Dopamine receptor D4 polymorphism predicts the effect of L-DOPA on gambling behavior

BACKGROUND There is ample evidence that a subgroup of Parkinson's disease patients who are treated with dopaminergic drugs develop certain behavioral addictions such as pathological gambling. The fact that only a subgroup of these patients develops pathological gambling suggests an interaction between dopaminergic drug treatment and individual susceptibility factors. These are potentially of genetic origin, since research in healthy subjects suggests that vulnerability for pathological gambling may be linked to variation in the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene. Using a pharmacogenetic approach, we investigated how variation in this gene modulates the impact of dopaminergic stimulation on gambling behavior in healthy subjects. METHODS We administered 300 mg of L-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or placebo to 200 healthy male subjects who were all genotyped for their DRD4 polymorphism. Subjects played a gambling task 60 minutes after L-DOPA administration. RESULTS Without considering genetic information, L-DOPA administration did not lead to an increase in gambling propensity compared with placebo. As expected, however, an individual's DRD4 polymorphism accounted for variation in gambling behavior after the administration of L-DOPA. Subjects who carry at least one copy of the 7-repeat allele showed an increased gambling propensity after dopaminergic stimulation. CONCLUSIONS These findings demonstrate that genetic variation in the DRD4 gene determines an individual's gambling behavior in response to a dopaminergic drug challenge. They may have implications for the treatment of Parkinson's disease patients by offering a genotype approach for determining individual susceptibilities for pathological gambling and may also afford insights into the vulnerability mechanisms underlying addictive behavior.

Dopaminergic stimulation increases selfish behavior in the absence of punishment threat.

RATIONALE People often face decisions that pit self-interested behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against normative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus, normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical processes mediating the impact of these influences remain unknown. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic system to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts. OBJECTIVES The present study investigates dopaminergic drug effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoidance in social interaction. METHODS Two-hundred one healthy male participants were randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair behavior could not be punished. RESULTS In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA administration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA administration had no significant effect on behavior when faced with punishment threats. CONCLUSIONS The results of this study broaden the role of the dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social interactions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behaviors in certain clinical subpopulations.

Associations between the decrease in bovine clinical mastitis and changes in dairy farmers' attitude, knowledge, and behavior in the Netherlands.

The aim of this study was to associate changes in dairy farmers' self-reported attitude, knowledge, and behavior with the decrease in incidence rate of clinical mastitis (IRCM). Farmer-diagnosed clinical mastitis cases were obtained from two surveys conducted before (July 2004-June 2005) and at the end (2009) of a mastitis control program in the Netherlands. Information on farmers' attitude, knowledge, and behavior was also obtained by sending the farmers the same questionnaire during both surveys. Multivariable linear regression models identified that the herd level 2004 IRCM explained 28% of the variation in the decrease of IRCM. Changes in farmers' attitude and knowledge, and changes in farmers' behavior additionally explained 24% and 5%, respectively. These results suggest that the way management measures are executed may be at least as important as the fact that they are executed. No control group was available for this study because the intervention was applied at the national level. We therefore do not claim any causal relationships.

Explicit vs implicit affiliation motives predict different social behavior in sports competition

Objectives The present study investigated the predictive value of the explicit and implicit affiliation motive for social behavior in sport competitions. From an information processing perspective, an explicit motive is linked to verbal cues and respondent behavior. The implicit motive in turn is linked to nonverbal stimuli and operant behavior (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008). Both respondent affiliative behavior (e.g., verbal interactions with teammates) and operant nonverbal social behavior (e.g., pleasant to opponents) can be observed in racquet sports team competitions. Design & Methods Fifty-two male racquet sportsmen completed the Personality Research Form (explicit affiliation motive) and the Operant Motive Test (implicit affiliation motive). Motive measures were used to predict social behavior during competitions using multiple regression analyses. To this aim real competitive matches were videotaped and analyzed. Results Results show that the explicit affiliation motive is associated with time spent in verbal team contact. The implicit affiliation motive, by contrast, is linked to pleasant nonverbal behavior shown toward opponents. Conclusions Findings suggest that implicit and explicit affiliation motives predict different kinds of social behavior in sports competition respectively. Indirect motive measures may be of additional predictive value for different behavior in real sports settings.

Effect of bone graft density on in vitro cell behavior with enamel matrix derivative

OBJECTIVES Bone replacement grafting materials play an important role in regenerative dentistry. Despite a large array of tested bone-grafting materials, little information is available comparing the effects of bone graft density on in vitro cell behavior. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to compare the effects of cells seeded on bone grafts at low and high density in vitro for osteoblast adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation. MATERIALS AND METHODS The response of osteoblasts to the presence of a growth factor (enamel matrix derivative, (EMD)) in combination with low (8 mg per well) or high (100 mg per well) bone grafts (BG; natural bone mineral, Bio-Oss®) density, was studied and compared for osteoblast cell adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation as assessed by real-time PCR. Standard tissue culture plastic was used as a control with and without EMD. RESULTS The present study demonstrates that in vitro testing of bone-grafting materials is largely influenced by bone graft seeding density. Osteoblast adhesion was up to 50 % lower when cells were seeded on high-density BG when compared to low-density BG and control tissue culture plastic. Furthermore, proliferation was affected in a similar manner whereby cell proliferation on high-density BG (100 mg/well) was significantly increased when compared to that on low-density BG (8 mg/well). In contrast, cell differentiation was significantly increased on high-density BG as assessed by real-time PCR for markers collagen 1 (Col 1), alkaline phosphatase (ALP), and osteocalcin (OC) as well as alizarin red staining. The effects of EMD on osteoblast adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation further demonstrated that the bone graft seeding density largely controls in vitro results. EMD significantly increased cell attachment only on high-density BG, whereas EMD was able to further stimulate cell proliferation and differentiation of osteoblasts on control culture plastic and low-density BG when compared to high-density BG. CONCLUSION The results from the present study demonstrate that the in vitro conditions largely influence cell behavior of osteoblasts seeded on bone grafts and in vitro testing. CLINICAL RELEVANCE These results also illustrate the necessity for careful selection of bone graft seeding density to optimize in vitro testing and provide the clinician with a more accurate description of the osteopromotive potential of bone grafts.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Do Information, Price, or Morals Influence Ethical Consumption? A Natural Field Experiment and Customer Survey on the Purchase of Fair Trade Coffee

We address ethical consumption using a natural field experiment on the actual purchase of Fair Trade (FT) coffee in three supermarkets in Germany. Based on a quasi-experimental before-and-after design the effects of three different treatments – information, 20% price reduction, and a moral appeal – are analyzed. Sales data cover actual ethical purchase behavior and avoid problems of social desirability. But they offer only limited insights into the motivations of individual consumers. We therefore complemented the field experiment with a customer survey that allows us to contrast observed (ethical) buying behavior with self-reported FT consumption. Results from the experiment suggest that only the price reduction had the expected positive and statistically significant effect on FT consumption.