Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed.

William Harvey revisited

William Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood is often described as a product of the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. Modern research has, however, shown thatHarvey followed the Aristotelian research tradition and thus tried to reveal the purpose of the organs through examination of various animals. His publication of 1628 has to be read as an argument of natural philosophy, or, more precisely, as a series of linked observations, experiments and philosophical reasonings from which the existence of circulation has to be deduced as a logical consequence. Harvey did not consider experiments as superior to philosophical reasoning nor intended he to create a new system of medicine. He believed in the vitality of the heart and the blood and rejected Francis Bacon's empirism and the mechanistic rationalism of Descartes. Harvey's contribution and originality lied less in his single observations and experiments but in the manner how he linked them with critical reasoning and how he accepted, presented and defended the ensuing radical findings.