Visual hallucinations in the psychosis spectrum and comparative information from neurodegenerative disorders and eye disease

Much of the research on visual hallucinations (VHs) has been conducted in the context of eye disease and neurodegenerative conditions, but little is known about these phenomena in psychiatric and nonclinical populations. The purpose of this article is to bring together current knowledge regarding VHs in the psychosis phenotype and contrast this data with the literature drawn from neurodegenerative disorders and eye disease. The evidence challenges the traditional views that VHs are atypical or uncommon in psychosis. The weighted mean for VHs is 27% in schizophrenia, 15% in affective psychosis, and 7.3% in the general community. VHs are linked to a more severe psychopathological profile and less favorable outcome in psychosis and neurodegenerative conditions. VHs typically co-occur with auditory hallucinations, suggesting a common etiological cause. VHs in psychosis are also remarkably complex, negative in content, and are interpreted to have personal relevance. The cognitive mechanisms of VHs in psychosis have rarely been investigated, but existing studies point to source-monitoring deficits and distortions in top-down mechanisms, although evidence for visual processing deficits, which feature strongly in the organic literature, is lacking. Brain imaging studies point to the activation of visual cortex during hallucinations on a background of structural and connectivity changes within wider brain networks. The relationship between VHs in psychosis, eye disease, and neurodegeneration remains unclear, although the pattern of similarities and differences described in this review suggests that comparative studies may have potentially important clinical and theoretical implications.

Soil and land information: How to support decision-making?

Soils are fundamental to ensuring water, energy and food security. Within the context of sus- tainable food production, it is important to share knowledge on existing and emerging tech- nologies that support land and soil monitoring. Technologies, such as remote sensing, mobile soil testing, and digital soil mapping, have the potential to identify degraded and non- /little-responsive soils, and may also provide a basis for programmes targeting the protection and rehabilitation of soils. In the absence of such information, crop production assessments are often not based on the spatio-temporal variability in soil characteristics. In addition, uncertain- ties in soil information systems are notable and build up when predictions are used for monitor- ing soil properties or biophysical modelling. Consequently, interpretations of model-based results have to be done cautiously. As such they provide a scientific, but not always manage- able, basis for farmers and/or policymakers. In general, the key incentives for stakeholders to aim for sustainable management of soils and more resilient food systems are complex at farm as well as higher levels. The same is true of drivers of soil degradation. The decision- making process aimed at sustainable soil management, be that at farm or higher level, also in- volves other goals and objectives valued by stakeholders, e.g. land governance, improved envi- ronmental quality, climate change adaptation and mitigation etc. In this dialogue session we will share ideas on recent developments in the discourse on soils, their functions and the role of soil and land information in enhancing food system resilience.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Recovery and Analysis of Transaction Scope from Scattered Information in Java Enterprise Applications

Java Enterprise Applications (JEAs) are large systems that integrate multiple technologies and programming languages. Transactions in JEAs simplify the development of code that deals with failure recovery and multi-user coordination by guaranteeing atomicity of sets of operations. The heterogeneous nature of JEAs, however, can obfuscate conceptual errors in the application code, and in particular can hide incorrect declarations of transaction scope. In this paper we present a technique to expose and analyze the application transaction scope in JEAs by merging and analyzing information from multiple sources. We also present several novel visualizations that aid in the analysis of transaction scope by highlighting anomalies in the specification of transactions and violations of architectural constraints. We have validated our approach on two versions of a large commercial case study.

Emotion recognition: The role of featural and configural face information

Several studies investigated the role of featural and configural information when processing facial identity. A lot less is known about their contribution to emotion recognition. In this study, we addressed this issue by inducing either a featural or a configural processing strategy (Experiment 1) and by investigating the attentional strategies in response to emotional expressions (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants identified emotional expressions in faces that were presented in three different versions (intact, blurred, and scrambled) and in two orientations (upright and inverted). Blurred faces contain mainly configural information, and scrambled faces contain mainly featural information. Inversion is known to selectively hinder configural processing. Analyses of the discriminability measure (A′) and response times (RTs) revealed that configural processing plays a more prominent role in expression recognition than featural processing, but their relative contribution varies depending on the emotion. In Experiment 2, we qualified these differences between emotions by investigating the relative importance of specific features by means of eye movements. Participants had to match intact expressions with the emotional cues that preceded the stimulus. The analysis of eye movements confirmed that the recognition of different emotions rely on different types of information. While the mouth is important for the detection of happiness and fear, the eyes are more relevant for anger, fear, and sadness.

Privacy Panel: Usable and Quantifiable Mobile Privacy

The ever increasing popularity of apps stems from their ability to provide highly customized services to the user. The flip side is that in order to provide such services, apps need access to very sensitive private information about the user. This leads to malicious apps that collect personal user information in the background and exploit it in various ways. Studies have shown that current app vetting processes which are mainly restricted to install time verification mechanisms are incapable of detecting and preventing such attacks. We argue that the missing fundamental aspect here is a comprehensive and usable mobile privacy solution, one that not only protects the user's location information, but also other equally sensitive user data such as the user's contacts and documents. A solution that is usable by the average user who does not understand or care about the low level technical details. To bridge this gap, we propose privacy metrics that quantify low-level app accesses in terms of privacy impact and transforms them to high-level user understandable ratings. We also provide the design and architecture of our Privacy Panel app that represents the computed ratings in a graphical user-friendly format and allows the user to define policies based on them. Finally, experimental results are given to validate the scalability of the proposed solution.

Understanding the underlying mechanisms of recent Jatropha curcas L. adoption by smallholders in Kenya: A rural livelihood assessment in Bondo, Kibwezi, and Kwale districts

Between 2004 and 2007, NGOs, community based organisations and private investors promoted jatropha in Kenya with the aim of generating additional income and producing biofuel for rural development. By 2008 it became gradually evident that jatropha plantations (both mono- and intercropping) are uneconomical and risky due to competition for land and labour with food crops. Cultivation of jatropha hedges was found to have better chances of economic success and to present only little risks for the adopting farmers. Still, after 2008 a number of farmers went on adopting jatropha in plots rather than as hedges. It is hypothesised that lack of awareness about the low economic prospects of jatropha plantations was the main reason for continued adoption, and that smallholder farmers with higher resource endowments mainly ventured into its cultivation. In this study we provide an empirical basis for understanding the role of households' capital assets in taking up new livelihood strategies by smallholder farmers in three rural districts in Kenya. For that purpose, we assess the motivation and enabling factors that led to the adoption of jatropha as a new livelihood strategy, as well as the context in which promotion and adoption took place. A household survey was conducted in 2010, using a structured questionnaire, to collect information on household characteristics and capital asset endowment. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical tests. We established that access to additional income and own energy supply were the main motivation for adoption of jatropha, and that financial capital assets do not necessarily have a positive influence on adoption as hypothesised. Further, we found that the main challenges that adopting farmers faced were lack of access to information on good management practices and lack of a reliable market. We conclude that continued adoption of on-farm jatropha after 2008 is a result of lacking awareness about the low economic value of this production type. We recommend abandoning on-farm production of jatropha until improved seed material and locally adapted agronomic knowledge about jatropha cultivation becomes available and its production becomes economically competitive.

Information-Centric Networking in Mobile and Opportunistic Networks

Information Centric Networking (ICN) as an emerging paradigm for the Future Internet has initially been rather focusing on bandwidth savings in wired networks, but there might also be some significant potential to support communication in mobile wireless networks as well as opportunistic network scenarios, where end systems have spontaneous but time-limited contact to exchange data. This chapter addresses the reasoning why ICN has an important role in mobile and opportunistic networks by identifying several challenges in mobile and opportunistic Information-Centric Networks and discussing appropriate solutions for them. In particular, it discusses the issues of receiver and source mobility. Source mobility needs special attention. Solutions based on routing protocol extensions, indirection, and separation of name resolution and data transfer are discussed. Moreover, the chapter presents solutions for problems in opportunistic Information-Centric Networks. Among those are mechanisms for efficient content discovery in neighbour nodes, resume mechanisms to recover from intermittent connectivity disruptions, a novel agent delegation mechanisms to offload content discovery and delivery to mobile agent nodes, and the exploitation of overhearing to populate routing tables of mobile nodes. Some preliminary performance evaluation results of these developed mechanisms are provided.