Good just isn't Good enough. Best System Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics

Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two strategies, viz. a globalist as suggested by Loewer, and a localist as advocated by Frigg and Hoefer. Both strategies fail because the system they are part of have rivals that are roughly equally good, while ontic probabilities should be part of a clearly winning system. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.

Statistical Methods and the Meaning of Probabilities. A Philosopher Looks at Statistics

The talk starts out with a short introduction to the philosophy of probability. I highlight the need to interpret probabilities in the sciences and motivate objectivist accounts of probabilities. Very roughly, according to such accounts, ascriptions of probabilities have truth-conditions that are independent of personal interests and needs. But objectivist accounts are pointless if they do not provide an objectivist epistemology, i.e., if they do not determine well-defined methods to support or falsify claims about probabilities. In the rest of the talk I examine recent philosophical proposals for an objectivist methodology. Most of them take up ideas well-known from statistics. I nevertheless find some proposals incompatible with objectivist aspirations.

Representation via Probabilities: Models of Probabilistic Modeling

How do probabilistic models represent their targets and how do they allow us to learn about them? The answer to this question depends on a number of details, in particular on the meaning of the probabilities involved. To classify the options, a minimalist conception of representation (Su\'arez 2004) is adopted: Modelers devise substitutes (``sources'') of their targets and investigate them to infer something about the target. Probabilistic models allow us to infer probabilities about the target from probabilities about the source. This leads to a framework in which we can systematically distinguish between different models of probabilistic modeling. I develop a fully Bayesian view of probabilistic modeling, but I argue that, as an alternative, Bayesian degrees of belief about the target may be derived from ontic probabilities about the source. Remarkably, some accounts of ontic probabilities can avoid problems if they are supposed to apply to sources only.

Hat der Raum-Relationalismus Hand und Fuss? Händigkeit und andere Herausforderungen für den Relationalismus

Eine rechte Hand unterscheidet sich von einer linken Hand. Diese bekannte Tatsache hat nach Kant philosophische Implikationen: Sie bringt den sog. Relationalismus in Schwierigkeiten. Dieser sieht den Raum als Inbegriff räumlicher Beziehungen zwischen materiellen Gegenständen. Für Kant kann der Relationalismus nun nicht zwischen linken und rechten Händen unterscheiden. Aber stimmt das wirklich? Und wie ist der Relationalismus vor dem Hintergrund der modernen Physik zu beurteilen? Der Vortrag entfaltet ausgehend von Kants Überlegungen zur Händigkeit die Debatte um den Relationalismus.

More than just Good Luck. How to Explain the Success of Monte Carlo Simulations

Monte Carlo simulation is a powerful method in many natural and social sciences. But what sort of method is it? And where does its power come from? Are Monte Carlo simulations experiments, theories or something else? The aim of this talk is to answer these questions and to explain the power of Monte Carlo simulations. I provide a classification of Monte Carlo techniques and defend the claim that Monte Carlo simulation is a sort of inference.

Das Paradigma des kritischen Realismus

Der Kritische Realismus („Critical Realism“) ist seit Ian G. Barbours grundlegenden Issues in Science and Religion (1966) erkenntnistheoretisches Paradigma zentraler Ansätze im angelsächsischen Gespräch zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaften geworden; neben Barbour selbst sind hier insbesondere Arthur Peacocke und John Polkinghorne zu nennen.

Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What this Means for the Simulation Argument

N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we are likely to live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies.

Good just isn't Good Enough: Humean Chances and Boltzmannian Statistical Physics

Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two Boltzmannian accounts of the Second Law, viz.\ a globalist and a localist one. In both cases, the probabilities fail to be chances because they have rivals that are roughly equally good. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.