to which territory the town belonged. The League of Nations was designated to be the guarantor of its status. British and American experts and policy advisors saw it as an experiment on the way to new forms of statehood, by means of which nationalism as the founding principle of territorial entities could be overcome. However, the „Free City“ status was rejected by both the city’s inhabitants and German and Polish government agencies, with the result that the League and its local representative, the High Commissioner, were constantly confronted with difficulties in the interpretation of the international treaties and conventions relating to Danzig. In addition, hardly anyone in Danzig, Germany or Poland was interested in the economic and financial situation of the Free City, but were more interested in winning political battles than in the well-being of the city and its inhabitants. As a result, the situation in Danzig became more and more hopeless. The city became increasingly dependent on (illegal) German subsidies, while the High Commissioners generally cared more about their own prestige and that of their home countries than about the interests of the League of Nations. But as no political means of modifying the city’s status had been provided for, nothing changed formally in Danzig until Germany started the Second World War and annexed the city in September 1939. In retrospect, the international control of local government could not contribute to a long-term solution for Danzig. It merely postponed its violent solution for twenty years.

Cleverer than we thought: the change in discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church

This paper will focus on three episodes of contemporary church-state relations in Georgia, in particular, the conflicting interaction between law and religion in the public space. The first episode will be an open confrontation between the church and the state over the law on Registration of Religious Minority organizations (2011) which allowed the religious minorities to freely register; second: the Law on Self-governance (2013) which Georgian Orthodox Church considered “a threat to territorial integrity of Georgia”; and lastly: the Law on Anti-discrimination (2014) which was deemed “legitimization of Sodomic sin”. By reflecting on the three examples where for the first time after the collapse of Soviet Union, the Georgian state openly confronted the church and made a decision notwithstanding its position, I will attempt to argue that the role of the Orthodox Church in influencing the law making process is in gradual decline. However, on the other hand, by presenting the results of an ethnographic study conducted in 23 eparchies and perishes in 7 regions of Georgia in 2014, I will also show that church has adapted to its declining role over policy making, and to regain its political influence it gradually started to employ a civic rather than ethno nationalist discourse on matters of religious freedom while engaging with government. The paper will suggest that both unilateral decision-making of the state and civic shift in the discourse of the church constitute an important change in understanding church-state dynamics in the post-communist Orthodox Christianity dominated society.

An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State and Nation in Contemporary Georgia

I will attempt to problematize the typologies of nationalism when applied to the Georgian context, particularly in relationship to nationalism of President Mikheil Saakashvili. I will argue that the state-driven nationalism of post-Rose Revolution government was a hybrid form of ethno-cultural and civic which had elements of ethnic particularism towards the Orthodox Church. By reflecting on the growing assistance of Western institutions to Georgia, I will problematize the extent to which the rise of American and European involvement in the region reinforced the perceptions of the “self” and the “other” among the religious elites since the Rose Revolution. By presenting field research data (interviews) gathered in 23 eparchies and perishes with religious clerics in 7 regions of Georgia, I will argue that religious nationalism in Georgia strengthened not in response to but as an outcome of President Saakashvili’s policies towards the church, and partially as a reaction to the growing dissatisfaction with Western institutions working in Georgia and Western governments’ response to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. By reflecting on empirical material, the paper attempts to problematize an understanding of religious nationalism as a social movement, an instance of cultural autonomy and a source of identity (Friedland 2001). In response, I suggest viewing religious nationalism in post-communist Georgia as medium of material and political interests

“Crye Fredome”? Medievalism and Twenty-First-Century Scottish National Identity

It is a well-documented fact that the Middle Ages have had a long history of instrumentalisation by nationalisms. 19th-century Eu¬rope in particular witnessed an origins craze during the process of nation-building. In the post-Shoah, post-modern West, on the other hand, we might expect this kind of medievalist master nar¬rative to have been consigned to the dustbin of history. And yet, as nationalism surges again in Europe, negotiations of national identi¬ties in medieval dress seem to have become fashionable once more. In order to come to terms with the fragmented and often contradictory presence of the Middle Ages in these discourses of national identity, I propose we consider medievalism a utilitarian product of the cultural memory. Rather than representing any ‘real’ Middle Ages, then, medievalism tailors available knowledge of the medieval past to the diverse social needs and ideologies of the present. This paper looks at a selection of Scottish examples of present-day medievalism in an attempt to investigate, in particular, the place of the medieval Wars of Scottish Independence in contemporary negotiations of ‘Scottishness’. Both the relationships envisioned between self and other and the role played by ‘the land’ in these cultural, social and political instances of national introspection offer starting points for critical inquiry. Moreover, the analysis of a scholarly intervention in the run-up to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum indicates an intriguing dialogue of academic and non-academic voices in the context of Scottish medievalist cultural memory. We thus find a wide array of uses of the Scottish Middle Ages, some of which feed into the burgeoning nationalism of recent years, while others offer more pensive and ambivalent answers to the question of what it means to be Scottish in the 21st century.