19 resultados para Game of rules
Resumo:
Land degradation as well as land conservation maps at a (sub-) national scale are critical for pro-ject planning for sustainable land management. It has long been recognized that online accessible and low-cost raster data sets (e.g. Landsat imagery, SRTM-DEM’s) provide a readily available basis for land resource assessments for developing countries. However, choice of spatial, tempo-ral and spectral resolution of such data is often limited. Furthermore, while local expert knowl-edge on land degradation processes is abundant, difficulties are often encountered when linking existing knowledge with modern approaches including GIS and RS. The aim of this study was to develop an easily applicable, standardized workflow for preliminary spatial assessments of land degradation and conservation, which also allows the integration of existing expert knowledge. The core of the developed method consists of a workflow for rule-based land resource assess-ment. In a systematic way, this workflow leads from predefined land degradation and conserva-tion classes to field indicators, to suitable spatial proxy data, and finally to a set of rules for clas-sification of spatial datasets. Pre-conditions are used to narrow the area of interest. Decision tree models are used for integrating the different rules. It can be concluded that the workflow presented assists experts from different disciplines in col-laboration GIS/RS specialists in establishing a preliminary model for assessing land degradation and conservation in a spatially explicit manner. The workflow provides support when linking field indicators and spatial datasets, and when determining field indicators for groundtruthing.
Resumo:
To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.
Resumo:
This paper examines concerns about the impact that TTIP could have on existing and future climate policies and laws from the inclusion of provisions on investment protection including investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS), the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the introduction of rules for trade in energy and raw materials. It argues that from an environmental perspective, ISDS should not necessarily be seen as a regime that goes against the defence of the environment or prevention of climate change. Although it might be used to challenge policies of an EU home State that increase levels of environmental protection, it can also be used to contest changes in an EU home State’s environmental policies that would reduce the protection of the environment, if foreign investment is affected. To a large extent, this also holds true for other areas of TTIP negotiations. While the achievement of a balance between rules that promote trade and those that maintain policy space for governments to respond to environmental concerns has to be closely monitored, benefits for climate could be seized from harmonisation of carbon laws at the level of the strictest regulations of two parties, provisions that promote trade in low carbon technologies and renewable energy and bilateral cooperation on climate change.
Resumo:
The previous chapter presented the overall decision-making structure in Swiss politics at the beginning of the 21st century. This provides us with a general picture and allows for a comparison over time with the decision-making structure in the 1970s. However, the analysis of the overall decision-making structure potentially neglects important differences between policy domains (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Knoke et al. 1996; Kriesi et al. 2006a; Sabatier 1987). Policy issues vary across policy domains, as do the political actors involved. In addition, actors may hold different policy preferences from one policy domain to the next, and they may also collaborate with other partners depending on the policy domain at stake. Examining differences between policy domains is particularly appropriate in Switzerland. Because no fixed coalitions of government and opposition exist, actors create different coalitions in each policy domain (Linder and Schwarz 2008). Whereas important parts of the institutional setting are similar across policy domains, decision-making structures might still vary. As was the case with the cross-time analysis conducted in the two previous chapters, a stability of 'rules-in-form' might hide important variations in 'rules-in-use' also across different policy domains.