Efficient team actions: Outline of a theory of teams in sport

So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and it's performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate the following presentations is put up for discussion. Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication and co-ordination. From a cognitivist point of view, internal representations (or mental models) guide the behaviour mainly in situations requiring quick reactions and adaptations, were deliberate or contingency planning are difficult. In sport teams, the collective representation contains the elements of the team situation, that is team task and team members, and of the team processes, that is communication and co-operation. Different meta-perspectives may be distinguished and bear a potential to explain the actions of efficient teams. Cranach, M. von, Ochsenbein, G., & Valach, L. (1986).The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

Actions speak louder than words

Ethical scandals in business have led to calls for more ethical or moral leadership. Yet, we still know very little about what characterizes ethical leadership and what its positive consequences actually are. We argue that the major question is not about what leaders value, but rather whether their ethical values are regularly reflected in behavioral patterns across situations and situational challenges. To address this, we have begun to build the Ethical Leadership Behavior Scale, which is based on behaviors reflecting concrete manifestations of ethical values (e.g., fairness, respect) across occasions and situational barriers. A study with 592 employees of 110 work units in two departments provided a first test of this scale and demonstrated that the level of ethical leadership behavior predicts important work-related attitudes (job satisfaction, work engagement, affective organizational commitment) and outcomes (health complaints, emotional exhaustion, absenteeism).

Evaluation of the benefit of emergency vaccination in a foot-and-mouth disease free country with low livestock density

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is highly contagious and one of the most economically devastating diseases of cloven-hoofed animals. Scientific-based preparedness about how to best control the disease in a previously FMD-free country is therefore essential for veterinary services. The present study used a spatial, stochastic epidemic simulation model to compare the effectiveness of emergency vaccination with conventional (non-vaccination) control measures in Switzerland, a low-livestock density country. Model results revealed that emergency vaccination with a radius of 3 km or 10 km around infected premises (IP) did not significantly reduce either the cumulative herd incidence or epidemic duration if started in a small epidemic situation where the number of IPs is still low. However, in a situation where the epidemic has become extensive, both the cumulative herd incidence and epidemic duration are reduced significantly if vaccination were implemented with a radius of 10 km around IPs. The effect of different levels of conventional strategy measures was also explored for the non-vaccination strategy. It was found that a lower compliance level of farmers for movement restrictions and delayed culling of IPs significantly increased both the cumulative IP incidence and epidemic duration. Contingency management should therefore focus mainly on improving conventional strategies, by increasing disease awareness and communication with stakeholders and preparedness of culling teams in countries with a livestock structure similar to Switzerland; however, emergency vaccination should be considered if there are reasons to believe that the epidemic may become extensive, such as when disease detection has been delayed and many IPs are discovered at the beginning of the epidemic.

Questionnaire-based study to assess the association between management practices and mastitis within tie-stall and free-stall dairy housing systems in Switzerland.

BACKGROUND Prophylactic measures are key components of dairy herd mastitis control programs, but some are only relevant in specific housing systems. To assess the association between management practices and mastitis incidence, data collected in 2011 by a survey among 979 randomly selected Swiss dairy farms, and information from the regular test day recordings from 680 of these farms was analyzed. RESULTS The median incidence of farmer-reported clinical mastitis (ICM) was 11.6 (mean 14.7) cases per 100 cows per year. The median annual proportion of milk samples with a composite somatic cell count (PSCC) above 200,000 cells/ml was 16.1 (mean 17.3) %. A multivariable negative binomial regression model was fitted for each of the mastitis indicators for farms with tie-stall and free-stall housing systems separately to study the effect of other (than housing system) management practices on the ICM and PSCC events (above 200,000 cells/ml). The results differed substantially by housing system and outcome. In tie-stall systems, clinical mastitis incidence was mainly affected by region (mountainous production zone; incidence rate ratio (IRR) = 0.73), the dairy herd replacement system (1.27) and farmers age (0.81). The proportion of high SCC was mainly associated with dry cow udder controls (IRR = 0.67), clean bedding material at calving (IRR = 1.72), using total merit values to select bulls (IRR = 1.57) and body condition scoring (IRR = 0.74). In free-stall systems, the IRR for clinical mastitis was mainly associated with stall climate/temperature (IRR = 1.65), comfort mats as resting surface (IRR = 0.75) and when no feed analysis was carried out (IRR = 1.18). The proportion of high SSC was only associated with hand and arm cleaning after calving (IRR = 0.81) and beef producing value to select bulls (IRR = 0.66). CONCLUSIONS There were substantial differences in identified risk factors in the four models. Some of the factors were in agreement with the reported literature while others were not. This highlights the multifactorial nature of the disease and the differences in the risks for both mastitis manifestations. Attempting to understand these multifactorial associations for mastitis within larger management groups continues to play an important role in mastitis control programs.

Prospects for measuring the gravitational free-fall of antihydrogen with emulsion detectors

The main goal of the AEgIS experiment at CERN is to test the weak equivalence principle for antimatter. AEgIS will measure the free-fall of an antihydrogen beam traversing a moir'e deflectometer. The goal is to determine the gravitational acceleration with an initial relative accuracy of 1% by using an emulsion detector combined with a silicon μ-strip detector to measure the time of flight. Nuclear emulsions can measure the annihilation vertex of antihydrogen atoms with a precision of ~ 1–2 μm r.m.s. We present here results for emulsion detectors operated in vacuum using low energy antiprotons from the CERN antiproton decelerator. We compare with Monte Carlo simulations, and discuss the impact on the AEgIS project.

O(N) Models with Topological Lattice Actions

A variety of lattice discretisations of continuum actions has been considered, usually requiring the correct classical continuum limit. Here we discuss “weird” lattice formulations without that property, namely lattice actions that are invariant under most continuous deformations of the field configuration, in one version even without any coupling constants. It turns out that universality is powerful enough to still provide the correct quantum continuum limit, despite the absence of a classical limit, or a perturbative expansion. We demonstrate this for a set of O(N) models (or non-linear σ-models). Amazingly, such “weird” lattice actions are not only in the right universality class, but some of them even have practical benefits, in particular an excellent scaling behaviour.

Atomic mutagenesis of the ribosomal Sarcin-Ricin-Loop to study EF-G GTPase activation

Translocation factor EF-G, possesses a low basal GTPase activity, which is stimulated by the ribosome. One potential region of the ribosome that triggers GTPase activity of EF-G is the Sarcin-Ricin-Loop (SRL) (helix 95) in domain VI of the 23S rRNA. Structural data showed that the tip of the SRL closely approaches GTP in the active center of EF-G, structural probing data confirmed that EF-G interacts with nucleotides G2655, A2660, G2661 and A2662.1-3 The exocyclic group of adenine at A2660 is required for stimulation of EF-G GTPase activity by the ribosome as demonstrated using atomic mutagenesis.4 Recent crystal structures of EF-G on the ribosome, gave more insights into the molecular mechanism of EF-G GTPase activity.5 Based on the structure of EF-Tu on the ribosome1, the following mechanism of GTPase activation was proposed: upon binding of EF-G to the ribosome, the conserved His92 (E.coli) changes its position, pointing to the γ-phosphate of GTP. In this activated state, the phosphate of residue A2662 of the SRL positions the catalytic His in its active conformation. It was further proposed that the phosphate oxygen of A2662 is involved in a charge-relay system, enabling GTP hydrolysis. In order to test this mechanism, we use the atomic mutagenesis approach, which allows introducing non-natural modifications in the SRL, in the context of the complete 70S ribosome. Therefore, we replaced one of the non-bridging oxygens of A2662 by a methyl group. A methylphosphonat is not able to position or activate a histidine, as it has no free electrons and therefore no proton acceptor function. These modified ribosomes were then tested for stimulation of EF-G GTPase activity. First experiments show that one of the two stereoisomers incorporated into ribosomes does not stimulate GTPase activity of EF-G, whereas the other is active. From this we conclude that indeed the non-bridging phosphate oxygen of A2662 is involved in EF-G GTPase activation by the ribosome. Ongoing experiments aim at revealing the contribution of this non-bridging oxygen at A2662 to the mechanism of EF-G GTPase activation at the atomic level.

Atomic mutagenesis of the ribosomal Sarcin-Ricin-Loop to study EF-G GTPase activation

Translocation factor EF-G, possesses a low basal GTPase activity, which is stimulated by the ribosome. One potential region of the ribosome that triggers GTPase activity of EF-G is the Sarcin-Ricin-Loop (SRL) (helix 95) in domain VI of the 23S rRNA. Structural data showed that the tip of the SRL closely approaches GTP in the active center of EF-G, structural probing data confirmed that EF-G interacts with nucleotides G2655, A2660, G2661 and A2662.1-3 The exocyclic group of adenine at A2660 is required for stimulation of EF-G GTPase activity by the ribosome as demonstrated using atomic mutagenesis.4 Recent crystal structures of EF-G on the ribosome, gave more insights into the molecular mechanism of EF-G GTPase activity.5 Based on the structure of EF-Tu on the ribosome1, the following mechanism of GTPase activation was proposed: upon binding of EF-G to the ribosome, the conserved His92 (E.coli) changes its position, pointing to the γ-phosphate of GTP. In this activated state, the phosphate of residue A2662 of the SRL positions the catalytic His in its active conformation. It was further proposed that the phosphate oxygen of A2662 is involved in a charge-relay system, enabling GTP hydrolysis. In order to test this mechanism, we use the atomic mutagenesis approach, which allows introducing non-natural modifications in the SRL, in the context of the complete 70S ribosome. Therefore, we replaced one of the non-bridging oxygens of A2662 by a methyl group. A methylphosphonat is not able to position or activate a histidine, as it has no free electrons and therefore no proton acceptor function. These modified ribosomes were then tested for stimulation of EF-G GTPase activity. First experiments show that one of the two stereoisomers incorporated into ribosomes does not stimulate GTPase activity of EF-G, whereas the other is active. From this we conclude that indeed the non-bridging phosphate oxygen of A2662 is involved in EF-G GTPase activation by the ribosome. Ongoing experiments aim at revealing the contribution of this non-bridging oxygen at A2662 to the mechanism of EF-G GTPase activation at the atomic level.

Distortion-free enhancement of terahertz signals measured by electro-optic sampling. I. Theory

We present three methods for the distortion-free enhancement of THz signals measured by electro-optic sampling in zinc blende-type detector crystals, e.g., ZnTe or GaP. A technique commonly used in optically heterodyne-detected optical Kerr effect spectroscopy is introduced, which is based on two measurements at opposite optical biases near the zero transmission point in a crossed polarizer detection geometry. In contrast to other techniques for an undistorted THz signal enhancement, it also works in a balanced detection scheme and does not require an elaborate procedure for the reconstruction of the true signal as the two measured waveforms are simply subtracted to remove distortions. We study three different approaches for setting an optical bias using the Jones matrix formalism and discuss them also in the framework of optical heterodyne detection. We show that there is an optimal bias point in realistic situations where a small fraction of the probe light is scattered by optical components. The experimental demonstration will be given in the second part of this two-paper series [J. Opt. Soc. Am. B, doc. ID 204877 (2014, posted online)].

Measuring the gravitational free-fall of antihydrogen

Antihydrogen holds the promise to test, for the first time, the universality of freefall with a system composed entirely of antiparticles. The AEgIS experiment at CERN’s antiproton decelerator aims to measure the gravitational interaction between matter and antimatter by measuring the deflection of a beam of antihydrogen in the Earths gravitational field (g). The principle of the experiment is as follows: cold antihydrogen atoms are synthesized in a Penning-Malberg trap and are Stark accelerated towards a moir´e deflectometer, the classical counterpart of an atom interferometer, and annihilate on a position sensitive detector. Crucial to the success of the experiment is the spatial precision of the position sensitive detector.We propose a novel free-fall detector based on a hybrid of two technologies: emulsion detectors, which have an intrinsic spatial resolution of 50 nm but no temporal information, and a silicon strip / scintillating fiber tracker to provide timing and positional information. In 2012 we tested emulsion films in vacuum with antiprotons from CERN’s antiproton decelerator. The annihilation vertices could be observed directly on the emulsion surface using the microscope facility available at the University of Bern. The annihilation vertices were successfully reconstructed with a resolution of 1–2 μmon the impact parameter. If such a precision can be realized in the final detector, Monte Carlo simulations suggest of order 500 antihydrogen annihilations will be sufficient to determine gwith a 1 % accuracy. This paper presents current research towards the development of this technology for use in the AEgIS apparatus and prospects for the realization of the final detector.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.