Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices

We examine the board overlap among firms listed in Switzerland. Collusion, managerial entrenchment, and financial participation cannot explain it. The overlap appears to be induced by banks and by the accumulation of seats by the most popular directors. We also document that seat accumulation is negatively related to firm value, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that multiple directorships induce and the time constraints directors face. Contrary to popular beliefs, however, the directors of traded firms do not generally hold more than one mandate in other traded firms. They do hold multiple seats in non-traded firms.

Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Stock offerings in a different institutional setting: the Swiss case, 1973-1983

This paper analyzes the stock price effect of equity issues in Switzerland. There, insiders are not legally prevented from using their information for personal trades, and security offerings are with almost no exception rights issues. Unlike what we find for a comprehensive sample of U.S. rights issues and a sample of U.S. general cash offerings, a significant majority of firms experiences a positive monthly announcement effect. The average abnormal return itself, however, is not significant. Also, we find evidence inconsistent with infinitely price-elastic demand functions for common stock, as well as some evidence that offer prices convey new information.

Daily monetary impulses and security prices

This paper uses Swiss data to study the real long-run effects of monetary policy. Daily unexpected changes in the monetary base are found to be negatively correlated with security price changes. This result is unaffected when, implicitly following Geske and Roll (1983), we try to measure the autonomous component of monetary policy by taking into account a reaction function of monetary policy to changes in real variables.

Multiasset Derivatives and Joint Distributions of Asset Prices

Several of multiasset derivatives like basket options or options on the weighted maximum of assets exhibit the property that their prices determine uniquely the underlying asset distribution. Related to that the question how to retrieve this distributions from the corresponding derivatives quotes will be discussed. On the contrary, the prices of exchange options do not uniquely determine the underlying distributions of asset prices and the extent of this non-uniqueness can be characterised. The discussion is related to a geometric interpretation of multiasset derivatives as support functions of convex sets. Following this, various symmetry properties for basket, maximum and exchange options are discussed alongside with their geometric interpretations and some decomposition results for more general payoff functions.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.

Institutions for sustainable governance of forests: Equity, robustness and cross-level interactions in Mawlyngbna, Meghalaya, India

This study adopts Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework in empirical fieldwork to explain how local forestry institutions affect forest ecosystems and social equity in the community of Mawlyngbna in North-East India. Data was collected through 26 semi-structured interviews, participatory timeline development, policy documents, direct observation, periodicals, transect walks, and a concurrent forest-ecological study in the village. Results show that Mawlyngbna's forests provide important sources of livelihood benefits for the villagers. However, ecological disturbance and diversity varies among the different forest ownership types and forest-based livelihood benefits are inequitably distributed. Based on a bounded rationality approach, our analysis proposes a set of causal mechanisms that trace these observed social-ecological outcomes to the attributes of the resource system, resource units, actors and governance system. We analyse opportunities and constraints of interactions between the village, regional, and state levels. We discuss how Ostrom’s design principles for community-based resource governance inform the explanation of robustness but have a blind spot in explaining social equity. We report experiences made using the SES framework in empirical fieldwork. We conclude that mapping cross-level interactions in the SES framework needs conceptual refinement and that explaining social equity of forest governance needs theoretical advances.

Minimum carbon payment along an aridity gradient for dryland afforestation in non annex I countries with stochastic weather and prices

Recent findings demonstrate that trees in deserts are efficient carbon sinks. It remains however unknown whether the Clean Development Mechanism will accelerate the planting of trees in Non Annex I dryland countries. We estimated the price of carbon at which a farmer would be indifferent between his customary activity and the planting of trees to trade carbon credits, along an aridity gradient. Carbon yields were simulated by means of the CO2FIX v3.1 model for Pinus halepensis with its respective yield classes along the gradient (Arid – 100mm to Dry Sub Humid conditions – 900mm). Wheat and pasture yields were predicted on somewhat similar nitrogen-based quadratic models, using 30 years of weather data to simulate moisture stress. Stochastic production, input and output prices were afterwards simulated on a Monte Carlo matrix. Results show that, despite the high levels of carbon uptake, carbon trading by afforesting is unprofitable anywhere along the gradient. Indeed, the price of carbon would have to raise unrealistically high, and the certification costs would have to drop significantly, to make the Clean Development Mechanism worthwhile for non annex I dryland countries farmers. From a government agency's point of view the Clean Development Mechanism is attractive. However, such agencies will find it difficult to demonstrate “additionality”, even if the rule may be somewhat flexible. Based on these findings, we will further discuss why the Clean Development Mechanism, a supposedly pro-poor instrument, fails to assist farmers in Non Annex I dryland countries living at minimum subsistence level.