The tectonometamorphic evolution of the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes (internal Western Alps): review and synthesis

This study reviews and synthesizes the present knowledge on the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes, the highest tectonic elements in the Western Alps (Switzerland and Italy), which comprise pieces of pre-Alpine basement and Mesozoic cover. All of the available data are integrated in a crustal-scale kinematic model with the aim to reconstruct the Alpine tectono-metamorphic evolution of the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes. Although major uncertainties remain in the pre-Alpine geometry, the basement and cover sequences of the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes are seen as part of a thinned continental crust derived from the Adriatic margin. The earliest stages of the Alpine evolution are interpreted as recording late Cretaceous subduction of the Adria-derived Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes below the South-Alpine domain. During this subduction, several sheets of crustal material were stacked and separated by shear zones that rework remnants of their Mesozoic cover. The recently described Roisan-Cignana Shear Zone of the Dent Blanche Tectonic System represents such a shear zone, indicating that the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes represent a stack of several individual nappes. During the subsequent subduction of the Piemonte–Liguria Ocean large-scale folding of the nappe stack (including the Roisan-Cignana Shear Zone) took place under greenschist facies conditions, which indicates partial exhumation of the Dent Blanche Tectonic System. The entrance of the Briançonnais micro-continent within the subduction zone led to a drastic change in the deformation pattern of the Alpine belt, with rapid exhumation of the eclogite-facies ophiolite bearing units and thrust propagation towards the foreland. Slab breakoff probably was responsible for allowing partial melting in the mantle and Oligocene intrusions into the most internal parts of the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes. Finally, indentation of the Adriatic plate into the orogenic wedge resulted in the formation of the Vanzone back-fold, which marks the end of the pervasive ductile deformation within the Sesia–Dent Blanche nappes during the earliest Miocene.

Anatomy of the nail unit and the nail biopsy

The nail unit is the largest and a rather complex skin appendage. It is located on the dorsal aspect of the tips of fingers and toes and has important protective and sensory functions. Development begins in utero between weeks 7 and 8 and is fully formed at birth. For its correct development, a great number of signals are necessary. Anatomically, it consists of 4 epithelial components: the matrix that forms the nail plate; the nail bed that firmly attaches the plate to the distal phalanx; the hyponychium that forms a natural barrier at the physiological point of separation of the nail from the bed; and the eponychium that represents the undersurface of the proximal nail fold which is responsible for the formation of the cuticle. The connective tissue components of the matrix and nail bed dermis are located between the corresponding epithelia and the bone of the distal phalanx. Characteristics of the connective tissue include: a morphogenetic potency for the regeneration of their epithelia; the lateral and proximal nail folds form a distally open frame for the growing nail; and the tip of the digit has rich sensible and sensory innervation. The blood supply is provided by the paired volar and dorsal digital arteries. Veins and lymphatic vessels are less well defined. The microscopic anatomy varies from nail subregion to subregion. Several different biopsy techniques are available for the histopathological evaluation of nail alterations.

Tectonic evolution of the Proterozoic Itremo Group metasediments in central Madagascar

The major geologic units of the Itremo region in central Madagascar include: (1) upper amphibolite to granulite facies (higher grade) Precambrian rocks, mainly para- and orthogneisses, and migmatites; (2) the newly defined Itremo Nappes, a fold-and-thrust belt containing the Proterozoic Itremo Group sediments, metamorphosed at greenschist to lower amphibolite facies (lower grade) conditions: (3) Middle Neoproterozoic and Late Neoproterozoic-Cambrian intrusives. The stratigraphic succession of the Itremo Group in the eastern part of the Itremo region is, from bottom to top: quartzites, metapelites, metacarbonates and metapelites overlain by metacarbonates. During D1 the Itremo Group sediments were detached from their continental substratum, deformed into a fold-and-thrust nappe (Itremo Nappes), and transported on top of higher grade rocks that are intruded by Middle Neoproterozoic (c. 797–780 Ma) granites and gabbros. A second phase of deformation shortening (D2) affected both the Itremo Sedimentary Nappes and structurally underlying higher-grade rocksunits, and formed large-scale N-S-trending F2 folds. S1 axial plane foliations in Itremo Group sediments are truncated by Late Neoproterozoic-Cambrian granites (c. 570–540 Ma). The age of the formation of the Itremo Nappes is not well constrained: they formed in Neoproterozoic times between 780 and 570 Ma.

Tectono-metamorphic evolution of a nappe stack: A case study of the Swiss Alps

Fold-and-thrust belts are prominent structures that occur at the front of compressional orogens. To unravel the tectonic and metamorphic evolution of such complexes, kinematic investigations, quantitative microstructural analysis and geothermometry (calcite–graphite, calcite–dolomite) were performed on carbonate mylonites from thrust faults of the Helvetic nappe stack in Central Switzerland. Paleo-isotherms of peak temperature conditions and cooling stages (fission track) of the nappe pile were reconstructed in a vertical section and linked with the microstructural and kinematic evolution. Mylonitic microstructures suggest that under metamorphic conditions close to peak temperature, strain was highly localized within thrust faults where deformation temperatures spatially continuously increased in both directions, from N to S within each nappe and from top–down in the nappe stack, covering a temperature range of 180–380 °C. Due to the higher metamorphic conditions, thrusting of the lowermost nappe, the Doldenhorn nappe, was accompanied by a much more pronounced nappe internal ductile deformation of carbonaceous rock types than was the case for the overlying Wildhorn- and Gellihorn nappes. Ongoing thrusting brought the Doldenhorn nappe closer to the surface. The associated cooling resulted in a freezing in of the paleo-isotherms of peak metamorphic conditions. Contemporaneous shearing localized in the basal thrust, initially still in the ductile deformation regime and finally as brittle faulting and cataclasis inducing ultimately an inverse metamorphic zonation. With ongoing exhumation and the formation of the Helvetic antiformal nappe stack, a bending of large-scale tectonic structures (thrusts, folds), peak temperature isotherms and cooling isotherms occurred. While this local bending can directly be attributed to active deformation underneath the section investigated up to times of 2–3 ma, a more homogeneous uplift of the entire region is suggested for the very late and still active exhumation stage.

A Process Model of the Formation of Spatial Presence Experiences

In order to bridge interdisciplinary differences in Presence research and to establish connections between Presence and “older” concepts of psychology and communication, a theoretical model of the formation of Spatial Presence is proposed. It is applicable to the exposure to different media and intended to unify the existing efforts to develop a theory of Presence. The model includes assumptions about attention allocation, mental models, and involvement, and considers the role of media factors and user characteristics as well, thus incorporating much previous work. It is argued that a commonly accepted model of Spatial Presence is the only solution to secure further progress within the international, interdisciplinary and multiple-paradigm community of Presence research.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.