The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy: Ideological Roots of Inequality

The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy examines how implementing American tropes in policy design inadvertently frustrates policy goals. It investigates multiple market-oriented designs including funding for private organizations to deliver public services, funding for individuals to buy services, and policies incentivizing or mandating private actors to provide social policy. The author shows that these solutions often not only fail to achieve social goals, but, in fact, actively undermine them, for example saddling the poor with debt or encouraging discrimination. The book carefully details the mechanisms through which this occurs, for example a mismatch between program goals and either contract terms or individual preferences. The author examines several policies in depth, covering universal social insurance programs like healthcare and pensions, as well as smaller interventions like programs for the homeless. The author builds the argument using detailed empirical evidence as well as anecdote, keeping the book accessible and entertaining.

Managing social policy under federalism: The challenges of hybrid funding and program delivery

This paper discusses generally the question of the level of government that should be used to administer different social policies. The chapter focuses on the Medicaid program, looking at recent state-level changes in health insurance for the poor and long-term care policy. Particular attention will be paid to the question of how states have used their new freedoms to outsource public insurance to the private sector and on the consequent differences in outcomes across states. Notably, this paper will be drawn from my forthcoming book “The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy” (Palgrave, MacMillan, November, 2015).

The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate Change Mitigation: Legal and Economic Analysis

This paper addresses a potential role that tariffs and tariff policy can play in encouraging countries to take part in a multilateral effort to mitigate climate change. It begins by assessing whether increasing tariffs on products from energy intensive or polluting industries amounts to a violation of WTO rules and whether protectionism in this case can be differentiated from genuine environmental concerns. It then argues that while lowering tariffs for environmental goods can serve as a carrot to promote dissemination of cleaner technologies, tariff deconsolidation is a legitimate stick to encourage polluting countries to move towards an international climate agreement. The paper further explores this view by undertaking a partialequilibrium simulation analysis to examine the impact of a unilateral unit increase in tariffs on the imports of the most carbon-intensive products from countries not committed to climate polices. Our results suggest that the committed importing countries would have to raise their tariffs only slightly to effect a significant decline in the imports of these products from the non-committed countries. For instance, a unit increase in the simple average applied tariffs on the imports of these carbon-intensive products in 2005 from our sample of non-committed exporting countries would reduce the imports of these products by an average 32.6% in Australia, 178% in Canada, 195% in the EU, 271% in Japan and 62% in the US, therebysuggesting the effectiveness of such a measure in pushing countries towards a global climate policy.