Identity, Philosophy, and the Problem of Armenian History in the Sixth Century

History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East gathers together the work of distinguished historians and early career scholars with a broad range of expertise to investigate the significance of newly emerged, or recently resurrected, ethnic identities on the borders of the eastern Mediterranean world. It focuses on the "long late antiquity" from the eve of the Arab conquest of the Roman East to the formation of the Abbasid caliphate. The first half of the book offers papers on the Christian Orient on the cusp of the Islamic invasions. These papers discuss how Christians negotiated the end of Roman power, whether in the selective use of the patristic past to create confessional divisions or the emphasis of the shared philosophical legacy of the Greco-Roman world. The second half of the book considers Muslim attempts to negotiate the pasts of the conquered lands of the Near East, where the Christian histories of Hira or Egypt were used to create distinctive regional identities for Arab settlers. Like the first half, this section investigates the redeployment of a shared history, this time the historical imagination of the Qu'ran and the era of the first caliphs. All the papers in the volume bring together studies of the invention of the past across traditional divides between disciplines, placing the re-assessment of the past as a central feature of the long late antiquity. As a whole, History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East represents a distinctive contribution to recent writing on late antiquity, due to its cultural breadth, its interdisciplinary focus, and its novel definition of late antiquity itself.

The Interplay of Power and Trust in Platform Ecosystems of the Enterprise Application Software Industry

In recent years, the formerly oligopolistic Enterprise Application Software (EAS) industry began to disintegrate into focal inter-firm networks with one huge, powerful, and multi-national plat-form vendor as the center, surrounded by hundreds or even thousands of small, niche players that act as complementors. From a theoretical point of view, these platform ecosystems may be governed by two organizing principles - trust and power. However, it is neither from a practical nor from a theoretical perspective clear, how trust and power relate to each other, i.e. whether they act as complements or substitutes. This study tries to elaborate our understanding of the relationship of trust and power by exploring their interplay using multi-dimensional conceptual-izations of trust and power, and by investigating potential dynamics in this interplay over the course of a partnership. Based on an exploratory multiple-case study of seven dyadic partner-ships between four platform vendors, and seven complementors, we find six different patterns of how trust and power interact over time. These patterns bear important implications for the suc-cessful management of partnerships between platform vendors and complementors, and clarify the theoretical debate surrounding the relationship of trust and power.

Performance Analysis and Comparison between Legacy-PSM and U-APSD

This paper evaluates the performance of the most popular power saving mechanisms defined in the IEEE 802.11 standard, namely the Power Save Mode (Legacy-PSM) and the Unscheduled Automatic Power Save Delivery (U-APSD). The assessment comprises a detailed study concerning energy efficiency and capability to guarantee the required Quality of Service (QoS) for a certain application. The results, obtained in the OMNeT++ simulator, showed that U-APSD is more energy efficient than Legacy-PSM without compromising the end-to- end delay. Both U-APSD and Legacy-PSM revealed capability to guarantee the application QoS requirements in all the studied scenarios. However, unlike U-APSD, when Legacy-PSM is used in the presence of QoS demanding applications, all the stations connected to the network through the same access point will consume noticeable additional energy.

The adaptive power of the present: Perceptions of past, present, and future life satisfaction across the life span

Despite remarkable stability of life satisfaction across the life span, it may be adaptive to perceive change in life satisfaction. We shed new light on this topic with data from 766 individuals from three age groups and past, present, and future life satisfaction perceptions across the life span. On average, participants were most satisfied with their current life. When looking back, satisfaction increased from past to present, and when looking ahead, satisfaction decreased into the future. Trajectories were best fitted with a curvilinear growth model. Neuroticism and extraversion predicted the level of trajectories, but none of the Big Five predicted the slope. We conclude that humans have an adaptive capacity to perceive the present life as being the best possible.

The relative importance of immediate allelopathy and allelopathic legacy in invasive plant species

Abstract Some introduced invasive species may be competitively superior to natives because they release allelochemicals, which negatively affect native species. Allelochemicals can be immediately effective after being released but can also persist in soils, resulting in a legacy effect. However, to our knowledge there are no studies which distinguish between allelopathic legacy and immediate allelopathy of invasive species and also test for their relative importance and possible interdependence. We used eleven invasive species and tested whether they show immediate allelopathy and allelopathic legacy effects in a factorial pairwise competition experiment using field-collected soil (invaded/non-invaded) and activated carbon to neutralize allelochemicals. We grew two native and the invasive species in both monocultures and pairwise mixtures. In monocultures, the native species did not experience an allelopathic legacy effect of the invasives, suggesting that invaders generally lack persistent allelochemicals. However, the effects of invader allelochemicals were modulated by competitive interactions. In competition, immediate allelopathy decreased competitive ability of natives, while allelopathic legacy positively affected the natives. Moreover, immediate allelopathic and allelopathic legacy effects were strongly negatively correlated. Our results suggest that both immediately released allelochemicals and the allelochemical legacy of invasive species are important for plant performance under natural conditions, and that natives should be able to recover once the invaders are removed. To test whether immediate allelopathy is responsible for plant invasion success, further studies should compare allelopathic effects between invasive and closely related native species.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Women, Medicine, and Power at the Albert Schweitzer's hospital of Lambarene

Paper presented at the French Colonial Historical Society annual Conference, Binghampton, University, NY on May 8, 2015